About 50 years ago, many countries around the world—freshly decolonised and newly named underdeveloped or developing, embarked on varying projects of national development. Some began to develop indigenous industries for export, others stepped up industrial production to substitute for imports. Across the Cold War swathe—communist as well as capitalist—industrialisation was thought of, by the political and economic elite, as the key to development.
In this singular conception of ‘development’ as economic growth, industrialisation became a race of catching up with the West or with standards almost entirely set by West-centric institutions for a country to be deemed developed. Accompanying this frenetic activity was the project of modernisation.
This was seen by the presiding figures of many countries as, amongst others: infrastructural changes such as dams and highways; social changes such as getting rid of the perceived ills of traditional beliefs and practices and revamping educational systems with an emphasis on modern science and rationality; and political changes such as creating an efficient bureaucracy and State apparatus to preside over the decolonised domain.
This three-pronged strategy was underpinned by what came to be known as modernisation theory. The ideas of the modernisation school of economists indirectly informed the choices of ‘development’ made by the leaders of many countries.
Modernisation has been a dominant theory in the social sciences in the West since the 1950s. It draws on the biological sciences, which, since the last quarter of the 18th century in Western Europe , studied the growth and development of different species. The biological metaphor was transferred to the social