“What Is It Like To Be A Bat?”
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?
Why is "consciousness" really tough to physical and mental problems, according to Thomas Nagel? Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the obstacle to the physical and mental problems. He said there is a little comprehension of consciousness by the reductionist, less available because there is no real convincing, incredible psychological account has been developed to help describe the familiar reductions (Nagel, 1998, 3-30). This leads reductionist to neglect the awareness of consciousness. However, according to Nagel, sense of physical and mental problems is boring without consciousness. Nagel now describes the conscious experience. He found that some animals and aliens have it and that there is something it is like to be that organism. He calls this "the main character of the experience" (Searle will call this "first person ontology" consciousness), and claims it has yet to be restored by reductionist, functional states, national or intentional acts of behaviour (Nagel, 1974, 436). An analysis of physical and mental awareness must include consciousness or some idea of it from the beginning of the work. He then compared the objective and subjective experience. The problem he discovered to reduce the latter is that it is connected to a single point of view. To make things not weird, Nagel attempted to analyze this case on bats (who are relatively close related to us, but still a bit different). Because their views and are so different from us, Nagel sees every reason to claim that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat (Nagel, 1998, 3-30). Nagel not only try to imagine the state of being like a bat for him, this does not do with the concept. He wanted to know what it is like for the bat itself (Nagel, 1974, 436). Transformation into a bat, even gradually, won’t help him
References: Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), p. 436. Nagel (1998) "Concealment and Exposure", Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 3-30