Monopoly over the Legitimate Use of Force vs Terrorism
If states already exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, why do they employ the tactics of terrorism?
Introduction
Max Weber, German sociologist who profoundly influenced social theory and political economy, contributed immensely to the notion of the state as a political organization, where he argues that the legitimate use of force successfully rests in the hands of its administrative staff. (Weber, 1922; cited in Holton & Turner, 1989). Many claim, however, that there is a need to clarify a variety of possible misunderstandings that may derive from this definition. For instance, Wimmer (2003) presents a range of arguments in this direction, focusing on the pervasive character of violence within a social context and the ambivalent notion that the state successfully holds the monopolization of legitimate violence or use of force. After all, the state’s little power over certain criminalities and the use of violence speaks for itself. The lack of control over ownership of arms and other uncountable means of exercising violence contributes to the continuous – and impossible to supress - presence of the illegitimate use of force by non-state actors. Therefore, the state’s control over force refers solely to the legitimate form of force. As a result, the success of such monopoly is rather imprecise: are states effective in combating criminality? To what extent their legitimate use of force prevent illegitimate violence under their penal law? For sure it does not prevent all forms of violence, and its efficacy depends very much on the level of such violence in societies – high levels of homicide, damage of property or even some form of ‘private armies’ such as guerrillas and mafias. Wimmer (2003) refers to a range of examples to support this: Columbia’s unsuccessful claim on the monopoly of violence; many African countries that ignore a large number of illustrations of violence and even Central Asia can be challenged in its ‘success’ over the
Introduction
Max Weber, German sociologist who profoundly influenced social theory and political economy, contributed immensely to the notion of the state as a political organization, where he argues that the legitimate use of force successfully rests in the hands of its administrative staff. (Weber, 1922; cited in Holton & Turner, 1989). Many claim, however, that there is a need to clarify a variety of possible misunderstandings that may derive from this definition. For instance, Wimmer (2003) presents a range of arguments in this direction, focusing on the pervasive character of violence within a social context and the ambivalent notion that the state successfully holds the monopolization of legitimate violence or use of force. After all, the state’s little power over certain criminalities and the use of violence speaks for itself. The lack of control over ownership of arms and other uncountable means of exercising violence contributes to the continuous – and impossible to supress - presence of the illegitimate use of force by non-state actors. Therefore, the state’s control over force refers solely to the legitimate form of force. As a result, the success of such monopoly is rather imprecise: are states effective in combating criminality? To what extent their legitimate use of force prevent illegitimate violence under their penal law? For sure it does not prevent all forms of violence, and its efficacy depends very much on the level of such violence in societies – high levels of homicide, damage of property or even some form of ‘private armies’ such as guerrillas and mafias. Wimmer (2003) refers to a range of examples to support this: Columbia’s unsuccessful claim on the monopoly of violence; many African countries that ignore a large number of illustrations of violence and even Central Asia can be challenged in its ‘success’ over the
References: Blakeley, R. (2009) State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South. New York: Routledge. Daalder, I.H. (2007) Beyond Pre-emption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World. Brookings Institution Press. HOLTON, R. J. & TURNER, B. S. (1989) Max Weber on Economy and Society. London: Routledge. TERRY, J., USMC, (1986) Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law Policy Analysis. 36 Naval Law Review 159-161 V for Vendetta (2006) [Film] Directed by James McTeigue WALKER (1969) Terror and Resistance. New York: Oxford University Press WIMMER, H