in argument which conveys to the jury an understanding that a conviction would be a community service.
Stephens v. State, 10 N.E.3d 599, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). For example, the court in Brummett held that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument, that the state’s witnesses “do not lie,” and that the victim’s former boyfriend testified because “he had to do the right thing,” improperly vouched for their credibility, and thus amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Brummett v. State, 10 N.E.3d 78, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The prosecutor’s comments asserted person knowledge of the facts at issue, and suggested that the prosecutor knew the boyfriend was telling the truth. Id. at 86. Moreover, when the prosecutor stated that the jury should imagine their own children coming to the stand, the …show more content…
prosecutor took the jury out of the jury box and asked them to focus on improper considerations. Id. at 85. Similarly, in Ryan, the court held that the prosecutor’s comments to the jury in closing argument, urging them to convict the defendant because they were tired and angry over a societal problem, constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 671, 672. The prosecutor requested the jury to convict the defendant for a reason other than his guilt, and not necessarily because the evidence warranted a conviction. Id. Additionally, the court in Gasper determined that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by referring to washcloths as bloody without presenting evidence of that assertion. Gasper v. State, 833 N.E.2d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Although the washcloths were admitted into evidence at trial, it was never determined that the substance covering them was blood. Id. at 1043. Further, in Maldonado, the court found that the prosecutor’s comments to the jury, that convicting the defendant would be the most important thing they do for their community, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Maldonado v. State, 355 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Ind. 1976). The argument could have been understood to mean that the conviction of the defendant would be a community service. Id. Here, the prosecutor’s comments improperly inflamed the prejudices of the jury.
As in Brummett, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the juror’s emotions when he asked them to imagine how they would feel if their own children, grandchildren, and family members became addicted to meth because of men like Mr. Dvorak. This conduct on the part of the prosecutor was especially damaging. The prosecutor instilled fear and anger in the jury, such that they would return a guilty verdict no matter what the evidence may have
indicated. Like the prosecutor in Brummett, here the prosecutor improperly vouched for witness testimony when he stated that Ackerman and Thomas had no reason to lie, and that they testified in order to tell the jury the truth. By vouching for their credibility, the jury was unable to determine what weight they should place upon witness testimony during deliberation. The prosecutor implied that he had personal knowledge of the truthfulness and reliability of witness testimony that the jury and opposing counsel did not. Vouching for witness credibility went to the very core of the issue the jurors were to decide- whether, based on their version of the events, the witnesses’ testimonies were sufficient to convict Mr. Dvorak. Like the prosecutor in Ryan, here the prosecutor improperly requested that the jury convict Mr. Dvorak, not because the evidence warranted a conviction, but because he is a user and methamphetamine is a dangerous drug. On two occasions the prosecutor improperly called Mr. Dvorak a drug addict and a meth head. While witness testimony revealed that Mr. Dvorak had experimented with some drugs in the past, the record never indicated that he was a drug addict. Mr. Dvorak was not on trial for experimenting with drugs, nor was he on trial for being an addict. The prosecutor wrongfully characterized him as a methamphetamine addict in front of the jury. Like the prosecutor in Gasper, here the prosecutor improperly mischaracterized expert testimony and evidence when he said that the state’s expert, Professor Nye, told the jury that Mr. Dvorak is a cook. Although Professor Nye determined that the seized evidence was consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamines in a home lab, he never mentioned that Mr. Dvorak was a cook. Dr. Nye referenced a cook in the abstract sense in order to illustrate general methamphetamine production processes. The prosecutor branded Mr. Dvorak as a cook without presenting evidence supporting that allegation. The prosecutor further commented on a matters not in evidence by telling the jury that the methamphetamine product from Mr. Dvorak’s home was being distributed by Ackerman and Thomas on their neighborhood streets. Witness testimony revealed that the methamphetamine from Mr. Dvorak’s home was being delivered to no more than three buyers. This particular comment was a matter of personal opinion, as no evidence admitted at trial reinforced the prosecutor’s claim that methamphetamine was being distributed to the community at large. As in Maldonado, the prosecutor improperly told the jury to do what is right for their community when referring to Mr. Dvorak’s possible conviction. The prosecutor implied that it was the jury’s duty to find guilt, and by convicting Mr. Dvorak, they would be performing a community service. The function of the prosecution is to uphold the canons of justice and ensure that justice does indeed prevail, not to secure convictions at any cost. Therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct throughout his closing argument, placing Mr. Dvorak in a position of grave peril to which he would not have been subjected otherwise.