Mackenzie's 'Constitution Of Selves'
Explain and assess Mackenzie’s argument that Schechtman overlooks the first personal significance of the body in the constitution of identity. Catriona Mackenzie’s (2009) Personal Identity, Narrative Integration and Embodiment, encapsulates a powerful critique and understanding of the significance of first personal constitution towards personal identity. Marya Schechtman’s (1996_ book The Constitution of Selves is critically assessed revealing a failure to recognize the degree to which, Mackensive believes, first personal significance of the body influences the constitution of identity. Mackenzie agrees with Schechtman on the role of narrative self-constitution possessing the ability to elucidate this signficance in the
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construction of identity, however, shcetman fails to mature these facets because her solution reprdouces problematic assumptions of both body and psychological continuity theoriests as the body as both a mere organisms and about our subjectivity, as entirely psychological. Mackenzie refutes this claiming that although people are not identical to their bodies, their personhood is constituted “in relation to an ongoing but changing bodily perspective that, along with character, provides a principle of stability and permanence that gives rise to a sense of ourselves as persisting subjects.” 114 Ref Mackenzie sustains a valid argument adhering to the complex process of bodily perspective development, which operates as an environment for the ongoing harmony and intelligibility in constructing our own identities.
Schetman’s highlights how prior philosophical literature sought to adress CONCERNS of personal identity through the process of reidenitfication, however, Mackenzie argues what matters most to identity is the dynamic of characterisation. The main concern about continuity of identity revolve around what it is that constitutes a person as the same temporally extended subject. Mackenzie later answers this through an elaboration of narrative self-constituion with a focus on the bodily perspective and it’s influence when appropriating a temporally extended subject and with their subsequent past and future actions, desires, belief and character traits. Mackenzie (2009; p.106) explores narrative self-constitution through the narrative theory of self-interpretation.
The hypothesis supposes our being as methodically structured and intelligible, doubting life as a series of subtle and disconnected experiences. Each person’s identity has an innate narrative form, linking an episodic structure which illustrates momentous characters that interpret and select events to make intelligible. Schechman’s claims “we create our identities and shape our characters by appropriating our past, anticipating our future actions and experiences and identifying or distancing ourselves from certain characteristics, emotions, desires and values (Mackenzie, 2009; p.107).” Schechman states that to us, our lives are coherent and comprehensible, but only to the degree that we articulate and make intelligible our self conceptions to ourselves (body schema), to others and to society. To make snese of our emobodied experience and more importantly to construct our own idenity’s involves a complex interplay that responds and reacts with biological realities, the social and cultural imaginary, and one’s individual psychic history, which includes one’s relationship with others. REF
122 Both Schechman and Mackenzie (2009; p.111) concur that narrative self-constitutions are vital in allowing human’s the capacity to articulate our self-conceptions which in turn allow them to be comprehensible to ourselves. Mackenzie’s argument arises as Schechman emphasises the second and third personal narrative self-constitutions. Schechman stresses that personal identity is distinct from human identity, which corresponds with psychological continuity theorists.. She believes “because the reidentification of human bodies plays such an important role in our social interactions, the narrative self-constitution view demands that it plays a central role in the constitution of persons and personal identity, even though this view does not simply identity persons with human beings.” 113 Schemtan’s argument sits on the fence so to speak, reproducing the problematic assumptions of psychological continuity theorits that the body can be both a merre organism, and that our subjectivity can be wholey physcholoigical.
construction of identity, however, shcetman fails to mature these facets because her solution reprdouces problematic assumptions of both body and psychological continuity theoriests as the body as both a mere organisms and about our subjectivity, as entirely psychological. Mackenzie refutes this claiming that although people are not identical to their bodies, their personhood is constituted “in relation to an ongoing but changing bodily perspective that, along with character, provides a principle of stability and permanence that gives rise to a sense of ourselves as persisting subjects.” 114 Ref Mackenzie sustains a valid argument adhering to the complex process of bodily perspective development, which operates as an environment for the ongoing harmony and intelligibility in constructing our own identities.
Schetman’s highlights how prior philosophical literature sought to adress CONCERNS of personal identity through the process of reidenitfication, however, Mackenzie argues what matters most to identity is the dynamic of characterisation. The main concern about continuity of identity revolve around what it is that constitutes a person as the same temporally extended subject. Mackenzie later answers this through an elaboration of narrative self-constituion with a focus on the bodily perspective and it’s influence when appropriating a temporally extended subject and with their subsequent past and future actions, desires, belief and character traits. Mackenzie (2009; p.106) explores narrative self-constitution through the narrative theory of self-interpretation.
The hypothesis supposes our being as methodically structured and intelligible, doubting life as a series of subtle and disconnected experiences. Each person’s identity has an innate narrative form, linking an episodic structure which illustrates momentous characters that interpret and select events to make intelligible. Schechman’s claims “we create our identities and shape our characters by appropriating our past, anticipating our future actions and experiences and identifying or distancing ourselves from certain characteristics, emotions, desires and values (Mackenzie, 2009; p.107).” Schechman states that to us, our lives are coherent and comprehensible, but only to the degree that we articulate and make intelligible our self conceptions to ourselves (body schema), to others and to society. To make snese of our emobodied experience and more importantly to construct our own idenity’s involves a complex interplay that responds and reacts with biological realities, the social and cultural imaginary, and one’s individual psychic history, which includes one’s relationship with others. REF
122 Both Schechman and Mackenzie (2009; p.111) concur that narrative self-constitutions are vital in allowing human’s the capacity to articulate our self-conceptions which in turn allow them to be comprehensible to ourselves. Mackenzie’s argument arises as Schechman emphasises the second and third personal narrative self-constitutions. Schechman stresses that personal identity is distinct from human identity, which corresponds with psychological continuity theorists.. She believes “because the reidentification of human bodies plays such an important role in our social interactions, the narrative self-constitution view demands that it plays a central role in the constitution of persons and personal identity, even though this view does not simply identity persons with human beings.” 113 Schemtan’s argument sits on the fence so to speak, reproducing the problematic assumptions of psychological continuity theorits that the body can be both a merre organism, and that our subjectivity can be wholey physcholoigical.