1) Direct Intent: purpose to cause it = purpose type intent or direct intent. 2) Oblique Intent: constructed when D does not intend result but foresees its occurrence as a certainty. Smith (1990) example: Plane Insurance bombing. 3) Itzhak Kugler (2004): states where there is only a 50% chance of explosion this should be conditional oblique intent and be a form of recklessness rather than intent. 4) MD (2004): states OI was created to help prosecution fill a gap in the rare case where a result may not be intended but D foresees the result to be a virtually certain consequence of his actions.
Modern Evolution of Intent: 5) DDP v. Smith: said D foresaw and intended everything that was a natural and probable consequence of his actions. 6) Sec 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 abolished this assumption. Therefore the approach became subjective, i.e. that D intended what HE foresaw not what a reasonable person would deem natural and probable. 7) Hyam v. DPP: stirred up conflict – here foresight that result is a highly probably consequence was sufficient to convict for murder. Criticism: 8) i) Artificial and unnatural to attribute foresight of a consequence to the meaning of intent. 9) ii) Distinction between OI and recklessness is merely level of foresight. OI = highly probably, R = merely probably this is far too unsatisfactory a distinction. Does OI not seem more a category of R then Intent. 10) iii) Williams (1984) states that there is greater blameworthiness in someone intending something unlawful (deliberately flouting the law) and someone who merely foresaw that thing to be a highly probable consequence to his act. Moral distinction exists. Especially in crime of murder where a mandatory life sentence is imposed. 11) Due to such criticism HoL changed approach in R v. Moloney[1], and stated that judges should avoid expounding on the meaning of intent and jury should answer this themselves.