Management and Program Analyst

Executive Summary

Public administration diverges from public accountability in that the former refers to rules and regulations, while the latter points to results and reward (or retribution). One mostly involves things, the other people. One is physical, the other organic. One is not relevant, much less successful, without the other.

Approaches to public administration and accountability differ between the United States and France due to each nation’s diverging political philosophies and constitutional systems, both a reflection of their people, culture and history. Each country can study and learn from the other’s respective public responsibility frameworks, and their major elements of integrity, ethics, transparency, governance, and performance.

France with its more egalitarian conceptualization of democracy, and centralized political and bureaucratic systems of preference, emphasizes universality based on law as a major organizational principle. This manifests itself as equality and solidarity in the arena of ethics, as stability and continuity in the area of governance, and parliamentary control with decentralized decision-making, when couched in terms of performance and results.

The Americans, preferring pluralistic democracy, have established their governmental institutions in their federalist principles and concept of shared power through checks and balances. This translates into an ethical framework based on individual rights and personal accountability, a governing framework which considers local representation and citizen participation, and a performance model focused, much like the French, on ensuring a common understanding of and commitment to the political and bureaucratic intent (i.e., goals and priorities) of elected and appointed officials.

In this last category regarding performance and results, both countries, as nations of consent, appear to be equally concerned about transparency and the open sharing of information. Unfortunately, both seem to be equally unconcerned about eliciting and incorporating the considerations of the general public in the development of government goals, objectives, and associated indicators of success.

Ultimately, Americans can learn a lot from the more mature, sophisticated and robust systems of French public administration.

More specifically, the United States should consider French philosophy, methods and practices in the development, implementation, and measurement of the effectiveness of US homeland security policy and strategy, mitigating its current challenges involving consistency, continuity, collaboration, connectivity and communication in line with America’s foundational principles of federalism, the separation of powers, and self-governance.

Introduction

It is thought that public accountability, distilled down to its essence as “who is responsible to whom for what, and through what means,” is an area in the domain of public administration that would benefit the most from the study and research of other nations’ best practices. President Woodrow Wilson, who spearheaded the development of the modern administrative state along with other early 20th Century Progressives, was quoted as saying that “nowhere in the whole field of politics, it would seem, can we make use of the historical, comparative method more safely than in this province of administration.” More specifically, he thought that the rather rudimentary American systems and practices would be enriched by borrowing from the Prussian and French (i.e., Napoleonic) models.

Almost 100 years earlier, Alexis de Toqueville, actively involved in the French politics of his time, wondered himself at the immature, patchwork, even haphazard approach to governing adopted by the Americans, whom he considered to be a fairly evolved people, modern in almost every other respect:

The public administration is, so to speak, oral and traditional. But little [in the United States] is committed to writing and that little is soon wafted away forever, like the leaves of the Sibyl, by the smallest breeze […]. The instability of [the American] administration has penetrated into the habits of the people…and no one cares for what occurred before his time: no methodical system is pursued, no archives are formed, and no documents are brought together when it would be very easy to do so […]. Nevertheless, the art of administration is undoubtedly a science, and no science can be improved if the discoveries and observations of successive generations are not connected together in the order in which they occur […]. But the persons who conduct the administration in America can seldom afford any instruction to one another […].

We will not be providing a comprehensive overview, historical or otherwise, of public administration, but rather a much more limited discussion on the topic of public accountability and what it means in terms of integrity, ethics, transparency, governance, and performance results; all major elements of administrative responsibility and public service. Nor will we be peering into the philosophy and practices of the Prussians, only their French counterparts; offering a few suggestions on how France’s current remedies might be reconciled with American thought, political ideas and constitutional systems. Our purpose is not to wholesale adopt the French model, tweaking it where appropriate to produce an Americanized version of the same, but, rather, to simply highlight some of its more neutral doctrines and general rules of administration, in view of their potential applicability to American political and administrative processes.
What is Public Accountability?
In “The Politics of the Administrative Process,” author Donald F. Kettle, provides three pillars of public accountability:

1. The legal/political responsibility to establish and uphold the law (i.e., Constitution); 2. The bureaucratic/administrative ethical responsibility to be obedient to the law, to hierarchy, and to standards of efficiency and effectiveness; and 3. Adherence to moral standards and values.

Legality can be expressed in two ways: (1) Legislation based on the Constitution, and in conformity with existing law; and (2) Public policy influenced by political considerations.

Ethics pertains to the rules and regulations governing public administrators and officials in the implementation of legislation and public policy.

Morality is an individual’s internal compass (i.e., what’s right and wrong for him/her).

Because of people’s tendency to rationalize bad behavior, the challenge becomes how to successfully subject bureaucratic power (i.e., ethics) to legal accountability (i.e., both the law and politics), and ultimately, to a nation’s guiding compass (i.e., morals). If unsuccessful, any legal boundaries codified into law will simply result in increasingly complex and difficult to solve political challenges, created by the havoc caused by individual administrative decisions made ad-hoc on the front lines in response to vague policy.

In the end, it is neither professional training (i.e., bureaucratic/administrative responsibility) nor external controls (i.e., legal/political responsibility) that ultimately hold executors accountable, but, rather, their own internal compasses (i.e., ethical/moral behavior). Therefore, true public accountability must include all three elements, if it is to ensure political legitimacy in nation-states of consent, where government is based on laws established by the governed and not simply on the mere whims of individuals.

Political, Executive Power and Public Accountability

Before we can discuss how American and French governmental power is ensuring public accountability; it is essential that we first understand the various political and bureaucratic authorities, under which the two countries operate.

We will briefly cover a few of these major philosophical streams by first summarizing, then comparing and contrasting the major political and bureaucratic institutions, policies and legal traditions of both the United States and France, and how the two philosophies impact each country’s concept of administrative responsibility.

Next, we will turn to a more focused discussion of public accountability based on these implicit and explicit legislative and judicial traditions and principles. We will look at how these differing contexts are being playing out at a more tactical, operational level, by reviewing how American and French attitudes are being manifested in practice in the following three (3) public accountability focus areas:

* Focus Area #1: Integrity, Ethics * Focus Area #2: Transparency, Democratic Governance * Focus Area #3: Performance, Results

Indeed, in democratic nations of consent, power always considers and responds to the concerns of those governed, whether proactively or reactively, positively or negatively, collaboratively or prescriptively, peacefully or contentiously. Government actions acknowledge the current dynamics and expectations of the public, products of a nation’s laws and by-laws, themselves a reflection of its people, culture and history.

Finally, we will highlight specific areas of divergence/convergence and make recommendations on how French philosophy, approaches and practices might be incorporated into the policies of U.S. agencies charged with developing, implementing, and measuring the effectiveness of homeland security strategy (i.e., the establishment of goals, prioritization of interests, allocation of resources, and the gauging of success).
Constitutional Democracy through Federalism (USA) vs. Constitutional Presidency with “Régionalization” (FRANCE)
Like in most democratic nations, American and French citizens’ attitudes and expectations toward public accountability are a reflection of their respective political and bureaucratic systems, approaches, restrictions, and legislative and executive requirements.
In the United States, for example, the American founding fathers, in their search of a “government of the people, for the people, and by the people,” established a federal constitutional republic consisting of three branches of government, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial, each recognizing their limitations on the exercise of power. Respective roles and responsibilities were written into the text of the fundamental law of the land, the U.S. Constitution. Implicit in its design was the separation of powers (i.e., checks and balances), the federal-state division of sovereignty (i.e., federalism), and the recognition that the ultimate arbiter of all disputes would be the law (i.e. the Constitution).
A nation’s Constitution describes its very nature. The American Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and subsequent Bill of Rights all have two overriding themes: (1) limited government, and (2) citizen participation (i.e., republican liberty). In the United States, both are necessary to maintain public trust. The nature of the American experience and collective social order is one of distributed, balanced and limited power. American thought pertaining to national unity and freedom are inseparable from these two pillars and their underlying principles of federalism, the separation of powers, self-governance, and the rule of law. In the American mind, there are no exclusions, or exceptions to these fundamental requirements.
Early 20th Century Progressives created fissures in this foundation when they chose to increase governmental authority by separating political influence from administrative discretion and decision-making. In creating the modern administrative state, Progressives believed that they had found a pragmatic solution to the all-powerful barons and captains of industry and their unbridled pursuit of wealth in the face of American industrial and territorial expansion. Wilsonian thought purported that many areas of public administration should be based upon expertise and neutral principles alone, in order to free the executive branch of government from the more negative influences of partisan politics.

One hundred years later, however, many believe that such a political-administrative dichotomy has resulted in government policy making and implementation being cut off from the positive, even purifying, influence of the people. In other words, they feel that the American government today has become a monopolistic “oligarchy” with important decisions affecting the daily lives of everyday Americans being made behind closed doors, by a limited number of unknown subject matter experts, holding themselves accountable for rather limited, sometimes even questionable, results. Due to the lack of transparency, open discussion and decision-making, a few purport that the United States is no longer a “government of the people, for the people, and by the people” because government officials are no longer directly accountable to the citizenry.
The French do not share this perspective, in the least.
Since 1959, France has operated under the Fifth Republic, a regime where the President is the effective head of state, running the affairs of government, with special powers over the Parliament and the Constitution. Parliament is made up of two chambers, the National Assembly, which makes the law, and the Senate, which acts as its consultative body. The executive arm of the government is almost completely separate from the National Assembly. The president appoints a prime minister, who then chooses his ministers. The executive commands the apparatus of the State, the ministries, and the civil servants.
The three American principles of separation of powers, federalism, and the rule of law, when placed within the context of France’s governmental systems, also diverge from the experience of the United States.
To begin with, there are really only three checks and balances that ensure that the French President, a sort of elected yet unimpeachable constitutional monarch, is prevented from enjoying quasi-dictatorial powers: (1) he must follow the Constitution, (2) he must be elected by universal suffrage, and (3) he must obey the laws of the Republic. Once elected, and the French system does everything to ensure that elections are decided by majorities, politicians are considered to be operating under comprehensive mandates, conferred by the people. Because they enjoy such widely recognized legitimacy, they are given much freer rein to reign than their American counterparts: a sort of de facto benefit of the doubt.
Regarding the concept of federalism (or local autonomy), the term liberty, in spite of being part of France’s national motto, “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité,” does not apply to local French government. This is basically because all of France is considered to be a “colony” of Paris; even Paris, which is also subject to state monopoly. In La République Française, there is no local government, only local administration, organized into three different levels: communes (or municipalities), 99 Départments (or administrative units), and 26 Régions, none of which have the authority to levy taxes.
Whereas Americans emphasize local representation and independence, the French appear to stress unity and uniformity. Indeed, local powers are seen as a threat to France’s cohesiveness, even sovereignty, and the French government systematically strips local communities of many of their powers. Municipalities are not even allowed to make their own laws to ensure safety, security, or sanitation, which might possibly result in differences in service, offending the average French citizen’s demand for equality.
On the topic of law, the role of the judiciary also occupies its own unique position in French public life, and therefore, a few important points need to be made regarding the influence of courts under the 5th Republic.
France’s current body of law, handed down from the Napoleonic era, consists of (1) Criminal Law; (2) Common Law (i.e., le Code Civil); and (3) Administrative Law. Our discussions will focus on the latter, as it specifically relates to public accountability and administrative responsiveness.
The French State does not see its role as one of responsibility to the people, but rather for them. Because of this, the State prefers to subject itself to a panel of peers, rather than directly to its citizenry, when determining whether its institutions and public servants are upholding the Constitution, according to the law and in the best interests of the general public. These administrative tribunals, operating under French administrative law, act as a buffer between the citizens of France and their public administrators. The French see the administrative law’s primary purpose as adjudicating the fairness of governmental systems and workers, judging the individual decisions and actions of unelected civil servants (i.e., fonctionnaires). In this sense, France considers itself to be a self-policing nation where the executive, through its court system, serves as its own judge, jury and executioner, weighing the government’s quotidian choices in the scales of administrative law. Ironically, France has not devolved into a dictatorship of technocrats, thanks, in part, to these technocratic tribunals, which often rule against the government and the State.
A second check on the power of the State, in the French mind, are its politicians; primarily the President, who is himself elected by universal suffrage, and, as protector of the people, considered to be the ultimate adjudicator of the law. The French appreciate that the administration (i.e., government apparatus) is held accountable to administrative law; the people, to civil and criminal law, and that the ensemble is subject to the President and other elected officials (i.e., Parliament), who are ultimately accountable to the people, at the top of the food chain, closing the loop.
Their reasoning goes something like this: Politicians are elected by the people at their whim, and therefore should not be subject to the mere whims of justice (i.e., bureaucratic/ administrative, civil, criminal law). Only the State, a faceless and rather impersonal hegemony, is to be judged by this law, not political representatives, who are actual, real live human beings. If the citizens choose to elect “criminals” and “sexual perverts,” then what business is that of the State? The law’s business is to regulate the decisions and actions of bureaucrats or unelected government officials, working within the system, and not their elected officials who are looking out for the people and the common good. The people have chosen the politicians, not the government, and they are in power, not to set examples, but to run things smoothly and equitably.
In fact, the French political system sees the independence of the judiciary, as “anti-democratic,” subjugating those “chosen by the people” to the administrative apparatus, that impersonal body of law, policy, and precedence. This is in stark contrast to the American system, where the judicial branch of government is expected to keep elected officials, both executors and legislators in check, by adjudicating on the constitutionality of legislative and executive decisions, overturning them when necessary.
In conclusion, the French basically trust their chosen leaders to commandeer the ship of state well; their political classes, all supposedly subject matter experts in public administration, to keep the governmental levers running like a well-oiled machine, within the confines of the Constitution and the law. The French people mostly desire order and stability from their elected and appointed officials, not explanations, preferring to focus their attention on greater pursuits, such as la joie de vivre (i.e., France’s version of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness). As long as the State allows them to freely pursue their passions, they are more than willing to cede political autonomy/power, becoming almost indifferent to the goings on in the Palais d’Élysées and its representatives at the local levels.
If only American politicians and civil servants were so lucky.
In spite of Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to reign in the influence of special interests in the affairs of state, by defining public accountability as the exercise of administrative power under the control and supervision of non-elected officials (i.e., civil servants), the American people persist in stridently demanding that their public institutions remain directly accountable to them, and not only to appointed, or even, elected officials.
As previously mentioned, the early 20th Century progressives adopted the French model, which maintained and supported such a politics-administration dichotomy, believing that protection against tyranny would only come through separating political decision-making, beholden to special interests (and the fickle idiosyncrasies of the people), from administrative policy execution (and the wise and sanguine direction of government experts).
The people have been fighting back ever since, because the only legitimate government, in the American mind, is the one that remains directly accountable to the people.
The American system of republican representation curtails the power and actions of both lawmakers and executives, but not judges, diverging from the French system. As upholders of the supreme law of the land, the Constitution, judges are seen by the people as an independent and objective collective body, defenders of true democracy and representative (i.e., republican) government.
Americans demand self-government, while the French willingly acquiesce before their state-run government.
It is obvious to see how these divergent French and American political and bureaucratic philosophies might create different values, attitudes, mind-sets and expectations toward public service and accountability.

Public Service and Accountability

Now that we know what the French and American attitudes and mindsets are toward public accountability and trust, and why they hold these differing values and expectations, let us now turn to policy development and execution, or how public servants in each respective country are implementing accountability-related approaches and practices based on four distinct categories of public service accountability expectations: ethical, democratic, fiscal and performance. Because these perspectives are each based on a common understanding or general concept of public accountability, we shall begin our discussion with a simple, yet broad definition offered by Melvin Dubnick and H. George Frederickson in their report, Public Accountability: Performance Measurements, the Extended State, and the Search for Trust:

Accountability can be approached as having two major definable characteristics: (1) it is a social relationship between at least two parties; (2) in which at least one party to the relationship perceives a demand or expectation for account giving between the two. This definition highlights the fact that accountability is social in nature---it must involve two or more individuals to come into play in any relationship.
The authors equate Public Service Accountability with the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture,” necessary to bring about the three things we require of our government today --- efficient control, democratic legitimacy, and effective performance.
A report from the Kettering Foundation, Don’t Count Us Out: How an Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine The Public’s Confidence in Schools, Business, Government, and More, equates the disconnect between the way public institutions understand accountability, and the way the general public does, by drawing attention to the difference between Public Administration, or policy/program accountability, which falls to non-elected government officials, and Public Accountability, the main responsibility of political representatives. They purport that institutions think of accountability in terms of information sharing toward increased effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., performance), while citizens tend to think of it in terms of trust, based on relationship. The public could care less that a government institution is managing appropriately (i.e., or properly executing), which is the concern of the typical public servant and his or her bureaucratic leadership. The average American citizen’s concerns relate to other less “machine-like” considerations, such as, integrity and trustworthiness, involving reprimanding or rewarding individuals based on conduct, democratic responsiveness to citizens’ needs, and improved government goods and services.
In summary, the highest levels of American political leadership understand that public service accountability demands improved transparency, communication, and citizen cooperation, collaboration and satisfaction, which, in turn, contributes to enduring public trust.

Elia Armstrong of the United Nations, in proposing an ethics framework or (inter)national integrity system with mutually reinforcing legislative standards, institutional structures and administrative procedures, defines public service accountability in equally simple terms:

* Integrity: honesty or trustworthiness in the discharge of official duties, serving as an antithesis to corruption or the abuse of office; * Transparency: unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance in the public sector; and * Accountability (or Performance): the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated performance objectives.

It is only when public service accountability is placed within the greater context of ethics and democratic governance that public officials will be encouraged to continually place community interest above their own, thus bridging the gap between policy and practice, rhetoric and results.

Having thus established, for the purposes of this discussion, a final working definition of public accountability as involving integrity, ethics, transparency, and sound public administration through fiscal and performance responsibility, let us now move on to comparing and contrasting practices in both France and the United States within these more limited parameters.

Focus Area #1: Integrity, Ethics and Accountability

Even though there is disagreement regarding whether ethics can be taught, as researchers into child development assert that the values of most children are formed by the age of three, an attempt will be made here to point out the major expectations and trends relative to the integrity of government officials in both the United States and France.

As previously stated, individual integrity and ethics speak of a person’s internal compass, his or her sense of what’s right and wrong, while such concepts, on a community level, pertain to the rules and regulations governing public administrators and officials in the implementation of legislation, public policy and government agency results. Public ethics result when governments are operating honestly, without conflict of interest, self-dealing, or other forms of fraud, or abuse of the undue influence of governmental authority.

Individual Ethics
We indicated earlier that American ethical values revolve around individualism and republican liberty, and, like a weathervane, are used by the average US citizen to assess fairness and justice within the public arena. Public officials, both elected and non-, exercise legitimate power in the exercise of their functions, only in so far as they are (1) chosen by the people and (2) remain beholden to them, continuing in their representation and advocacy of each individual constituent’s unique, even idiosyncratic values, and personal needs. Such a (dis)position is captured well in one of the more famous American sayings, “No taxation, without representation.”
In France, public expectations and trends regarding the concept of individual integrity and ethics among public officials fall at the polar opposite end of the spectrum. They have been captured in a recent Charter outlining public service values to be encouraged in France’s citizen-servants. It is important to note that public priorities in France relating to sense of duty to country and public service are not focused on the same things or in the same way as they are in America. This is because French civil servants are not looking to vehicle the same image of themselves to their citizenry, who have different expectations than most Americans.

The French mentality toward public service was shaped by their history, which as previously stated, was steeped in law. For the French, to separate moral values from judicial law is to immediately diminish both their authority and their influence. Separated from law, such ethics no longer enjoy solidarity with or legitimacy from the French people and, by extension, immediately surrender their universal applicability. In short, these ethical considerations become subjective. For the French, all judicial principles are values, but not all values are judicial principles. The former are considered “traditional” values and are mandatory within French civil society, while the latter, even if desirable, remain optional. Nevertheless, even though they might not be officially codified by law, the Charter highlights a few of these “emerging” values, but only if they were based on the results of either (1) a public survey or referendum, or (2) part of statutory law elsewhere. Both categories follow:

* Traditional Values: Respect for the law, Neutrality, Integrity, Continuity, Secularism, Equality, Respect, Solidarity, Impartiality * Emerging Values: Competency, Quality, Responsibility, Adaptability, Transparency, Efficiency, Performance, Innovation, Enterprise, Engagement, Ambition, Creativity, Responsiveness, Discretion, Customer Service

It is important to note that the Charter appeared to be slightly suspicious of the emerging values, associated as they were with industry and the private sector, focused on the client or end user rather than the public servant, and therefore, having the potential for randomness. To take into account such skepticism, but still usher in “reform,” the Charter’s committee proposed revising their initial list by using the traditional values as a reference point for the newer ones. They also proposed further anchoring their list by infusing some of the judicial principles contained in their regularly updated Law No. 83-634 of July 13, 1983, concerning the responsibilities and obligations of public servants. However, in spite of all these safeguards, they still warned that translating legal concepts into behavioral norms was not without risk. Special attention would need to be made to strike the right balance between the traditional collective values, and the more individualistic emerging mores, if the common interest and public good was to be maintained. In the end, combining the best of both worlds, the committee identified the following essential public service values, grouping them into three separate categories:

1. Republican Values: Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood, Impartiality, Neutrality, Secularism (associated with non-discrimination and equal treatment under the law) 2. Professional Values: Efficiency, Performance, Quality, Legality, Adaptability, Continuity (excluding any mention of strikes) 3. Human Values: Integrity, Honesty, Exemplary Nature (the opposite of impropriety), Discretion, Loyalty, Transparency

It is obvious to see the French national value of “Fraternité,” here almost synonymous with solidarity, reflected in this short list.

Public Ethics

Based on the information gathered, we were left with the impression that, although both governments have different cultural, political and administrative environments, the USA and France face similar ethical challenges regarding public integrity and accountability. Both handle them in similar ways, and with comparable results.

As a world dominated by increasing globalization, most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, wealthy and mainly located in western Europe and North America, seem to be displacing emphasis on standard anti-corruption safeguards (i.e., conflict-of-interest, bribery, fraud, etc.), and public access to information (i.e., freedom of information), to stress the importance of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs. Efforts in the first two areas have been largely successful, due in large part to the robust transparency mechanisms that have been built into these countries’ accountability frameworks.

These OECD countries, of which the United States and France are a part, identified and adopted 12 Principles to strengthen their national ethics infrastructures by “incorporating an ethical dimension into management frameworks, and reviewing the impact of various reforms on the integrity of public sector employees.” Likewise, the European Union developed an Ethics Framework in 2004, resembling the work of the OECD, and focusing on four (4) areas: (1) general core values of integrity, (2) specific standards of conduct, (3) actions for implementing and promoting integrity values, and (4) standards and methods and procedures to report integrity-related offences.

Public websites, such as The Global Integrity Report publically displays the results of such efforts, using both qualitative analysis and quantitative indicators of success articulated around major accountability concepts, such as transparency of the public political and administrative processes, media freedom, asset disclosure requirements, and conflicts of interest regulations.

Tables displaying the assessment results of both the United States and France, highlighting the differences and gaps between official policy, based on legal frameworks, and actual implementation results, can be accessed on their website at the following link: http://report.globalintegrity.org. Comparisons between the two countries in 2007, for example, found the United States with a “Strong” rating, or overall score of 87 out of 100, and France with an overall score of 78 out of 100, or “Moderate” rating. The researchers highlighted high-level corruption scandals within all three branches of government (i.e., the executive, legislative and judiciary), insufficient disclosure of government officials’ assets, and inadequate auditing of state-owned enterprises, as challenges unique to France; while high-level lobbying and corruption scandals, official secrecy, campaign finance regulations and lack of true independence and objectivity in American oversight agencies, topped the list of challenges plaguing accountability frameworks within the United States. Both countries received similar scores with regards to freedom of the press, public access to information, political participation, election integrity, and political financing. Further discussion on transparency or media and public access to information will be provided in the next section.

A possible solution to these challenges, which in the opinion of this author, is still yet to be fully considered in either country, is a solid plan to educate the private sector, both individuals and organizations, on their oversight responsibilities (i.e., “watchdog” roles), getting them, as partakers of civil society, more involved in the actual development and evaluation of public policy, goals and objectives.

Focus Area #2: Transparency, Democratic Governance and Accountability

Moving along with the concept of democratic governance, simply defined as government agencies doing what their citizens want and need, is dependent upon government’s responsibility to conduct its business transparently. Transparency is also defined in simple terms as “unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on public sector decisions.” Indeed, without transparency, or openness in government, citizens would remain detached and unengaged from the efforts of their elected representatives and appointed officials, not knowing whether they were doing what they were sent to do.

The ultimate goal of democratic governance, undergird by government transparency, is to ensure that the common citizen has had a chance to understand and weigh in on what their government is doing, and evaluate how well it is doing it, in time to prevent and/or possibly correct ineffective or inappropriate actions. The more people are informed, the more involved they will become. The more involved they become, the more they will buy in. The more they buy in, the less they will come to resent or resist their government.

Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, former European Union (EU) Ombudsman, states that democratic governance can only exist where there is government legitimacy, ensured through free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and public access to information.

He continues by saying that there are two types of democratic government in existence today: pluralistic and egalitarian.

The French have adopted the egalitarian or “leveling” conceptualization of democracy, with their centralized form of government and preoccupation with equality, or homogeneity, as a major organizational principle. The major drawback of egalitarianism is the diminution of local representation and individual rights.

The Americans, on the other hand, prefer pluralistic democracy, rooted in their federalist principles and concept of shared power through checks and balances, excluding, by definition, the notion that electoral victory confers a plenary right to exercise power. Because the USA has more robust institutional and societal checks and balances on power than France, it tends to demand greater account of its leaders, more often, and this, throughout the political/administrative process.

Indeed, Federalism encourages decision-making to be as open and as close to the citizen as possible. A similar principle is Subsidiarity, found in the laws of the European Union (EU), or Régionalization, its equivalent in France. Without some devolution of power to the lower levels of government, bringing citizens closer to their governmental decision-making structures, public administration would quickly descend into technocracy and elitism, or worse, corruption. Government that is unconnected and estranged from the governed automatically becomes less legitimate in their eyes.

In most Western democracies, people are free to elect the person they want to represent them, and if he or she does not deliver, the people will hold this individual “accountable” by not reelecting him/her to office. This is referred to as accountability at elections. In governments of consent, such accountability is no longer problematic. However, unless the electorate is continually being provided with enough information to make well-informed evaluations regarding the priorities of their representatives and the choices they are making, what Professor Diamnadourous calls accountability between elections, accountability at elections becomes questionable. Indeed, an uninformed and disinterested electorate makes a mockery of elections, along with the notion of the will of the people, swept aside by public administration that can easily become, under such opaque conditions, arbitrary, self-serving, and possibly even, corrupt.

True government legitimacy entails accountability both at and between elections, guaranteed through robust checks and balances, at the institutional and societal levels; in other words, representative government that is open and transparent before the people:

The basic idea of transparency is that citizens should easily be able to obtain the information they need in order to call public authorities to account, whether at elections, or between elections. At least until recently, many modern democracies have tended to assume that sufficient information would [simply] emerge as a by-product of the exercise of traditional political freedoms, in particular the freedom of expression. However, freedom of expression does not require public authorities to impart information to citizens [voluntarily].

In order for this type of (official) information to flow freely from the government to the general public, some type of forcing mechanism(s) must be put into place.

Western European countries, most of which have parliamentary systems, began to adopt domestic legislation for transparency and accountability in the 1950s, both basic qualifications for membership in the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). EU Regulation 1049/2001 now constitutes the basic legal framework for public access to documents held by EU institutions and bodies. The Regulation applies directly to the Council, Commission and European Parliament and it has been extended ad hoc to cover certain EU agencies. Many of the other institutions and bodies that adopted rules on public access following the EU regulation subsequently revised them in line with its principles. In the United States, laws designed to ensure public access to information include the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, and the Ethics in Government Act, passed in 1978. Their equivalent in France is Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978 and Law 200-321 of April 12, 2000.

Freedom of Information

Freedom of information is an area where there is the least amount of divergence, in both principle and practice, between France and the United States. Both countries equally expound on the democratic principles of free nations, where rulers govern with the consent of the governed, and where leaders regularly update citizens on their action and progress through inspirational, motivating speeches and public awareness campaigns. This proximity of thought is reflected in the following statements spoken by a true American and a true Frenchman:

"A popular Government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives."
James Madison, Letter to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822

"The concentration of power and the subjection of individuals will increase amongst democratic nations... in the same proportion as their ignorance."
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 2, 1840

In spite of differences between French and American political systems, laws and regulations relating to democratic governance and transparency, or the right of citizenry to know and influence what their government is doing, are quite similar.

The Global Integrity Report provides a snapshot of both countries’ guarantee to provide information on its operations at the request of the public, using two (2) performance indicators: the legal right to access information and the effectiveness of such access (see Appendix A).

Democratic Governance

Unfortunately, this closeness in rhetoric is offset by an equally dramatic gap in practice, also comparatively similar in both countries.

Democratic governance not only entails freedom and access to information, or transparency, it also requires policies and practices that allow citizens to influence what their government is doing and how they are doing it based on that information. While adequate mechanisms exist to obtain information from government officials on their activities, there are few viable (i.e., effective) options for citizens to meaningfully act upon it once they have it.

Americans, understanding that they currently have no direct control over, and often very little knowledge of, the unaccountable numbers of individual decisions that administrators make every day to make public administration work, seek other avenues to voice their concerns and impact change.

There are several options currently available to the American taxpayer to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” a right enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

To begin with, there are two-way, interactive means of communicating with both elected and unelected government officials at the local level, such as attending town hall or neighborhood council meetings, participating in public surveys and focus groups, serving on boards, commissions, and oversight committees, sponsoring initiatives, and volunteering, all of which encourages greater public participation.

At the national level, as well, citizens can influence accountability between elections, by directly soliciting their elected officials in Congress.

We will focus our attention on the latter, more particularly how Congress sees its role and responsibility to be responsive to its citizens in fulfillment of its obligation to conduct oversight of the executive branch’s administrative programs and activities. Indeed, without the full recognition and consistent enforcement of legislation, the United States would quickly devolve into a nation of scofflaws.

The United States Congress accomplishes its oversight responsibilities through a variety of legislative review mechanisms:

* Authorizing Committees: the regular legislative committees that prepare the laws that authorize government programs; * Appropriations Committees: standing committees that manage the annual appropriations process, or legislation that commits money to be spent on government programs; * Committees on Government Operations

The primary purposes of oversight are multiple: assurance that administrators follow legislative intent; investigation of instances of fraud, waste, and abuse; collection of information; evaluation of program effectiveness; protection of legislative prerogatives; personal advocacy; and reversal of unpopular actions.

The task is daunting and it is no secret that Congressional representatives neither have the will nor the way to execute adequate oversight of all government agencies and programs throughout the lifecycle of an authorized and appropriated investment (i.e., pre-, and post-legislation).

Absence a smooth transition between legislation and the corresponding development, implementation, and evaluation of executive branch policy interpreting that mandate, divergence will continue to exist between the law and its enforcement, with deficiencies plaguing the implementation of government programs diverging from the intent of lawmakers and the American values and expectations they represent.

The general public and their officials often express frustration with government’s inability (or unwillingness) to reconcile freedom and flexibility (i.e., discretion) to act when necessary in order to obtain the best results possible in the implementation of policy, while still remaining accountable to the nation’s law, ethics and morals. Fortunately, for government administrators these three elements often overlap, but not always. Sometimes there is divergence due to particular circumstances and individuals, because, at present, there is no system in place where everyone knows the accountability expectations and where these expectations apply to everyone.

As long as there are different interpretations and disagreement regarding the law, Americans will continue to write their Congressional Representatives who will dutifully consider their constituents’ letters of complaint before forwarding them to the same the agency where the complaint arose in the first place. Admittedly, such a self-policing approach for the “redress of grievances” is not ideal. Congressional oversight is not enough to ensure accountability, because today elected officials are not making the rules, appointed officials are, and every effort should be made to proactively seek alternatives.

France’s political institutions, as well, are slowly attempting to infuse greater responsiveness into their rigid penchant for absolutism, authoritarianism, and centralism, by interjecting Régionalization (the devolution of limited powers to local administrations,) and La Cohabitation (President and Prime Minister from rival parties) into their political processes. They’re looking for that hybrid “sweet spot” between total dictatorial centralization and decentralization, which they consider to be “disorderly, confusing, and inefficient.” Decentralization, translated into French terms, simply means that the Palais d’Élysées will be able to make more informed decisions, being closer to the action on the ground, as opposed to sharing any real representative, checked-and-balanced power with the Provinces.

Nevertheless, an unintended side effect of such localized decision-making, as well as rival parties counter-balancing power at the executive level, is that the French electorate is starting to demand more accountability from their elected officials.

Getting average citizens, and other impartial/independent stakeholders, more involved in government affairs and operations creates an environment conducive to greater political and administrative accountability (i.e., for both policy makers and executors). Therefore, both countries should continually and proactively seek to strengthen and sustain a more open, transparent, and participative relationship between public administrators and the citizens they serve.

Focus Area #3: Performance, Results and Accountability

We conclude our comparative analysis with the third and final definition(s) of accountability: (1) fiscal responsibility, understood as government spending its money as authorized, with as little waste as possible, and (2) performance results, where government agencies and their employees deliver effective and cost-efficient government programs. This third category of public accountability involves the evaluation of program effectiveness, which is one of the primary purposes of oversight. We will focus the remainder of our discussions on improved performance, or the enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and programs.

Performance-based Accountability There is a global trend toward performance- (or results-) based management, focusing on establishing and achieving strategic outcomes, not only in line with the rules and process requirements of public administrators, responsible for implementing government programs, but also in response to the demands and expectations of the general public; more concerned with ultimate outcomes, or what benefits they are actually receiving from public sector expenditures and activities.

There is external pressure to do better with less, coming from both civil society, working to ensure that government efforts remain linked to the needs and desires of the citizenry (i.e., democratic governance), and also from the various management and oversight bodies themselves, tasked with ensuring government accountability.

For example, the European Union (EU) is pressuring its members to adopt a more results-oriented approach to governing, influencing its administrative systems to focus on outcomes, identifying how EU policies and programs might need to be adjusted, improved, or replaced with better alternatives.

In France, the government passed a new organic budget law in 2001: the Loi Organique relative aux Lois des Finances (LOLF), now focused on performance-based budgeting, or managing for results, reconfiguring and replacing the Law of 1959, France’s former system of expenditure planning and execution. The result is that public officials have been granted greater flexibility in the way they spend taxpayer dollars in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their programs.

This new budgeting system is aimed at transitioning from activity-based budgeting, to outcome-based fiscal and performance management, through (1) managerial (i.e., decentralized) autonomy of individual government organizational units, allowing them to make better-informed decisions; and (2) parliamentary control of the budget, ensuring that the government is investing in programs that deliver services that are important to the French people. Today, resource allocations are being made to multiple-mission programs that cross jurisdictional boundaries, as opposed to the former system’s simple, line-by-line investments to individual directorates and stove-piped activities.

The result is that French policy and planning decision makers, in exchange for increased managerial autonomy, are now required to commit formally to the establishment, monitoring, and reporting of objectives and their achieved results.

In the United States, the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010 offers a performance-based accountability framework meant to institutionalize fiscal and performance accountability within the federal government by codifying the development, use and reporting of performance information to clarify, assess, implement and continuously improve organizational strategy and its execution by identifying, measuring and then managing what matters. The main purpose of these types of federal-level strategic management frameworks is to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and overall performance of operations. GPRA-MA offers guiding principles and a strategy, for achieving greater transparency and understanding of the internal workings of government, hopefully resulting in improved congressional oversight of the use of taxpayer dollars and a better informed and more engaged American public.

The statute, enacted on January 4th 2011, builds upon the GPRA performance planning, measurement development and reporting framework of 1993. It is meant to encourage greater use of performance information in program decision-making by requiring that the 24 Federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) Act of 1990 focus their efforts on: 1. Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement: demonstrating leadership commitment to creating a positive learning and performance improvement culture; 2. Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment: aligning individual, program, and agency priorities through annual planning and goal–setting; 3. Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation: improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytic capacity to produce and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision-making; 4. Performance Reviews: conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to improve performance outcomes and reduce costs; and 5. Transparency and Accountability: communicating and reporting transparent performance information frequently and effectively to increase accountability and results.

The first four (4) focus areas contribute to accountability within agencies, or inter- and intra-organizational trust, whereas the fifth area is geared toward increasing public trust in government through strategic communications with the general public.

Performance Reporting

In addition to requiring that public authorities react promptly and positively to requests from members of the public for access to information and documents which have not been published, there is also an obligation for the government to proactively “volunteer” or provide information on its operations in formats that are easily accessible and understandable to the average citizen. This often comes in the form of one-way communications from government agencies to constituents, such as posting periodic strategic plans, annual budgets and performance reports on public websites, direct media relations, community education campaigns and e-government.

We highlight, below, one particular type of public information sharing: the reporting of data on government priorities, programs and performance results.

In a recent IBM report, “Performance Reporting: Insights from International Practice,” Richard Boyle, head of research at the Institute of Public Administration in Dublin, Ireland, identifies the following six (6) key attributes of good performance reporting:

1. Consistency and comparability in performance reporting structures 2. Inclusion of qualitative narrative to accompany quantitative performance indicators 3. Existence of clearly identified outcome measures 4. Availability of both target and baseline data to guide assessment(s) over time 5. Good formatting/presentation and effective use of technology platforms 6. Inclusion of output and activity indicators

Using these criteria, we have evaluated the quality of the performance reporting mechanisms of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), comparing them with its French equivalent, the Ministry of the Interior (i.e., Ministère de l’Interieure). The results of this assessment can be found in Appendix B.

Areas of Divergence/Convergence

Focus Area #1: Integrity, Ethics and Accountability

Americans value individual values and can easily make them as binding as law, with their propensity to legislate morality, both at the local and national levels. In America, lack of local representation translates into illegitimacy. The French, on the other hand, value law as an overriding principle, to which all other individual peculiarities (i.e., moral values) must conform. In France, lack of universality translates into illegitimacy. As governments of consent, both countries have equal concerns and similar expectations regarding the professional (if not personal) integrity and behavior of their elected and appointed officials. As such, both nations have established institutional stop-gaps in their public service frameworks to ensure financial, human resource and information management probity, in the hopes that public trust will be upheld.

Focus Area #2: Transparency, Democratic Governance and Accountability

Paradoxically, even though the USA only spends one-third of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on national, state and local government combined, compared to France with fifty-five percent of its economic output spent on state functions; Americans tend to expect more from their government in terms of products, services, and verified results, than the French, who expect neither miracles, nor proof of success. These expectations are reflected in each country’s laws and associated governance systems relating to transparency. Current efforts to better inform the average citizen, through increased transparency of the inner workings of government, are largely similar in both countries. In order to translate these information sharing mechanisms into true democratic governance, however, where government officials are both attentive and responsive to the needs and expectations of citizens, transparency should be coupled with the establishment of a context and framework for the broader incorporation of citizens in public policy and program development, implementation, and assessment. These types of “outside-the-box” solutions, challenging the current status quo, are required to ensure that public institutions remain accountable to the people, and not simply to their elected and appointed officials. Until this occurs, true accountability, both at and between elections, will remain chimerical.

Focus Area #3: Performance, Results and Accountability

In the United States, the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010 offers a public performance accountability framework that contributes to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and bureaucratic intent (i.e., goals and priorities) of elected and appointed officials. Success in the GPRA-MA environment, as it is currently being interpreted, is not being stated in terms of public accountability, or how the administrative state is increasing public trust and achieving a better society, but in terms of government performance and results, or how well it is implementing a presidential and/or congressional agenda. The new French budget reform also seeks to make the allocation of resources more transparent and more flexible through a revised budget architecture which is defined by mission purpose and on increased parliamentary control of the budget. It also seeks to make the use of allotted resources more effective by giving greater managerial autonomy to central and decentralized government units, in exchange for commitments on the outcome results to be achieved. As such, both countries accomplish the first task in establishing a performance-based accountability system for public organizations, which is to publically and transparently clarify accountability expectations, both with those being held accountable and with those holding them to account. However, greater effort needs to be made in the arena of democratic governance, or eliciting and incorporating the considerations of the general public in the development of government goals and objectives, and associated outcome-based performance indicators in order to reflect the needs and desires of the citizenry, rather than simply those of public administrators, tasked with executing public programs and activities.

Recommendations

What does France do well in the arena of public administration and accountability? What lessons can be learned and applied to American political and bureaucratic processes? How can French philosophy, methods and practices be considered in the development, implementation, and measurement of the effectiveness of US homeland security policy and strategy?

Building upon the work already begun by the early 20th Century Progressives, but more in compliance with America’s foundational principles of federalism, the separation of powers, self-governance, and the rule of law, we have articulated several recommendations below.

They are associated with various factors and elements that apply to most large-scale organizations and can be considered for incorporation into the policies of any U.S. agency charged with the establishment of goals, prioritization of interests, allocation of resources, and the evaluation of success, seeking to instill a culture of public accountability:

1. Separation of Powers (i.e., checks and balances)

a. Interconnections of Policy Making and Execution: Ensure greater linkages and collaboration between those who shape policy (i.e., legislative branch) and those who execute it (i.e., executive branch), establishing the mechanisms necessary for a clearer articulation and understanding of federal intent at both the state and local levels. b. Coordination: Develop more refined administrative processes that produce improved inter- and intra-agency collaboration, communication and coordination. c. Inside and Outside: Work to reconcile the diverging points of view regarding the homeland security enterprise, its mission and functions.

2. Representative Government (i.e., federalism)

d. Relationships and Power: Make individual officials responsible for setting and achieving cross-cutting federal, state and local priority goals, distinguishing those that are the highest priority, driving progress on those priorities through inter- and intra-agency collaboration, and holding managers accountable for achieving mission results. e. Top-Down and Bottom-Up: Demand a rapprochement between senior leaders, management and front line personnel in the development and implementation of strategy in order to obtain less of a top-down system of authority, conformity, and compliance, and more of a bottom-up flow of information, ensuring better informed and innovative solutions to problems. f. HQ and Field: Develop processes with sufficient linkages and more effective coordination between headquarters staff and physically dispersed field personnel; reconciling the former, organized by function, with the latter, managed by geographic location.

3. Rule of Law (i.e., Constitution):

g. Floating in the Seas of Time: Due to the more volatile nature of the American political landscape, develop more sophisticated continuity of operations planning and implementation that is based on established protocol and processes, capable of weathering changes in elected and bureaucratic leadership and direction without suffering loss of productivity. h. Information: Work to reconcile the disparate performance monitoring and reporting systems integrating large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources to provide situational awareness (i.e., common operating picture). i. Values: Ensure the incorporation of citizens’ concerns in the development and implementation of policy, through the engagement of Congressional or legislative representatives at all three levels of government, minimizing turf battles where feasible. j. Physical and Organic Models: Discourage idiosyncratic interpretations of the law, either by individuals or collectivities that override the intent of the people as expressed in the law. k. Success: Define success in terms of public accountability and democratic governance rather than simply in terms of administrative/bureaucratic prowess. Conclusion

We will conclude with where we began, by providing a quote from our “American” Frenchman, Alexis de Toqueville:

Democracy, pushed to its furthest limits, is therefore prejudicial to the art of government; and for this reason it is better adapted to a people already versed in the conduct of administration than to a nation that is uninitiated in public affairs.

Followed by another from our former President, Woodrow Wilson, who was to public administration what chef Julia Child was to French cooking, translating it into a language and context that the average American citizen (and cook) could understand and appreciate:

[The science of administration] is not of our making; it is a foreign science, speaking very little of the language of English or American principles […]. It has been developed by French and German professors, and it is consequently in all parts adapted to the needs of a compact state, and made to fit highly centralized forms of government […]. If we would employ it, we must Americanize it, and that not formally, in language merely, but radically, in thought, principle, and aim as well. It must learn our constitutions by heart; must get the bureaucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale much free American air.”

In other words, he believed that Americans could “learn from Prussian and French autocracies without being infected by their anti-democratic political principles.”

In conclusion, Americans would do well to disillusion themselves from the mistaken belief that democracy is a universal solvent for problems of legitimacy or that practicality can and should override the law; that there are “quick fix” alternatives to the methodical, persistent, patient, and sustained application of sound, sophisticated public administration; that freedom is synonymous with libertinage, or believing that doing what you want, when you want and where you want is actually sustainable in civil society; and finally, that “limited government” and “citizen participation”, the bedrock principles of the American Republic, justify the haphazard hobbling of American political and bureaucratic power to the point of dilapidation.

Americans are generally proud of their country. This is sometimes purely based on blind patriotic zeal, sometimes on more thoughtful consideration and enduring trust. Now, almost two hundred and fifty years in, a “government of the people, for the people, and by the people,” deserves administrative systems and processes that are more than simple “leaves of the Sibyl, soon wafted away forever, by the smallest breeze.”

American politicians, legislators and public administrators, should all proactively endeavor to continually ensure that American patriotism and faith in their governmental institutions of power are both well-placed and well-deserved.

Appendix A: Global Integrity Report (2007)
Comparative Results USA/France of Integrity Indicators – Public Access to Information

Global Integrity ReportIntegrity Indicators: Public Access to Information | United States(Year: 2007) | France(Year: 2007) | (12) Do citizens have a legal right of access to information? | (12a) In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records. | YES: At the federal level, Title 5, Section 552 of the U.S. Code grants citizens the right to public information that does not fall under the nine exemptions of the code (e.g., classified information). References: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). | YESReferences: Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978; Law 200-321 of April 12, 2000 | (12b) In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied. | YES: At the federal level, Title 5, Section 552 of the U.S. Code grants citizens the right to sue for access to records that a government agency has denied. | YES: A person who is denied access to an administrative document must refer to the Commission for the Access to Administrative Documents (CADA) created by article 20 of the law 78-753. The commission produces an opinion. If the refusal persists, the person can refer the case to the administrative tribunals. References: Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978 | (12c) In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records. | YES: However, each federal agency is responsible for fulfilling its individual information requests, so there is no universal federal institution or process. | YES: Procedures for accessing documents are listed in article 4 of the Law 78-753. The Commission for the Access to Administrative Documents (CADA) created by article 20 of this law ensures that freedom to access to administrative records is respected. References: Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978. | (13) Is the right of access to information effective? | (13a) In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period. | SCORE (25/100): According to a report from OpenTheGovernment.org and People For the American Way Foundation, government secrecy has only increased.References: The law does not stipulate any limit on the amount of time an agency can take to respond, although it does require agencies to respond in some manner within 20 days (which often takes the form of notify the requesting party that the request has been received). Actual processing of the request often drags on far longer, with some information requests going unfilled for nearly two decades. The Associated Press reports backlogs are increasing at most agencies. In particular, the AP asserts agencies involved with national security are clamping down on the amount of information they release to the public. Note also that each state has its own public information law, each with its own unique exemptions and process for requesting data. | SCORE (75/100): The administrative services have one month to answer a request. After this period, it is considered that their silence amounts to a refusal and the person requesting the document can refer the case to the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents. In about one fourth of the cases, the service in cause, when contacted by the CADA, communicates the document to the applicant and the procedure is stopped. References: Commission d'Accès aux Documents Administratifs, Rapport d'Activité de l'Année 2005, Août 2006. | (13b) In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost. | SCORE (100/100)References: The law prevents U.S. federal agencies from charging excessive fees for information requests. Most charge nominal fees or no fee at all. For example, see: Department of Justice Freedom of Information Act Reference Guide. | SCORE (100/100): The information mechanisms have virtually no cost (cost of a letter, of an email; visit to the relevant office is more costly but rarely necessary). The cost of photocopies is limited and the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents ensures there are no abuses. References: Commission d'Accès aux Documents Administratifs, Rapport d'Activité de l'Année 2005, Août 2006. | (13c) In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests at a reasonable cost. | SCORE (50/100)References: The law requires an agency to respond to any appeal within 20 days, and notify the appellant if any extension is required. Should the agency continue to deny a request (which critics charge is likely given the agency was the entity who initially denied the request), the requesting party can sue the agency in a federal court, a process that can take years. | SCORE (50/100): The Commission for Access to Administrative Documents is supposed to produce opinion on the situations referred to it within one month. In practice the time period is much longer. This in partly due to the fact that the CADA only holds two sessions a month and to the time taken by the administration to reply to the requests of the CADA during the instruction. For those cases in which the citizen then refer to the administrative tribunals, delays are much longer because of the overall slowness of the justice system. References: Commission d'Accès aux Documents Administratifs, Rapport d'Activité de l'Année 2005, Août 2006. | (13d) In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost. | SCORE (50/100)References: High legal costs are the result should the appeals process go to court. | SCORE (100/100): Referring to the CADA is free. If the request is referred to a tribunal, there is a cost involved, which is passed onto the administration if the applicant wins. References: Commission d'Accès aux Documents Administratifs, Rapport d'Activité de l'Année 2005, Août 2006. | (13e) In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request. | SCORE (50/100)References: There are nine formal exemptions typically given for why a FOIA request is denied. Each federal agency must provide an assessment of FOIA requests and exemptions used to the Department of Justice on an annual basis. George Washington University's National Security Archives notes that agencies often offer vague reasons for why a particular exemption is warranted (particularly for national security reasons). | SCORE (75/100): The administration normally gives reasons for denying the document. In some instances, however, the administration does not provide a reason or does not answer at all. References: Commission d'Accès aux Documents Administratifs, Rapport d'Activité de l'Année 2005, Août 2006. |

Appendix B: Performance Reporting Key Attributes
Comparative Results of USA/France – Fiscal Year 2012

Performance Reporting Key Attributes | United States(Year: 2011) | France(Year: 2011) | (1): Do performance measurement systems use a consistent, comparable, and structured approach to performance information across all agencies and programs? | YES: At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security posts online its Annual Performance Report (APR) presenting the Department’s performance measures and applicable results, associated performance targets for the past fiscal year and two out-years, providing information on the DHS’ Priority Goals. The APR is part of the Office of Management and Budget’s alternative approach to the consolidated Performance and Accountability report and is submitted as part of the DHS’ Congressional Budget Justification. The report satisfies the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 requirement to publish the Department’s Annual Performance Plan. It presents detailed performance information on the ensemble of the Department’s mission in a consistent, comparable and structured format across all DHS agencies and programs (i.e., DHS Missions and Responsibilities; Performance Results by Mission; Priority Goals; DHS Workforce Strategy; GAO High-Risk Series – Summary of Progress; Low-Priority Program Activities; Measure Descriptions and Data Collection Methodologies and Program Evaluations). Source Document: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Annual Performance Report (FY2011-2013)Link: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/cfo_apr_fy2011.pdf | YES: Agency objectives, specified in terms of performance indicators and associated performance targets, according to Articles 7 and 51 of the LOLF, are specified in “annual performance plans” (projets annuels de performances) presented as annexes to the draft budget law. At the end of the FY, the results achieved are reported and commented upon in “annual performance report” (rapports annuels de performances) presented as annexes to budget closure law (Article 54 of the LOLF). Performance targets are set, on an annual or multi-year basis, for periods of up to five years. It presents detailed performance information on the ensemble of the agency’s mission in a consistent, comparable and structured format across all directorates programs (i.e., Priorities; Funding Authorization Levels; Mission Descriptions; Funding Amounts by Mission; and Mission Objectives). This approach is based on the application of a number of key principles which were agreed to by parliament, the Audit Office, and the government, and embodied in a methodological guide entitled The Performance-Based Approach (June 2004). Source Document: Ministry of the Interior of the French Republic FY 2011 Budget Priorities (Mnistère de l’Interieure, de l’Outre-Mer et des Collectivités Territoriales - Priorités Budget 2011)Link: http://www.interieure.gouv.fr/Publications/Budget/Budget-2011 | (2): Do they include a good performance story to accompany the indictors? | YES: Each DHS Mission Area presents at least one (1) “Success Story” accompanying its tables of performance measures and results, highlighting major accomplishments in specific DHS agencies and programs. | NO | (3): Do they specify outcome indicators, and fully explain the results reported against each indicator? | YES: DHS’ APR specifies outcome indicators and explanation of results for each of its Mission Areas. | YES: French agencies are expected to articulate three types of objectives and associated performance indicators in their annual performance plans and reports: * Outcome objectives, reflecting citizen expectations; * Service quality objectives, reflecting expectations of the users of public services; * Management efficiency (i.e., cost saving) objectives, reflecting taxpayer expectations.Each program contains five objectives on average, with an average of two performance indicators for each of these objectives. Each objective relies, moreover, on the implementation of specific courses of actions (levier d’action) or action plans. | (4): Do they provide both target and baseline data? | YES: DHS’ APR provides results covering three (3) prior years, the current fiscal year, and two (2) out-years for each performance measure. | NO: Only current fiscal year results are provided. | (5): Do they ensure effective use of technology in presenting the performance data collected? | YES: Annual performance plans and reports are posted online in an easily understandable and publically accessible format. | YES: Annual performance plans and reports are posted online in an easily understandable and publically accessible format. | (6): Do they present agency performance information which includes output and activity indicators in addition to outcome indicators? | YES | YES: Objectives and associated performance indicators related to the reallocation of inputs or activities within programs to achieve new priorities are included and recognized as management efficiency objectives. The French system excels in providing detailed data at the department and municipal levels, cascading from, aligned/linked to national-level strategic plans, priorities, budgets and performance results. |

Notes: