After supporting the New Look policy for most of his term, he came to the realization that it was a policy, that if utilized, it would only bring destruction since there were no nuclear weapons that could contain damage as he thought (174). This transformation reveals that he realized that the previous policy was not as effective as he thought and he was willing to admit that he was wrong, but he had convinced Eisenhower early on of the policy’s significance that he could not change the president’s mind (182). Overall, Dulles’s time as secretary of state was well spent, regardless of the fact he often resorted to hyperboles. He was able to shape foreign policy for the remainder of the Cold War by providing examples of both his successes and failures in foreign policy. Dulles was the mastermind behind the administration because no one else had the audacity to provide the same advice that he did to the president, who in turn, could not reach the same conclusions without Dulles.
After supporting the New Look policy for most of his term, he came to the realization that it was a policy, that if utilized, it would only bring destruction since there were no nuclear weapons that could contain damage as he thought (174). This transformation reveals that he realized that the previous policy was not as effective as he thought and he was willing to admit that he was wrong, but he had convinced Eisenhower early on of the policy’s significance that he could not change the president’s mind (182). Overall, Dulles’s time as secretary of state was well spent, regardless of the fact he often resorted to hyperboles. He was able to shape foreign policy for the remainder of the Cold War by providing examples of both his successes and failures in foreign policy. Dulles was the mastermind behind the administration because no one else had the audacity to provide the same advice that he did to the president, who in turn, could not reach the same conclusions without Dulles.