Nazi and British Propaganda During Wwii

Nazi and British Propaganda during WWII

In this paper I will discuss the use of propaganda before and during the World War II and how it affected British and German society. I will first note that differences in the countries ' war aims had a great effect upon the success and content of propaganda. Then I will examine how propaganda affected morale. I will describe how hatred and violence were successful parts of the German, but not British, propaganda campaign. I will then examine how propaganda saturated every aspect of civilian life. Throughout this paper I will prove that British propaganda was more successful towards the war effort than German propaganda.
It is important to note that Britain and Germany had different aims and ambitions in mass persuasion. The Nazis talked of "fighting on the battlefields of the mind," but this idea never took hold in Britain because Britain was not suggesting major changes in society as Germany was (Briggs 6). German propaganda:

"had set itself the task of educating the German people for a new society based upon a dramatically restructured value system. The ‘revolutionary ' task of German propaganda contrasts starkly with the ‘conservative ' basis of British propaganda aims" (Kershaw 182).

The Nazi 's main propaganda aim was to keep the keep the people of Germany from seeing or reading anything that was damaging to the Nazi Party and to present the Nazi ideals to the public in the most persuasive way possible. One effect of this exclusive method of mass persuasion was that stifled and prosecuted people such as artists and intellectuals fled to other countries (Propaganda in Nazi Germany -WEB). British propaganda has no such exclusivity. It focused on the total involvement of society in the war effort and giving people a sense of unity and enthusiasm. "In German home propaganda, the Nazi 's found it difficult at critical moments to strike the same motes as the British had been able to strike with little fuss in 1940". Germans went to war with "reluctant loyalty" (Balfour 148). When Germany began to lose the war, "the task of upholding morale was incomparably greater than that of British propaganda." Because it was promoting more drastic changes, German propaganda had to work harder than British to gain support for the war (Kershaw 182). Both countries directed their propaganda at the masses, although with different attitudes toward them. Hitler thought of the masses as malleable and corrupt and had an utter contempt for public opinion. The British government saw the people as malleable but did not view them with such great disdain. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote that propaganda must always address itself to the broad masses of the people. There was no point in trying to influence the intellectuals: Hitler conceded that they would be capable of forming their own opinions. Hitler believed that the proper task for propaganda was to bring certain subjects within the field of vision of the masses. It concentrated on as few points as possible and hammered them home repeatedly (Propaganda in Nazi Germany -WEB)
One of the main duties of propaganda in Britain was to maintain a high level of civilian morale. This was the prime duty of the Ministry of Morale, which was formed in 1935 and had departments devoted to news, control, publicity, collecting, and administration. Unfortunately, the Ministry of morale was almost comically ineffective, but morale was boosted by other means and remained remarkable high during the war. The British film industry used drama, political films, and comedy to raise morale as well as shaping peoples values and worldview (McLaine 2). In both countries, morale was heightened by public spectacles and speeches, and by the wireless. Both styles of propaganda were highly emotional and both sides presented ideas in terms of black and white; but a key difference was in the arousal of hatred in the civilian population. Hitler thought that a politically uneducated mass public was bound to be receptive to emotive appeal rather than to rational argument. In his eyes, propaganda could afford to make no concessions to the other side. Britain produced propaganda to incite hatred of Germans, but in May 1941 the Policy Committee of the Ministry of Morale had to formally propose an anger campaign because the British people lacked personal anger towards the Germans. This campaign was implemented on a small scale and did not significantly alter British attitudes (McLaine 103). The Germans, however, were persuaded to hate the British from the first (largely because of residual anger of the Treaty of Versailles), though it took time to make them hate the Jews.

The wireless played an important role in both Nazi and British propaganda. In the summer of 1932, the Nazis gained access to the German broadcast system. In 1939, 70 per cent of German households owned a wireless—the highest percentage in the world. Not long after the war began, Germany banned all foreign broadcasts; listening to one could result in receiving the death penalty (Balfour 145-149). "We spell radio with three exclamation marks ', said one Nazi, "Because we are possessed in it of a miraculous power (Briggs 5-6)." In Britain the BBC functioned as an instrument of social control by fostering a feeling of communal identity among their dispersed audiences. It warned against apathy and promised a new world would come with victory (Briggs 142). Yet the Director General of the BBC, F.W. Oglivie, "certainly did not conceive of his job as that of a propagandist (Briggs 6)." The BBC was praised for allowing at least some opposing opinions and "a ‘League of Nations ' of foreign refugees had assembled in the BBC 's studios and offices in London," adding their own perspectives to the BBC 's output (Brigss 10). The BBC grew during the war and reached its peak figure of 11,663 staff in March 1944. The BBC was pure "white" but the Political Warfare Executive also had power over the radio waves as was responsible for the more than sixty "black" broadcasts during the war, which falsely purported to come from behind enemy lines. This stood in contrast to Germany, where the Nazi 's controlled not only the aboveboard operations but also a wide range of "black" stations (Briggs 13).
Propaganda also included spectacle intended to elicit admiration, pride, and a sense of belonging to the nation. Hitler ' heil greeting, the corpus of National Socialist songs, the eagle standard were all well-planned and Hitler 's speeches became great spectacles. In Britain, the BBC regularly featured public events, ceremonial occasions and festivals. It was responding to the desires of its audiences for stability, coherence, and collective identity, and thereby fostered a sense of national unity (Roetter 45). Early in the war, public speaking was Hitler 's main propaganda weapon and he frequently exercised his supreme skill in bending large crowds to his will. In the 1920s, he had actually been banned from public speaking in Germany. Like his propaganda, his speaking was very emotional. "Active propaganda" such as speeches and meetings formed the main branch of the Nazi propaganda machine. To an unprecedented degree, propaganda entered into every aspect of civilian life. In Nazi Germany there was required meeting attendance, radio listening, and purchase of Nazi newspapers; speakers were erected in factories (Propaganda in Nazi Germany –WEB). Both countries undertook propaganda campaigns promoting economic self sufficiency—an undertaking that involved even housewives in the war. And just as propaganda entered into daily life, daily life entered into British propaganda: Propaganda glorified ordinary people who could then see themselves as heroes and heroines of the national drama (Andrea 375-376). Propaganda had completely saturated the political, social, and domestic spheres. British mass persuasion affected Germany and Germany 's affected Britain. "German propaganda in Britain was largely a failure"; but it had some successes, such as Lord Haw Haw 's radio program, to which 27 per cent of Britons listened regularly (Briggs 8). The Nazi stranglehold on information was perhaps one of the greatest reasons for the failure of German Propaganda, while British propaganda was considered successful. On 22 August 1939, after announcing to his generals that he would provide a propagandist pretext for the start for the war, Hitler concluded: "the victor will not be asked afterwards whether he told the truth!" (Balfour 147) In Germany, more so than in Britain, there was a growing counter-opinion and distrust in official information. The credibility of Nazi media was virtually destroyed after its silences and outright lies during the Stalingrad catastrophe (Kershaw 198).
In conclusion, I believe the Nazi 's pushed their propaganda too far; the reason why Germany fought to the bitter end cannot be attributed to propaganda, but Britain 's persistence can because British propaganda was firm without becoming a stranglehold.

Works Cited
Andrea, Alfred. The Human Record Volume 2: Since 1500. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 2005.
Balfour, Michael. Propaganda in War, 1939-1945
London: Routledge, 1979
Briggs, Asa. The History of Broadcasting in the UK: vol.3: The war of Words 1939-
1945. Oxford University Press, 1995.
Kershaw, Ian. Nazi Propaganda: The Power and Limitations, ed. David Welch. London: Croom Helm, 1983
McLaine, Ian. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979.
Propaganda in Nazi Germany http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/propaganda_in_nazi_germany.htm Roetter, Charles. The Art of Psychological Warfare. New York: Stein and Day, 1974.

Cited: Andrea, Alfred. The Human Record Volume 2: Since 1500. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 2005. Balfour, Michael. Propaganda in War, 1939-1945 London: Routledge, 1979 Kershaw, Ian. Nazi Propaganda: The Power and Limitations, ed. David Welch. London: Croom Helm, 1983 McLaine, Ian in World War II. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979. New York: Stein and Day, 1974.