Legislative Accountability in a Semi-Presidential System: Analysis of the Single-Member District Elections to the Russian State Duma
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 57, No. 8, December 2005, 1143 – 1167
Legislative Accountability in a Semi-Presidential System: Analysis of the Single-Member District Elections to the Russian State Duma
DINISSA DUVANOVA & JAKUB ZIELINSKI
THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THEORY is that repeated elections function as a mechanism of accountability. The underlying logic behind this claim is simple: if politicians want to be re-elected and if voters condition their ballots on policy outcomes, then politicians have an incentive to implement policies that benefit the electorate. Otherwise, they lose in electoral competition. This argument is intuitive and well-known, but is it empirically valid? Does the system of repeated elections function as a mechanism of political control? This question is particularly interesting in the case of the new post-communist democracies because electoral competition in these countries takes place in the context of unstable party systems and, in some cases, under constitutional arrangements obscuring political responsibility. Among new democracies, Russia stands out as one of the most dubious cases for democratic responsibility. It is often argued that, although formal democratic institutions exist in this post-communist country, their de facto functions are different from those performed in established liberal democracies. In Russia, where formal democratic institutions do not have deep roots in cultural attitudes and historical traditions, one would expect that politicians will be unlikely to care for the needs and welfare of their electorate. Given Russia’s long history of politics as a zero-sum game in which the losing party was usually exterminated, its revolutionary tradition, and the increasingly authoritarian features of current politics, adherence to democratic rules of the game can be interpreted as a pact on the part of the competing elites that secures their long-term survival and political influence. Russia’s
Legislative Accountability in a Semi-Presidential System: Analysis of the Single-Member District Elections to the Russian State Duma
DINISSA DUVANOVA & JAKUB ZIELINSKI
THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THEORY is that repeated elections function as a mechanism of accountability. The underlying logic behind this claim is simple: if politicians want to be re-elected and if voters condition their ballots on policy outcomes, then politicians have an incentive to implement policies that benefit the electorate. Otherwise, they lose in electoral competition. This argument is intuitive and well-known, but is it empirically valid? Does the system of repeated elections function as a mechanism of political control? This question is particularly interesting in the case of the new post-communist democracies because electoral competition in these countries takes place in the context of unstable party systems and, in some cases, under constitutional arrangements obscuring political responsibility. Among new democracies, Russia stands out as one of the most dubious cases for democratic responsibility. It is often argued that, although formal democratic institutions exist in this post-communist country, their de facto functions are different from those performed in established liberal democracies. In Russia, where formal democratic institutions do not have deep roots in cultural attitudes and historical traditions, one would expect that politicians will be unlikely to care for the needs and welfare of their electorate. Given Russia’s long history of politics as a zero-sum game in which the losing party was usually exterminated, its revolutionary tradition, and the increasingly authoritarian features of current politics, adherence to democratic rules of the game can be interpreted as a pact on the part of the competing elites that secures their long-term survival and political influence. Russia’s