Moral Obligation In Famine, Affluence, And

The basic premise of utilitarianism is we have a moral obligation to produce the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people (Mill, p. 364) and Peter Singer believes we have a moral obligation to help others less fortunate than we to the extent at which no more moral good comes of comparable significance to the bad thing that we “ought” prevent (Singer, p. 874). How is it that we are somehow philosophically indebted to society and required to alleviate suffering? Can such an obligation even be construed moral? I contend that anything deemed a moral obligation, or “ought” as Singer renounces usage of the term obligation in note 2 following the essay (Singer, p. 880), is a liability, not an asset, which in and of itself is immoral. For
I try to ponder the various scenarios he presents, in an attempt to justify his position, without apprehension, yet my own moral beliefs continually combat an open-minded approach. So it is within this writing I will attempt to argue my point while meticulously examining all perspectives. In his essay: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Peter Singer seemingly try to get those refusing to aid others suffering from lack of food, shelter and medical care in some sort of existential crisis (Singer, p. 873). I am not one who shares his assessment that our only purpose in life is to aid others. Basing our own moral convictions on the felicity of others is simply compromise and is only a meager attempt at social equality. If I “ought” to help a society so fraught with ambiguity, corruption and unethical bias that it can never yield its members the preordained greatest happiness, then what is the point? Because we undertake a moral duty to do what we say we will do or perform dutifully the responsibilities of the positions we place ourselves in. This kind of duty is the product of the commitments we make to others and is the
A valid objection to this argument would be: what about Theology and the divine in all of this? As stated in his book God and Moral Obligation, Dr. C. Stephen Evans suggests that such obligations are best understood as God's commands or requirements, communicated to humans in a variety of ways, including conscience (2013, p. 31). And even the founder of Rastafarianism, Marcus Garvey proclaimed: Our duty is to extend the hand of charity to any brother/sister in distress, to every human, animals and plants. All Rastafarians must refrain from the things that makes one uncomfortable because if one continues to entertain or participate in that which makes one uncomfortable, this will eventually lead to the breakdown of moral discipline (Garvey, p. 2). Yet these philosophies assume a belief in an omnipotent entity, but the poignant truth is, if one is not willing to belittle his own moral values in the name of conforming to some religious tenet, then these are simply inclinations to do what one consciously believes is right and not an obligation until acceptance by the