John Stuart Mill's Argument Analysis

The golden rule poses a simple moral guideline that seems almost intuitive to many people: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” In his attempt to determine a code for what is right and what is wrong, John Stuart Mill argues for the “greatest happiness principle.” In his book Utilitarianism, he writes, “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (7). In other words, the only metric of whether an action is good or bad is its promotion of happiness or lack thereof. As part of his proof of this principle, Mill poses an argument in support of hedonism, asserting that happiness is the only things humans desire. He argues that “happiness is desirable, and
the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end” (35). In other words, happiness is the only object of people’s desires. If people desire something else, they desire it not for its own sake but for its ability to serve as a means to happiness. His logic behind this argument is that if happiness is all that we desire, then it is what humans must promote as an ethical metric. In this paper, I will begin with a reconstruction of Mill’s argument in favor of hedonism.
I will then explore a potential objection to Mill’s argumentative strategy regarding Mill’s definition of “happiness” and its components, as well as potential responses from Mill or his supporters. Subsequently, I will examine what effect, if any, this contention has on Mill’s argument as a whole for utilitarianism as a moral guideline. Through this discussion of Mill’s hedonistic argument, I will show that although Mill’s broad definition of the components of happiness establishes that happiness or pleasure is the only thing we intrinsically desire, it also weakens utilitarianism’s function as a moral
guideline. To demonstrate that happiness is the only thing humans intrinsically desire, Mill begins with the premise that happiness is at least one of the things humans desire for its own sake. Human experience shows this is indisputable. Mill anticipates the objection that people desire things distinguishable from happiness, such as virtue. He admits this is true. However, he explains that virtue can be “to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it” (36). In fact, he asserts that humans are “not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner” (36). In other words, Mill recognizes that virtue is valuable for its own sake, and virtue for its own sake helps humans follow the general happiness principle. Although virtue is not part of the original utilitarian end, Mill argues that for virtuous people, it becomes a part of their end as part of their happiness. This concept of virtue transforming from a means into a part of people’s happiness forms the crux of Mill’s argument. According to Mill, happiness is composed of different parts, and since happiness as a whole is desirable for itself, each part of happiness is also desirable for itself. In his own words, “the ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling as an aggregate” (36). Virtue, for example, is a part of happiness. In addition to virtue, everything humans desire, any pleasure or any absence of pain, is a part of happiness. Since each thing that humans desire compose the parts of happiness, Mill concludes that happiness is the only thing that we desire for itself. Mill demonstrated that happiness is the only thing that humans desire for its own sake, but in doing so, he sacrifices the meaningfulness of happiness as a concept. He asserts that anything humans desire is a part of their happiness, but this renders “happiness” with a vacuous nature. If something not originally a part of happiness can become a part of someone’s happiness, it follows that anything has the potential to become a part of an individual’s happiness in the right circumstances. Mill states himself that virtue is not a part of happiness for everyone, saying that “the desire of virtue is not as universal” (36) as the desire for happiness. Since the components of happiness are not universal, individuals’ definitions of happiness will differ. By allowing happiness to take on such a broad definition, Mill opens the door to unwelcome implications for what a reasonable person would consider happiness to be. Mill says that although one may initially desire virtue as a means to happiness, such as a child undergoing moral education, virtue can become a true part of happiness. However, consider the case of a drug addict. A man in despair might turn to drugs as a form of escape, as a means of happiness. At first, the drugs allow him to find peace, but as he sinks deeper into addiction, the use of the drugs becomes a part of happiness itself. This transformation from becoming a means to a part of happiness is a critical element of the problem of drug addiction. Although the desire for drugs is, referencing Mill’s language itself, not as universal as the desire for happiness, it is still undeniably present in our society. Should access to drugs, then, be considered a good that should be maximized under the greatest happiness principle? Most people would respond that it should not. A utilitarian might object that the harm caused to society by drug addicts would always outweigh their happiness, but that is not the issue at hand. The issue is whether drug access should count as a good in these utilitarian calculations at all. To prove that happiness is the only thing humans intrinsically desire, Mill defined happiness broadly enough that even drug use is a part of the happiness he and other followers of utilitarianism seek to maximize. In fact, anything that could become synonymous with an individual’s happiness might be reasonably promoted under utilitarianism. Mill or his supporters have multiple potential responses to this objection. One response is that any misinformed desire held by a minority of the population is not a proper desire to be factored into the general definition of happiness. Supporters of Mill’s view may classify the desire to indulge in a drug addiction as “misinformed” because of its ultimate harm to the individual: although there may be some happiness gained, the pain of potential long-term health complications outweighs any happiness of the addict. If the addict was a reasonable person and had full knowledge of the consequences of drug use, he would not desire the drugs. Thus, the desire is misinformed and not a proper desire. Therefore, it does not fall under Mill’s definition of happiness. Advocates of the argument might alternatively choose to accept the implication that drug use might be a good under the greatest happiness principle. Though it might seem counterintuitive, these proponents might argue that since drug use is a good to such a minority of the population, it would never actually be promoted under the greatest happiness principle. Therefore, to them, vices such as drug use may be accepted as a good to a few individuals, although this good is heavily outweighed by the harm drug use brings to both the individual and to society. It is true that any good that a drug user experiences would likely be outweighed by the subsequent harm.
It is also true that any reasonable person would disagree with the drug user’s desire for drugs. However, there exists a tension in the premise that misinformed desires are not proper desires. This carries the implicit notion that people should have certain desires and should not have others. If utilitarianism uses happiness and people’s desires to define what people should and should not do, it is circular to attempt to dictate what a person should and should not desire. Although most people would disagree with the desire to use drugs, it is undeniable that it is something that some people desire. Since some people desire it as an end in itself, it falls under the definition of happiness that Mill used to prove that happiness is the only thing that people intrinsically desire as a part of his broader proof of
utilitarianism. This example illustrates how flexible the bounds of Mill’s happiness are. So long as something can be eventually desired as an end in itself, it can be maximized under the greatest happiness principle. With the right situation and argument, then, anything could be ideally maximized under Mill’s greatest happiness principle. Mill succeeded in showing that happiness is the only thing that humans intrinsically desire. In doing so, however, he let happiness take on any meaning, and thus no meaning at all. Utilitarianism formalizes the golden rule taught to so many children growing up: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Since you would have others increase your happiness, you should increase the happiness of others. Yet, the greatest happiness principle loses some of its power when happiness means something different to everyone, when it could mean anything to anyone. Supporters of utilitarianism, such as Mill, would have humans use the philosophy as a moral guideline. The guideline is supposedly simple: “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (7). However, Mill has defined happiness so broadly that actions could be right if they promote anything. A utilitarian can provide examples where the source of greatest happiness is determinable, but this vacuous definition poses a more general problem that requires more than examples.