Moral Philosophy: Bernard Williams And Thomas Nagel
appiness Rests on Luckiness
Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness.
I
Moral philosophers frequently remark how a philosophical position can reflect the practical …show more content…
Or at least in determining what our ends ought to be. In our pursuit of happiness we far too often charge ahead without stopping to ask what sort of happiness we should seek. And we have become far too adept at facilitating our charge with machinations both moral and technical. I suggest that we pause for a moment, shut down our eudaemonic engines, and ask ourselves if we might be seeking felicity in a manner somewhat inept. We shall see, I believe, that fortune has a role to play in setting our goals. But in so doing our luck does not impoverish our happiness. Paradoxically we may find it …show more content…
When he engages in an activity, someone who pursues happiness in this way has not yet attained an end. He is only successfully working towards his goal. And yet when he attains his end, someone who views happiness in this way is no longer actively engaged. He no longer has a rational plan to fulfill. Consequently, when he is happy, he has not attained an end, and when he attains an end, he is no longer happy. (22)
The reason for this paradox is that carrying out a plan of life is not itself end. We do find some value for its own sake in making a plan and carrying it out. Some people especially take pleasure in logistics of this sort. But we primarily value a rational plan for the sake of other things. Who would make a plan merely for the sake of making a plan? And those philosophers who advance this conception of happiness do in fact argue that we primarily value a life plan for the sake of something else. Usually for the sake of satisfying desire.
Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness.
I
Moral philosophers frequently remark how a philosophical position can reflect the practical …show more content…
Or at least in determining what our ends ought to be. In our pursuit of happiness we far too often charge ahead without stopping to ask what sort of happiness we should seek. And we have become far too adept at facilitating our charge with machinations both moral and technical. I suggest that we pause for a moment, shut down our eudaemonic engines, and ask ourselves if we might be seeking felicity in a manner somewhat inept. We shall see, I believe, that fortune has a role to play in setting our goals. But in so doing our luck does not impoverish our happiness. Paradoxically we may find it …show more content…
When he engages in an activity, someone who pursues happiness in this way has not yet attained an end. He is only successfully working towards his goal. And yet when he attains his end, someone who views happiness in this way is no longer actively engaged. He no longer has a rational plan to fulfill. Consequently, when he is happy, he has not attained an end, and when he attains an end, he is no longer happy. (22)
The reason for this paradox is that carrying out a plan of life is not itself end. We do find some value for its own sake in making a plan and carrying it out. Some people especially take pleasure in logistics of this sort. But we primarily value a rational plan for the sake of other things. Who would make a plan merely for the sake of making a plan? And those philosophers who advance this conception of happiness do in fact argue that we primarily value a life plan for the sake of something else. Usually for the sake of satisfying desire.