Mackie Moral Relativism
JANE: Hi, Zach!
ZACHERY: Hello, Jane.
JANE: So, I was wondering, you just finished covering moral relativism in CRA, right?
ZACHERY: Yup.
JANE: Alright, well, John was talking to me the other day, and I was telling him about the work I've been doing to support education for women in Africa. And he told me that, according to some guy named Mackie, that people's right to education isn't actually a moral fact and me trying to increase the education of women isn't justified, cuz I'm just forcing my own culture onto theirs.
ZACHERY: You could certainly make that claim from Mackie's work.
JANE: So what does he mean that there are no moral facts?
ZACHERY: Well. First, Mackie defines two orders of "moral views". First order moral views are more practical and direct. And second order moral views are the views concerning the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing (709). In this case, because we're talking about moral facts, we're only really concerned with what he calls second order. Mackie does agree that, if we have objective moral values, we can correctly judge the actions in relation to those values. But he disagrees that there can be those values.
JANE: So I can judge how well I can help educate women, but not whether that's right?
ZACHERY: Exactly!
JANE: Alright, but, that doesn't tell me if it's good to educate them though... …show more content…
Hypothetical imperatives are based on "If you want something, do this", where what you should do is the most effective way to get whatever you want. And categorical imperatives leave off the first part and are simply: "you ought to do this." That is, if it is to be done only for itself, instead of for some other desire, like hypotheticals are. Of course, it isn't just the grammatical structure that makes these definitions, it's whether the action is done for a specific result, instead of for the action itself
ZACHERY: Hello, Jane.
JANE: So, I was wondering, you just finished covering moral relativism in CRA, right?
ZACHERY: Yup.
JANE: Alright, well, John was talking to me the other day, and I was telling him about the work I've been doing to support education for women in Africa. And he told me that, according to some guy named Mackie, that people's right to education isn't actually a moral fact and me trying to increase the education of women isn't justified, cuz I'm just forcing my own culture onto theirs.
ZACHERY: You could certainly make that claim from Mackie's work.
JANE: So what does he mean that there are no moral facts?
ZACHERY: Well. First, Mackie defines two orders of "moral views". First order moral views are more practical and direct. And second order moral views are the views concerning the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing (709). In this case, because we're talking about moral facts, we're only really concerned with what he calls second order. Mackie does agree that, if we have objective moral values, we can correctly judge the actions in relation to those values. But he disagrees that there can be those values.
JANE: So I can judge how well I can help educate women, but not whether that's right?
ZACHERY: Exactly!
JANE: Alright, but, that doesn't tell me if it's good to educate them though... …show more content…
Hypothetical imperatives are based on "If you want something, do this", where what you should do is the most effective way to get whatever you want. And categorical imperatives leave off the first part and are simply: "you ought to do this." That is, if it is to be done only for itself, instead of for some other desire, like hypotheticals are. Of course, it isn't just the grammatical structure that makes these definitions, it's whether the action is done for a specific result, instead of for the action itself