National Response Framework: Criticism To Hurricane Katrina
National Response Framework
(Author’s name)
(Institutional Affiliation)
Criticism to the Hurricane Katrina Response Framework
Following the Hurricane Katrina landfall of August 2005; the greatest natural disaster in the history of the United States that claimed and destroyed myriads of lives there is a debate for criticism of roles of different stakeholders’ response.
Federal Government Response
President Bush allocated 10.5 billion US dollars of relief kitty four days within the hurricane, and assigned 7000 active troops to help with relief tasks. These relief efforts were however slow owing to the poverty ascribed to most of the affected regions (Moynihan, 2008). There was also a shortage of National Guard Unit in terms of staffing following some of the units’ deployment overseas. In addition, local recruiting attempts from schools as well as the community was constrained, resulting in less than the ideal quantity of resources. On September 2, Ray Nagin, the Mayor of New Orleans, expressed his frustration citing inadequate provision of reinforcement by the federal authorities (Townsend, 2006).
Official help requests in line with apt command chains were not fruitful due to delayed engagement of Federal Management Agency, for federal assistance …show more content…
(Kapucu 2006). The local police together with Emergency Response workers deemed the situation a traumatic one, with at least two suicidal officer cases being reported. Appleseed Foundation reported that local entities were better placed in terms of response than the federal arm. Inadequate legal authority and insubordinate requirements for application and those for eligibility set federal response back. In most cases, federal government was not flexible, lacked training and the requisite resources to suffice relief demands (Moynihan 2008).
State and Local Government
Officials of the State of Louisiana like governor Blanco and leaders charged with managing state emergency face wide criticism for delaying the capacity of federal government and external agencies to avail relief. National Guard troops of the state headed by the governor, were able to quell civil unrest before the relief efforts, but were not hands-on in the hurricane situation. Governor Blanco turned down a request by the Bush Administration to take charge of law enforcement, so did Hayley Barbour, governor of Mississippi. Governor Blanco requested more National Guard troops to augment relief efforts. The formal request was however made two days following the hurricane, a time when the better time of the city was under water (Townsend, 2006).
Most of the imminent problems were attributed to insufficient planning and emergency communication systems at all levels of the National Response Plan. The press also reported failure on the level of the State and local government in according expected aid, plus social service, with Mayor Ryan Nagin being accused of delaying relief efforts. Blanco is also reported to have been reluctant to give a compulsory evacuation order until the president called her, directing her to give the order (Kapucu 2006).
City and Local Response
Local response was inept in the disaster plan of New Orleans that entailed the use of School buses within the city to evacuate incapable residents.
The buses were not deployed, and were destr4oyed by floods. Amtrak offered a special train to the city on August 27, to move equipment from the city, but the city rejected the offer, which had space for several hundred passengers. Conditions in the Conventions Center were appalling, surrounded by refuse, human wastes, as well as corpses. Delay in evacuations led to the death of several patients in the Downtown Charity hospital. Independent investigations indicate mismanagement of pre-Katrina levees funds set to protect New Orleans (Townsend
2006).
References
Kapucu, N. (2006) ‘Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies’. Public Administration. 84(1). pp. 205-220
Moynihan, Donald P. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for PolicyTools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. CrisisManagement. Governance 21 (2): 205-229. Townsend, F. F. (2006).The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington DC: Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. www.whitehouse.com
(Author’s name)
(Institutional Affiliation)
Criticism to the Hurricane Katrina Response Framework
Following the Hurricane Katrina landfall of August 2005; the greatest natural disaster in the history of the United States that claimed and destroyed myriads of lives there is a debate for criticism of roles of different stakeholders’ response.
Federal Government Response
President Bush allocated 10.5 billion US dollars of relief kitty four days within the hurricane, and assigned 7000 active troops to help with relief tasks. These relief efforts were however slow owing to the poverty ascribed to most of the affected regions (Moynihan, 2008). There was also a shortage of National Guard Unit in terms of staffing following some of the units’ deployment overseas. In addition, local recruiting attempts from schools as well as the community was constrained, resulting in less than the ideal quantity of resources. On September 2, Ray Nagin, the Mayor of New Orleans, expressed his frustration citing inadequate provision of reinforcement by the federal authorities (Townsend, 2006).
Official help requests in line with apt command chains were not fruitful due to delayed engagement of Federal Management Agency, for federal assistance …show more content…
(Kapucu 2006). The local police together with Emergency Response workers deemed the situation a traumatic one, with at least two suicidal officer cases being reported. Appleseed Foundation reported that local entities were better placed in terms of response than the federal arm. Inadequate legal authority and insubordinate requirements for application and those for eligibility set federal response back. In most cases, federal government was not flexible, lacked training and the requisite resources to suffice relief demands (Moynihan 2008).
State and Local Government
Officials of the State of Louisiana like governor Blanco and leaders charged with managing state emergency face wide criticism for delaying the capacity of federal government and external agencies to avail relief. National Guard troops of the state headed by the governor, were able to quell civil unrest before the relief efforts, but were not hands-on in the hurricane situation. Governor Blanco turned down a request by the Bush Administration to take charge of law enforcement, so did Hayley Barbour, governor of Mississippi. Governor Blanco requested more National Guard troops to augment relief efforts. The formal request was however made two days following the hurricane, a time when the better time of the city was under water (Townsend, 2006).
Most of the imminent problems were attributed to insufficient planning and emergency communication systems at all levels of the National Response Plan. The press also reported failure on the level of the State and local government in according expected aid, plus social service, with Mayor Ryan Nagin being accused of delaying relief efforts. Blanco is also reported to have been reluctant to give a compulsory evacuation order until the president called her, directing her to give the order (Kapucu 2006).
City and Local Response
Local response was inept in the disaster plan of New Orleans that entailed the use of School buses within the city to evacuate incapable residents.
The buses were not deployed, and were destr4oyed by floods. Amtrak offered a special train to the city on August 27, to move equipment from the city, but the city rejected the offer, which had space for several hundred passengers. Conditions in the Conventions Center were appalling, surrounded by refuse, human wastes, as well as corpses. Delay in evacuations led to the death of several patients in the Downtown Charity hospital. Independent investigations indicate mismanagement of pre-Katrina levees funds set to protect New Orleans (Townsend
2006).
References
Kapucu, N. (2006) ‘Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies’. Public Administration. 84(1). pp. 205-220
Moynihan, Donald P. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for PolicyTools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. CrisisManagement. Governance 21 (2): 205-229. Townsend, F. F. (2006).The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington DC: Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. www.whitehouse.com