Legislative History Must Be Used
Legislative History Must be used
When the wording of a statute is not clear and explicit, then it is difficult to know how a particular statute should be applied. Supreme Court Justice Scalia wrongly clams that legislative history should not be used when interpreting an ambiguous statute’s meaning. He is wrong to state that it is undemocratic to use legislative history because legislators, staffers, and lobbyists are all a part of the process of the creation of statutes. Legislators often intentionally write a statute ambiguously, so that a compromise can be reached. Therefore, judges should use the floor reports, presidential messages and committee reports when trying to interpret ambiguous statues. Additionally, Scalia states that those who are in favor of legislative history are trying to make legislative history the law. Legislative history is merely a tool to be used when interpreting ambiguous statutes. Scalia himself utilizes legislative history when dealing with ambiguous statutes as seen in Pierce V. Underwood and Green V. Bock. Ultimately, legislative history adds a great deal of value to judicial interpretation, so not using it, as Scalia suggests, would be a mistake.
There are inherent ambiguities in statutes due to competing legislative interests that require courts to find ways to understand the meaning of statutes. We must use legislative history to find this meaning. In addition, legislators, when creating statutes, interact with other institutions and groups like lobbyists who contribute their own interests, as a result, we see further ambiguity in statutes. When text is ambiguous, judges should use legislative history to find the core meaning. An example of a successful use of legislative history can be found when the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. V Marathon Pipe Line Co. case was used as an example in Congress’ 1984 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy law. The statute contained a phrase “core proceeding.” The statute went on to enumerate
When the wording of a statute is not clear and explicit, then it is difficult to know how a particular statute should be applied. Supreme Court Justice Scalia wrongly clams that legislative history should not be used when interpreting an ambiguous statute’s meaning. He is wrong to state that it is undemocratic to use legislative history because legislators, staffers, and lobbyists are all a part of the process of the creation of statutes. Legislators often intentionally write a statute ambiguously, so that a compromise can be reached. Therefore, judges should use the floor reports, presidential messages and committee reports when trying to interpret ambiguous statues. Additionally, Scalia states that those who are in favor of legislative history are trying to make legislative history the law. Legislative history is merely a tool to be used when interpreting ambiguous statutes. Scalia himself utilizes legislative history when dealing with ambiguous statutes as seen in Pierce V. Underwood and Green V. Bock. Ultimately, legislative history adds a great deal of value to judicial interpretation, so not using it, as Scalia suggests, would be a mistake.
There are inherent ambiguities in statutes due to competing legislative interests that require courts to find ways to understand the meaning of statutes. We must use legislative history to find this meaning. In addition, legislators, when creating statutes, interact with other institutions and groups like lobbyists who contribute their own interests, as a result, we see further ambiguity in statutes. When text is ambiguous, judges should use legislative history to find the core meaning. An example of a successful use of legislative history can be found when the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. V Marathon Pipe Line Co. case was used as an example in Congress’ 1984 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy law. The statute contained a phrase “core proceeding.” The statute went on to enumerate