Kokoda Track Research Paper
Location: Crn. Deakin St and Rickard St - Mary St, Rhodes
Event: Although the Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway was built to specifically commemorate the events of The Kokoda Trail, Papua New Guinea (July 1942 - January 1943), the Walkway also commemorates all those who served and died in the Papua-New Guinea campaign of July 1942-January 1943.
The Papuan Campaign: Port Moresby and Milne Bay
The Japanese entered the war in December of the year 1941 and slowly forced their way towards the Australian coastline, overthrowing any who dared stand in their way. In February of the year 1942, the attack on the coast of Australia was postponed but was not forgotten. Instead, the Japanese invaded Australian Papua New Guinea and attempted to take Port …show more content…
Moresby in May. Port Moresby was a vital piece in the international game of war. If overtaken by the Japanese, the position of the headquarters of Australian troops in Papua New Guinea would give the Japanese a distinct advantage as this vantage point allowed them to not only cut Australia off from the USA, but would force Australia to live under the continuous shadow of this immediate invasive threat. From Port Moresby, the Japanese could directly launch an attack onto the mainland of Australia from the East side. Without the position provided by the settlement, the threat was hollow. Port Moresby also provided a base from which to prepare and launch attacks into the South Pacific. There was no particular resource in Papua New Guinea that the Japanese needed for their warfare; rather it but another link in the chain of defences this strong Asian country had built for itself.
The first attack on Port Moresby from the sea was foiled by the bravery of the defending American and Australian fleets in the battle of the Coral Sea on the 5th-8th of May. Even though the main part of the fleet and air squadron was engaged farther east, a small joint Royal Australian Navy/United States Navy squadron, under the command of Australian Admiral John Crace (above) was positioned in the mouth of the Jomard Passage, east of Milne Bay to prevent the Japanese troops from reaching the army base positioned at Milne Bay and heading to Port Moresby from there. The Japanese had tried to transfer their men directly from their last base at Rabaul on the island of New Britain and so were not wholly prepared for the fierce defence they met and therefore, concerned for the loss of their vulnerable transport ships, turned back to Rabaul to nurse their wounds and let their plans fester till the time was right.
The Japanese commanding Officers decided that Port Moresby would only be taken by using two approaching it from two directions, using a pincer manoeuvre. The first would be from Milne Bay in the south-east of the island and the second was to be an approach from the north, taking Kokoda from the rear and reaching Port Moresby over the Kokoda Trail, a 96 km overland track, stretching from Buna to Port Moresby, across the Owen Stanley Range. The Japanese landed at Milne Bay on the 26th August and made an attempt to take the airfield there but were confronted in the first stages by the 61st and 2/10th battalions and then forced as they retreated by the 2/12th and 2/9th battalions. As the Japanese drew back, their cruisers entered the bay on Sept 6th and fired as the Japanese troops were evacuated, sinking the M.V. Anshun. However, they had been given orders to fall back and the Japanese cruisers withdrew, repulsed and defeated.
A Fighting Retreat: Landing and the clash at Kokoda
Meanwhile, the Japanese battalions approaching from the rear of the Kokoda track had landed unopposed on the 21st July at Basabua, not far from their defences at Sananada, Gona and Buna. They made their way inland making their first serious clash with the Australian and American troops at Oivi, 16km east of Kokoda. Captain Sam Templeton (right) of the 39th Battalion (affectionately known as “Uncle Sam”), after whom Templeton’s Crossing was named, decided to make a stand at Oivi. The combined troops only held out for a few hours before retreating. Templeton was wounded, captured, interrogated and later executed.
The first stand at Kokoda was on the 28th July. The Japanese began their attack at 2:30AM that morning, splitting the platoons to attack the Australians from the flanks. Lieutenant Colonel William Taylor Owen (left) positioned his men into an arc surrounding the Kokoda airstrip administration buildings (the only airstrip between the north coast and Port Morseby). Owen was one of the first to be gunned down on the front lines as he was throwing grenades (he was the first soldier to earn the Distinguished Service Cross). The loss of their lieutenant and attack from both flanks proved too much for the small company of the 39th battalion and they retreated to Deniki, some 8km down the track.
The Japanese progressed no further and an attempt was made to retake Kokoda on the part of the combined Australian and American troops (the Maroubra Force) using a three pronged attack. On 8th August Major Cameron moved down the track leading directly from Deniki to Kokoda while a second force under Captain Bidstrup moved to block the track to Oivi by which re-enforcement troops might come. A third party under Captain Symington moved towards Kokoda by a third track, unknown to the Japanese. By sheer coincidence, the Japanese had planned to attack Deniki the same day, so Major Cameron met the battalion coming to attack him halfway along the direct track. A skirmish ensued and Cameron, immediately realising that he was outnumbered, beat a hasty retreat to Deniki, quickly followed by his assailants.
The other outer prong under Bidstrup also met overwhelming resistance in the form of a platoon of engineers repairing a supply chain. Bidstrup fought until it was too dark then he too retreated to join the rest of the Maroubra Force. Meanwhile the centre prong under Symington met no Japanese until they entered Kokoda, which they found deserted apart from a small platoon of engineers who turned and immediately retreated back up the track. The battalion settled themselves on a ridge overlooking the Kokoda airstrip. Finally after three days of intermittent fighting with a company sent back from the siege at Deniki, low ammunition and supplies forced Symington to retreat back to Deniki. The Australians had only managed to hold Kokoda for a short period but it was enough to make the Japanese wary of underestimating their opponents again.
Isurava
After the retreat of the Maroubra Force to Deniki, Kokoda was taken back into Japanese hands and they were able to go ahead with the previously interrupted attack on Deniki on the 13th August. The Australian and American forces were driven slowly but surely back up the ridge to Isurava. The battle of Isurava was the vital delaying battle. If the Japanese had broken through the defences at Isurava any earlier than they did, they would have pushed on to Port Morseby with ease. So, with the jungle to the west and Eora creek to the east, the Maroubra Force, under the command of Brigadier Arnold Potts, dug in and assumed a defensive stance, keeping the Japanese at bay for four days. The Japanese, under the command of Commander Horii, decided to use the tactic of complete encirclement in an attempt to completely eliminate the opposing force in their way. One division was sent through the centre of the Maroubra Force while two others were sent to the flanks and the final division held in reserve for pursuit of survivors in the event of a retreat. But Horii’s plan was completely futile in the creation. Firstly, the 1/144th battalion which was supposed to make the frontal attack was in poor state as it had taken the heaviest blows in previous conflicts. When the attack was begun on the 26th August, the results of the 1/144th assault was so disappointing that Horii pulled a company from a flank battalion, 3/144, in order to strengthen the 1/144th battalion and thus weakened the flank attack. Even when it had been reinforced, the performance of the 1/144 was weak and a counter-attack on the 29th August cut right through the battalion. It was in this fight that Private Bruce Steel Kingsbury lost his life and earned the Victoria medal for his bravery in action as he ran forward, firing his gun and clearing a path for his fellows, completely disregarding his own safety. He was shot dead by sniper fire but his memory remains at the sight of the battle in the form of a rock now called “Kingsbury’s rock”.
Regardless of their blunders, the Japanese made head way in the attack and by nightfall of the 29th, the position could no longer be maintained by the Maroubra Force. They were forced to retreat on the 31st, slowly moving south along the Kokoda track. Even though the battle had not been won, the Australians and their allies had succeeded in hindering and delaying the Japanese in their progress towards the ultimate goal; Port Moresby. The Japanese had failed to achieve their purpose and the opposing troops had only been partially damaged.
Eora Creek to Templeton’s Crossing
The Maroubra Force withdrew to Efogi, covered by a rearguard comprising of the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions dug in on the southern heights above Eora village. A fresh Japanese pursuit group made up of the 41st Regiment, who had not participated in the battle at Isurava arrived and after artillery bombing on September 1st, a night attack was attempted. Two companies were held in reserve, one attacked the Australian’s frontally and another two were send to attack the right flank and by the morning of September 2nd, the line held by the rear guard had been infiltrated at several points. They were forced to retreat to Templeton’s Crossing over Eora Creek where they were forced to make a stand in the evening of September 3rd, protecting Myola, the dry lake which had been the location of all supplies received by air. However, the Japanese again used the tactic of a frontal and flank attack and the rearguard fell back to Efogi to join the rest of the Force with Brigadier Potts.
Efogi: Mission Ridge and Brigade Hill
The small village of Efogi and its surrounding jungle land was the sight of the two disaster battles of Mission Ridge and Brigade Hill.
The authority at Port Moresby, believing that the Maroubra Force had been reinforced by fresh troops, ordered Potts to cease his retreat and make a stand at Efogi. Potts divided the three battalions with him, placing the former rearguard battalions, 2/14 and 2/16, on Brigade Hill behind the fresher battalion, 2/27, which had been placed on Mission Ridge. Both positions were south of Efogi, holding a commanding view of the valley. Behind these three battalions, Potts placed his headquarters with a company from the 2/16th Battalion on the southern slopes of Brigade Hill, leaving a gap between. The Japanese, upon arrival, did not immediately attack but rather positioned their artillery just north of Mission Hut in the valley and began fire on the 2/27th battalion while secretly scouting the positions open to them and those held by the opponent. Colonel Kusunose, who was in command of the Japanese battalions of 2/144 and 3/144, decided to attack the Australians frontally on Mission Ridge with the 3/144th battalion while secretly sending the 2/144th around to their rear at night on Brigade Hill which he was unaware was also held by the Maroubra Force. The attack commenced in force on 7 September; however the Japanese were unable to take any land that day as the Australians were at a vantage point on high ground. As night fell, the 2/144th battalion began their move to the supposed rear of the Maroubra Force on Brigade Hill. With a lot of luck, the 2/144th found their way through the gap between the 2/16th and 2/14th battalions and HQ (Headquarters) which they still did not know was there. As day dawned, the Japanese were able to see the before-unknown positions of the 2/14th and 2/16th on Brigade Hill and the attack switched from Mission Ridge to Brigade Hill. The artillery in the valley were ordered to switch targets to Brigade Hill.
A counter attack was attempted on the part on the 2/14th and 2/16th battalion and Potts’ headquarters, but wether the former rearguard had been weakened from much fighting or they simply underestimated the strength of the attack, the counter-attack failed and on the 8th of September, the Maroubra Force retreated down the Kokoda track to Ioribaiwa.
Ioribaiwa
Ioribaiwa was the furthermost post of the Japanese advance. Potts had been replaced by Brigadier Porter who took command with the reinforcing 25th Brigade’s Brigadier Eather. Eather placed the 3rd and 2/31st battalions in a defensive position on Ioribaiwa Ridge, with the 2/31st taking the left flank and the 3rd taking the right of the 2/14th and2/16th battalions with the fresher 25th held in the reserve. On the 14th September, as the Japanese advanced half of their 3/144th to frontally attack and deplete the 2/14th and 2/16th battalions, the 2/144th battalion moved to attack the left flank but was met with the opposing force of the fresher 2/31st battalion which immediately engaged. Unable to make headway on the left flank, the Japanese moved the other half of the 3/144th to the right flank and attacked the 3rd Battalion. They seemed to be making headway until a counter attack was launched by the 25th battalion. By the morning of the 16th, there was a stalemate. The Australians retired to Imita Ridge on the 17th and the Japanese occupied Ioribaiwa. The Australians may not have won that fight but the Japanese could go no further.
The Turn of the Tide
On the 18th September, following a defeat in the Solomon Islands, the Japanese troops were ordered to turn back. Ioribaiwa was abandoned and the Japanese turned to return to the northern landing place they came from. Meanwhile, Australian troops had been given the order to begin the counter-offensive. The Maroubra Force had been strengthened primarily from the 7th Division and the commander of this Division, Lt. General Allen, was made commander of the entire Maroubra Force. However, when they attacked Ioribaiwa on September 28th, they found the place abandoned.
Phase 1-The Japanese who had been ordered back with Commander Horii had been reinforced and ordered to advance again on Port Moresby. Horii ordered four positions to be dug in at the Eora-Templeton Crossing; the first two were outliers on the two paths leading north to Isurava, the third was to be where they met, just before Templeton’s Crossing and the fourth in Eora village as an insurance against failure. Thus it was that after a two week pursuit, on the 13th October, the 2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions met and engaged with the two outlying garrisons of the 144th Regiment. Neither battalion made headway and when the 3rd Battalion was brought up to strengthen the 2/33rd, the Japanese retreated to their third position, overlooking Templeton’s Crossing, on the 14th.
Phase 2 - Lt. General Allen surrounded this position with the 25th Brigade and later sent the 16th to support the weakening 25th. Upon arrival, the Maroubra Force was immediately under artillery fire. The turning point of this phase came on the 20th October when the 2/2nd Battalion broke away from the main attack and besieged the left flank of the 144th Regiment, prompting a quick retreat to the fourth emergency position in Eora Village. This was the first time in the Papuan Campaign that Australian troops had closed in and captured Japanese opponents outright. That simple flank attack by the 2/2nd was the turning point of the two week’s worth of fighting from Templeton’s Crossing to Eora Village.
Phase 3 - Previously, at the end of September, Horii, confident that the 144th Regiment under the command of Commander Tsukamoto could hold the Eora-Templeton Crossing, had withdrawn all his men from the mountains and down to Kokoda and Oivi. When the 2/2nd forced Tsukamoto’s sudden retreat, Horii was unable to do anything to support him. Horii sent men to Eora Village but he had never expected to use that position and it needed many more men to man it than he was able to send. By the 24th, the Japanese troops had relatively stabilised their position in the region but they would not have been able to withstand an attack by the whole Maroubra Force. As it was, Allen held his men off until the Japanese had received orders to fall back on the 28th due to yet another unstable situation in the Solomon Islands. The attack on the 28th beat back the 144th Regiment and they were forced to escape back to Kokoda.
Retaking Kokoda
On the 2nd November, the Maroubra Force arrived at the Kokoda Airstrip administration buildings to find them deserted. The Japanese had left two days earlier. The Force secured the area and then recaptured and fortified Kokoda village which had also been deserted.
Oivi-Gorari
Realising that the Australians meant to attack and capture the Japanese base at Buna-Gona, Horii ordered his men to make a stand at Oivi and Gorari. He divided his men into two Regiments; the original 144th with additional men and the 41st. The Maroubra Force, not expecting them to make a stand, was surprised to encounter the 41st Regiment on the 4th November and a three day skirmish ensued between them and the 16th Brigade at Oivi. Another Australian brigade, the 25th had been on a track parallel to the 16th. When the reports came, the 25th along with the 2/1st advanced north probing forward so as to find some method of attacking the Horii’s rearguard. Horii was soon aware of them and swung the main body of the 144th Regiment under Tsukamoto around to meet them. The Maroubra Force was able to completely surround and capture them, then leaving the 21st Battalion to contain the situation, the 25th brigade continued along their northern path, attacking and overcoming the remainder of the 144th Regiment (which had retreated from the battle with the 16th Brigade at Oivi to defend Gorari) and Horii’s Headquarters. Horii, seeing that is position had been compromised, gave the order to retreat and the disorganised Japanese troops fled to the coast.
The Battle of the Beachheads: The Japanese Defeated
The siege at Buna, Gona and Sanananda ended the Papuan Campaign. The Japanese defences on the coast were in four parts; the centre was at Sanananda with three outer defences, the Sanananda Road, Buna and Gona. Each defence was besieged and overtaken individually. Gona was taken by the Australians in late November/early December. The 25th Brigade besieged Gona for a week from the 19th but made no headway until the 21st Brigade attacked at their right, cutting Gona off from the other defences and finally clearing a way for Gona to be taken from two sides. The Americans were unsuccessful at Buna until Australian reinforcements arrived in late December. They had been attacking since the 16th November but could not breach the defences at Buna. To breach the stalemate, the 18th Briade was brought up from Milne bay and achieved in six days what had taken the Americans six weeks. The frontal defences on the Sanananda Road were obliterated in mid-January and the Australians were considering leaving the Japanese to fester in their malaria-infested, rapidly crumbling defences at Sanananda, but the Japanese authorities, seeing that the fall of all secondary defences only heralded the destruction of Sanananda, gave the order to retreat and move out of the country. By the 21st January, all organised Japanese resistance was in Papua New Guinea was terminated and the Papuan Campaign was over. The total number of American and Australian casualties was 8546.
Legacy
The fighting on the Kokoda Trail was of vital importance to the security of Australia. The Kokoda Campaign signifies the first time in Australian history that the security of the country itself had been directly threatened. If the Japanese had succeeded in gaining Port Moresby, an attack could have easily been carried out on the Eastern coast of Australia, beginning with the bombing of Queensland. Our land was kept safe through the bravery and resolution of the young men in the American and Australian defence forces and through the willing efforts of the “fuzzy wuzzy angels”, the native Papuans who carried supplies and stretchers to aid and facilitate the war effort of the Allied troops. The Papuan Campaign left behind a legacy of teamwork, courage and complete disregard of personal safety to protect a homeland. The trail remains as an everlasting remainder of an adversary only conquered by the extraordinary endurance, mateship and strength that the Australian diggers displayed on the campaign.
Bibliography:
Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 1998, Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 2/07/2013, http://www.kokodawalkway.com.au/
Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 1998, Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 2/07/2013, http://www.kokodawalkway.com.au/the_kokoda_track.html Australian Government: Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 2013, The Kokoda Track: Exploring the site of the battle fought by Australians in WWII, 2/07/2013, http://kokoda.commemoration.gov.au/
Australian Government: Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 2013, Australia’s War: 1939 to 1945, 4/07/2013, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/
Kokoda: 39th Battalion, 2006, motion picture, Australian Film Finance Corporation, directed by Alister Grierson
The four sentinel stones represent the resolute commitment and sacrifice of those Australian soldiers who stood firm to slow and finally halt the advance of Japanese forces across Papua New Guinea in 1942. In scribed on these stones are the words “Courage Endurance Mateship Sacrifice.”
Event: Although the Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway was built to specifically commemorate the events of The Kokoda Trail, Papua New Guinea (July 1942 - January 1943), the Walkway also commemorates all those who served and died in the Papua-New Guinea campaign of July 1942-January 1943.
The Papuan Campaign: Port Moresby and Milne Bay
The Japanese entered the war in December of the year 1941 and slowly forced their way towards the Australian coastline, overthrowing any who dared stand in their way. In February of the year 1942, the attack on the coast of Australia was postponed but was not forgotten. Instead, the Japanese invaded Australian Papua New Guinea and attempted to take Port …show more content…
Moresby in May. Port Moresby was a vital piece in the international game of war. If overtaken by the Japanese, the position of the headquarters of Australian troops in Papua New Guinea would give the Japanese a distinct advantage as this vantage point allowed them to not only cut Australia off from the USA, but would force Australia to live under the continuous shadow of this immediate invasive threat. From Port Moresby, the Japanese could directly launch an attack onto the mainland of Australia from the East side. Without the position provided by the settlement, the threat was hollow. Port Moresby also provided a base from which to prepare and launch attacks into the South Pacific. There was no particular resource in Papua New Guinea that the Japanese needed for their warfare; rather it but another link in the chain of defences this strong Asian country had built for itself.
The first attack on Port Moresby from the sea was foiled by the bravery of the defending American and Australian fleets in the battle of the Coral Sea on the 5th-8th of May. Even though the main part of the fleet and air squadron was engaged farther east, a small joint Royal Australian Navy/United States Navy squadron, under the command of Australian Admiral John Crace (above) was positioned in the mouth of the Jomard Passage, east of Milne Bay to prevent the Japanese troops from reaching the army base positioned at Milne Bay and heading to Port Moresby from there. The Japanese had tried to transfer their men directly from their last base at Rabaul on the island of New Britain and so were not wholly prepared for the fierce defence they met and therefore, concerned for the loss of their vulnerable transport ships, turned back to Rabaul to nurse their wounds and let their plans fester till the time was right.
The Japanese commanding Officers decided that Port Moresby would only be taken by using two approaching it from two directions, using a pincer manoeuvre. The first would be from Milne Bay in the south-east of the island and the second was to be an approach from the north, taking Kokoda from the rear and reaching Port Moresby over the Kokoda Trail, a 96 km overland track, stretching from Buna to Port Moresby, across the Owen Stanley Range. The Japanese landed at Milne Bay on the 26th August and made an attempt to take the airfield there but were confronted in the first stages by the 61st and 2/10th battalions and then forced as they retreated by the 2/12th and 2/9th battalions. As the Japanese drew back, their cruisers entered the bay on Sept 6th and fired as the Japanese troops were evacuated, sinking the M.V. Anshun. However, they had been given orders to fall back and the Japanese cruisers withdrew, repulsed and defeated.
A Fighting Retreat: Landing and the clash at Kokoda
Meanwhile, the Japanese battalions approaching from the rear of the Kokoda track had landed unopposed on the 21st July at Basabua, not far from their defences at Sananada, Gona and Buna. They made their way inland making their first serious clash with the Australian and American troops at Oivi, 16km east of Kokoda. Captain Sam Templeton (right) of the 39th Battalion (affectionately known as “Uncle Sam”), after whom Templeton’s Crossing was named, decided to make a stand at Oivi. The combined troops only held out for a few hours before retreating. Templeton was wounded, captured, interrogated and later executed.
The first stand at Kokoda was on the 28th July. The Japanese began their attack at 2:30AM that morning, splitting the platoons to attack the Australians from the flanks. Lieutenant Colonel William Taylor Owen (left) positioned his men into an arc surrounding the Kokoda airstrip administration buildings (the only airstrip between the north coast and Port Morseby). Owen was one of the first to be gunned down on the front lines as he was throwing grenades (he was the first soldier to earn the Distinguished Service Cross). The loss of their lieutenant and attack from both flanks proved too much for the small company of the 39th battalion and they retreated to Deniki, some 8km down the track.
The Japanese progressed no further and an attempt was made to retake Kokoda on the part of the combined Australian and American troops (the Maroubra Force) using a three pronged attack. On 8th August Major Cameron moved down the track leading directly from Deniki to Kokoda while a second force under Captain Bidstrup moved to block the track to Oivi by which re-enforcement troops might come. A third party under Captain Symington moved towards Kokoda by a third track, unknown to the Japanese. By sheer coincidence, the Japanese had planned to attack Deniki the same day, so Major Cameron met the battalion coming to attack him halfway along the direct track. A skirmish ensued and Cameron, immediately realising that he was outnumbered, beat a hasty retreat to Deniki, quickly followed by his assailants.
The other outer prong under Bidstrup also met overwhelming resistance in the form of a platoon of engineers repairing a supply chain. Bidstrup fought until it was too dark then he too retreated to join the rest of the Maroubra Force. Meanwhile the centre prong under Symington met no Japanese until they entered Kokoda, which they found deserted apart from a small platoon of engineers who turned and immediately retreated back up the track. The battalion settled themselves on a ridge overlooking the Kokoda airstrip. Finally after three days of intermittent fighting with a company sent back from the siege at Deniki, low ammunition and supplies forced Symington to retreat back to Deniki. The Australians had only managed to hold Kokoda for a short period but it was enough to make the Japanese wary of underestimating their opponents again.
Isurava
After the retreat of the Maroubra Force to Deniki, Kokoda was taken back into Japanese hands and they were able to go ahead with the previously interrupted attack on Deniki on the 13th August. The Australian and American forces were driven slowly but surely back up the ridge to Isurava. The battle of Isurava was the vital delaying battle. If the Japanese had broken through the defences at Isurava any earlier than they did, they would have pushed on to Port Morseby with ease. So, with the jungle to the west and Eora creek to the east, the Maroubra Force, under the command of Brigadier Arnold Potts, dug in and assumed a defensive stance, keeping the Japanese at bay for four days. The Japanese, under the command of Commander Horii, decided to use the tactic of complete encirclement in an attempt to completely eliminate the opposing force in their way. One division was sent through the centre of the Maroubra Force while two others were sent to the flanks and the final division held in reserve for pursuit of survivors in the event of a retreat. But Horii’s plan was completely futile in the creation. Firstly, the 1/144th battalion which was supposed to make the frontal attack was in poor state as it had taken the heaviest blows in previous conflicts. When the attack was begun on the 26th August, the results of the 1/144th assault was so disappointing that Horii pulled a company from a flank battalion, 3/144, in order to strengthen the 1/144th battalion and thus weakened the flank attack. Even when it had been reinforced, the performance of the 1/144 was weak and a counter-attack on the 29th August cut right through the battalion. It was in this fight that Private Bruce Steel Kingsbury lost his life and earned the Victoria medal for his bravery in action as he ran forward, firing his gun and clearing a path for his fellows, completely disregarding his own safety. He was shot dead by sniper fire but his memory remains at the sight of the battle in the form of a rock now called “Kingsbury’s rock”.
Regardless of their blunders, the Japanese made head way in the attack and by nightfall of the 29th, the position could no longer be maintained by the Maroubra Force. They were forced to retreat on the 31st, slowly moving south along the Kokoda track. Even though the battle had not been won, the Australians and their allies had succeeded in hindering and delaying the Japanese in their progress towards the ultimate goal; Port Moresby. The Japanese had failed to achieve their purpose and the opposing troops had only been partially damaged.
Eora Creek to Templeton’s Crossing
The Maroubra Force withdrew to Efogi, covered by a rearguard comprising of the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions dug in on the southern heights above Eora village. A fresh Japanese pursuit group made up of the 41st Regiment, who had not participated in the battle at Isurava arrived and after artillery bombing on September 1st, a night attack was attempted. Two companies were held in reserve, one attacked the Australian’s frontally and another two were send to attack the right flank and by the morning of September 2nd, the line held by the rear guard had been infiltrated at several points. They were forced to retreat to Templeton’s Crossing over Eora Creek where they were forced to make a stand in the evening of September 3rd, protecting Myola, the dry lake which had been the location of all supplies received by air. However, the Japanese again used the tactic of a frontal and flank attack and the rearguard fell back to Efogi to join the rest of the Force with Brigadier Potts.
Efogi: Mission Ridge and Brigade Hill
The small village of Efogi and its surrounding jungle land was the sight of the two disaster battles of Mission Ridge and Brigade Hill.
The authority at Port Moresby, believing that the Maroubra Force had been reinforced by fresh troops, ordered Potts to cease his retreat and make a stand at Efogi. Potts divided the three battalions with him, placing the former rearguard battalions, 2/14 and 2/16, on Brigade Hill behind the fresher battalion, 2/27, which had been placed on Mission Ridge. Both positions were south of Efogi, holding a commanding view of the valley. Behind these three battalions, Potts placed his headquarters with a company from the 2/16th Battalion on the southern slopes of Brigade Hill, leaving a gap between. The Japanese, upon arrival, did not immediately attack but rather positioned their artillery just north of Mission Hut in the valley and began fire on the 2/27th battalion while secretly scouting the positions open to them and those held by the opponent. Colonel Kusunose, who was in command of the Japanese battalions of 2/144 and 3/144, decided to attack the Australians frontally on Mission Ridge with the 3/144th battalion while secretly sending the 2/144th around to their rear at night on Brigade Hill which he was unaware was also held by the Maroubra Force. The attack commenced in force on 7 September; however the Japanese were unable to take any land that day as the Australians were at a vantage point on high ground. As night fell, the 2/144th battalion began their move to the supposed rear of the Maroubra Force on Brigade Hill. With a lot of luck, the 2/144th found their way through the gap between the 2/16th and 2/14th battalions and HQ (Headquarters) which they still did not know was there. As day dawned, the Japanese were able to see the before-unknown positions of the 2/14th and 2/16th on Brigade Hill and the attack switched from Mission Ridge to Brigade Hill. The artillery in the valley were ordered to switch targets to Brigade Hill.
A counter attack was attempted on the part on the 2/14th and 2/16th battalion and Potts’ headquarters, but wether the former rearguard had been weakened from much fighting or they simply underestimated the strength of the attack, the counter-attack failed and on the 8th of September, the Maroubra Force retreated down the Kokoda track to Ioribaiwa.
Ioribaiwa
Ioribaiwa was the furthermost post of the Japanese advance. Potts had been replaced by Brigadier Porter who took command with the reinforcing 25th Brigade’s Brigadier Eather. Eather placed the 3rd and 2/31st battalions in a defensive position on Ioribaiwa Ridge, with the 2/31st taking the left flank and the 3rd taking the right of the 2/14th and2/16th battalions with the fresher 25th held in the reserve. On the 14th September, as the Japanese advanced half of their 3/144th to frontally attack and deplete the 2/14th and 2/16th battalions, the 2/144th battalion moved to attack the left flank but was met with the opposing force of the fresher 2/31st battalion which immediately engaged. Unable to make headway on the left flank, the Japanese moved the other half of the 3/144th to the right flank and attacked the 3rd Battalion. They seemed to be making headway until a counter attack was launched by the 25th battalion. By the morning of the 16th, there was a stalemate. The Australians retired to Imita Ridge on the 17th and the Japanese occupied Ioribaiwa. The Australians may not have won that fight but the Japanese could go no further.
The Turn of the Tide
On the 18th September, following a defeat in the Solomon Islands, the Japanese troops were ordered to turn back. Ioribaiwa was abandoned and the Japanese turned to return to the northern landing place they came from. Meanwhile, Australian troops had been given the order to begin the counter-offensive. The Maroubra Force had been strengthened primarily from the 7th Division and the commander of this Division, Lt. General Allen, was made commander of the entire Maroubra Force. However, when they attacked Ioribaiwa on September 28th, they found the place abandoned.
Phase 1-The Japanese who had been ordered back with Commander Horii had been reinforced and ordered to advance again on Port Moresby. Horii ordered four positions to be dug in at the Eora-Templeton Crossing; the first two were outliers on the two paths leading north to Isurava, the third was to be where they met, just before Templeton’s Crossing and the fourth in Eora village as an insurance against failure. Thus it was that after a two week pursuit, on the 13th October, the 2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions met and engaged with the two outlying garrisons of the 144th Regiment. Neither battalion made headway and when the 3rd Battalion was brought up to strengthen the 2/33rd, the Japanese retreated to their third position, overlooking Templeton’s Crossing, on the 14th.
Phase 2 - Lt. General Allen surrounded this position with the 25th Brigade and later sent the 16th to support the weakening 25th. Upon arrival, the Maroubra Force was immediately under artillery fire. The turning point of this phase came on the 20th October when the 2/2nd Battalion broke away from the main attack and besieged the left flank of the 144th Regiment, prompting a quick retreat to the fourth emergency position in Eora Village. This was the first time in the Papuan Campaign that Australian troops had closed in and captured Japanese opponents outright. That simple flank attack by the 2/2nd was the turning point of the two week’s worth of fighting from Templeton’s Crossing to Eora Village.
Phase 3 - Previously, at the end of September, Horii, confident that the 144th Regiment under the command of Commander Tsukamoto could hold the Eora-Templeton Crossing, had withdrawn all his men from the mountains and down to Kokoda and Oivi. When the 2/2nd forced Tsukamoto’s sudden retreat, Horii was unable to do anything to support him. Horii sent men to Eora Village but he had never expected to use that position and it needed many more men to man it than he was able to send. By the 24th, the Japanese troops had relatively stabilised their position in the region but they would not have been able to withstand an attack by the whole Maroubra Force. As it was, Allen held his men off until the Japanese had received orders to fall back on the 28th due to yet another unstable situation in the Solomon Islands. The attack on the 28th beat back the 144th Regiment and they were forced to escape back to Kokoda.
Retaking Kokoda
On the 2nd November, the Maroubra Force arrived at the Kokoda Airstrip administration buildings to find them deserted. The Japanese had left two days earlier. The Force secured the area and then recaptured and fortified Kokoda village which had also been deserted.
Oivi-Gorari
Realising that the Australians meant to attack and capture the Japanese base at Buna-Gona, Horii ordered his men to make a stand at Oivi and Gorari. He divided his men into two Regiments; the original 144th with additional men and the 41st. The Maroubra Force, not expecting them to make a stand, was surprised to encounter the 41st Regiment on the 4th November and a three day skirmish ensued between them and the 16th Brigade at Oivi. Another Australian brigade, the 25th had been on a track parallel to the 16th. When the reports came, the 25th along with the 2/1st advanced north probing forward so as to find some method of attacking the Horii’s rearguard. Horii was soon aware of them and swung the main body of the 144th Regiment under Tsukamoto around to meet them. The Maroubra Force was able to completely surround and capture them, then leaving the 21st Battalion to contain the situation, the 25th brigade continued along their northern path, attacking and overcoming the remainder of the 144th Regiment (which had retreated from the battle with the 16th Brigade at Oivi to defend Gorari) and Horii’s Headquarters. Horii, seeing that is position had been compromised, gave the order to retreat and the disorganised Japanese troops fled to the coast.
The Battle of the Beachheads: The Japanese Defeated
The siege at Buna, Gona and Sanananda ended the Papuan Campaign. The Japanese defences on the coast were in four parts; the centre was at Sanananda with three outer defences, the Sanananda Road, Buna and Gona. Each defence was besieged and overtaken individually. Gona was taken by the Australians in late November/early December. The 25th Brigade besieged Gona for a week from the 19th but made no headway until the 21st Brigade attacked at their right, cutting Gona off from the other defences and finally clearing a way for Gona to be taken from two sides. The Americans were unsuccessful at Buna until Australian reinforcements arrived in late December. They had been attacking since the 16th November but could not breach the defences at Buna. To breach the stalemate, the 18th Briade was brought up from Milne bay and achieved in six days what had taken the Americans six weeks. The frontal defences on the Sanananda Road were obliterated in mid-January and the Australians were considering leaving the Japanese to fester in their malaria-infested, rapidly crumbling defences at Sanananda, but the Japanese authorities, seeing that the fall of all secondary defences only heralded the destruction of Sanananda, gave the order to retreat and move out of the country. By the 21st January, all organised Japanese resistance was in Papua New Guinea was terminated and the Papuan Campaign was over. The total number of American and Australian casualties was 8546.
Legacy
The fighting on the Kokoda Trail was of vital importance to the security of Australia. The Kokoda Campaign signifies the first time in Australian history that the security of the country itself had been directly threatened. If the Japanese had succeeded in gaining Port Moresby, an attack could have easily been carried out on the Eastern coast of Australia, beginning with the bombing of Queensland. Our land was kept safe through the bravery and resolution of the young men in the American and Australian defence forces and through the willing efforts of the “fuzzy wuzzy angels”, the native Papuans who carried supplies and stretchers to aid and facilitate the war effort of the Allied troops. The Papuan Campaign left behind a legacy of teamwork, courage and complete disregard of personal safety to protect a homeland. The trail remains as an everlasting remainder of an adversary only conquered by the extraordinary endurance, mateship and strength that the Australian diggers displayed on the campaign.
Bibliography:
Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 1998, Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 2/07/2013, http://www.kokodawalkway.com.au/
Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 1998, Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway, 2/07/2013, http://www.kokodawalkway.com.au/the_kokoda_track.html Australian Government: Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 2013, The Kokoda Track: Exploring the site of the battle fought by Australians in WWII, 2/07/2013, http://kokoda.commemoration.gov.au/
Australian Government: Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 2013, Australia’s War: 1939 to 1945, 4/07/2013, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/
Kokoda: 39th Battalion, 2006, motion picture, Australian Film Finance Corporation, directed by Alister Grierson
The four sentinel stones represent the resolute commitment and sacrifice of those Australian soldiers who stood firm to slow and finally halt the advance of Japanese forces across Papua New Guinea in 1942. In scribed on these stones are the words “Courage Endurance Mateship Sacrifice.”