Leibniz's Three Types Of Monad

Leibniz describes as monad as the basic foundation from which everything else is composed. With monads being very simple, Leibniz suggests that a monad is a substance that neither has extension, nor shape, nor can it be divided. He argues that a monad is one thing with no individual parts. He also contends that monads cannot be changed from anything externally but can only be changed from something internally. He maintains that monads have to have properties because if they didn’t, they would not be considered a being. Thus, monads are distinct and no two monads are alike. This is consistent with his notion that every substance has within itself everything pertaining to its being. They are composed of evidence from their past as well as everything that involves their future. Hence, if any change were to be made in the monad, it would have to come from inside the monad itself.
One type of monad is simple or entelechies. These monads have simple perception, but does not contain any mental capacities such as consciousness or memory. Because this monad is unconscious, he uses the state of dreaming in order to describe this happening. He suggests that during this time, the person is not conscious and often has no recollection of what actually took place in the dream. These monads are also associated with physical objects such as rocks and plants. Another kind of monad are souls. He argues that souls have more distinct perception coupled with memory. Unlike Descartes, Leibniz includes animals in this distinction. He argues that animals have souls and that in their souls, memory imitates reason. He argues that memory, in dogs, trigger sensations that allow them to remember events. He uses the example of dogs and how if a dog were to see a stick, it runs due to the perception of pain that it has attached to the stick. He argues that many actions arise from