BY
Michael Rea
Advised by
Dr. James Keese
ANT 461, 462
Senior Project
Social Sciences Department
College of Liberal Arts
CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY
Spring 2013
Table of Contents
Research Proposali
Annotated Bibliographyii
Outlinevi
Abstract1
Introduction2
Actors in the Distribution of Latin American ‘Aid’3
U.S. Military’s Expanding Role in the Humanitarian Sector…………...6
The United States Military and Foreign Policy in Latin America………8
Capabilities and Culture of SOUTHCOM……………………………..10
USAID: A Twofold Approach…………………………………………13
Non-Governmental Organizations: Diversity for Diversity 's Sake……15
Operation Unified Response…………………………………………...18 …show more content…
The U.S. military focused its communication efforts on its own familiar classified Internet network, the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). SIPRNET essentially eliminates the possibility for a facilitating communications with civilian responders to access. Koch suggests military elements must learn to forget the SIPRNET completely; basically, you have to be prepared to use the unclassified Internet almost exclusively to gain and then share rapidly unfolding events (Koch, 9). Communication issues were at fault for one of the highly publicized instances where aid was slow to be delivered. The first was a Doctors without Borders plane carrying a stockpile of medical supplies was continually rerouted by the military operators of the airport. As noted before the UN Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs has various mechanisms for interagency cooperation to prevent duplication of efforts and define the most relevant needs. Not only is there a need for greater understanding of the UN mechanisms, but inclusion of these mechanisms can increase the military’s effectiveness in disaster relief. This would require the mission of the military to be more specific than, “preventing human suffering” when in fact it may fall under many of the already defined cluster categories, such as emergency shelter, medical aid, and logistics for example. Representatives who are subject matter experts in these fields can attend cluster group meetings and return to brief the Joint Task Force Commander who will then take necessary action. This approach will increase the exposure military capabilities, display expertise to the NGO community, and still preserve the command rigid structure as the subject matter experts ultimately report to one