Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction
The Mind-Body Problem:
Five Philosophical Observations: 1) You have a mind and a body 2) These normally work together 3) Your body is physical and, thus, publicly observable 4) Your mental life is essentially private; no one else can feel your pain, or experience the images you do; and unlike the physical realm the mental realm is not publicly observable, therefore, 5) You have privileged access to the contents of your own mind
2
Consciousness studies- What is Consciousness?
I can taste you
I can feel you
I can see you
I can smell you
I can hear you.
Do we have other senses?
Proprioception – yes
Arguably the most central and distinguishable aspect of consciousness is experience, …show more content…
at least according to the putative understanding we have thus far. What we know or can say with any measure of assuredness is that consciousness, at least the identifiable features, are those that involve ‘perception’ in the various modalities (sight, taste, etc.), ‘thoughts’ (mental content), ‘feelings’ (emotions), and particularly ‘awareness’. To this list we might add, intentional states, dispositional states, to have beliefs, and a whole myriad of other identifiable experiential states. Experience, is central to a subjective viewpoint, however, for the objectivist it is somewhat more problematic. Since one can provide a descriptive account which may entail how ‘fields, waves, and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold interact’ and eventually evolve to produce complex systems such as brains but what is not included in this description is how qualia arise. This is then ‘the explanatory gap’
Proprioception — from Latin proprius, = "one's own," and perception, is one of the human senses. It is debatable just how many senses humans have and depending on which research you ask the answer is between 9 and 21 different senses. Proprioception is the sense of the orientation of one's limbs in space as an internal feedback mechanism. Proprioception though integrated with the sense of balance which derives from the fluids in the inner ear, and is called equilibrioception, it is nonetheless distinct. When police stop a car driver for suspected drunkenness they often test the driver’s proprioceptive ability. Proprioception is so important that without it, you would struggle to walk and need to keep an eye on yourfeet in order to get the appropriate feedback you were upright.
Proprioception we know is not derived from any specific organ but from the nervous system as a whole. The input comes from sensory receptors distinct from tactile receptors — nerves from inside the body rather than on the surface.
3
Problems of Consciousness * The Descriptive Question: What is consciousness? What are its principal features? And by what means can they be best discovered, described and modelled? * The Explanatory Question: How does consciousness of the relevant sort come to exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality, and if not how does (or could) consciousness in the relevant respect arise from or be caused by nonconscious entities or processes? * The Functional Question: Why does consciousness of the relevant sort exist? Does it have a function, and if so what is it? Does it act causally and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a difference to the operation of systems in which it is present, and if so why and how? * The Functional question: Mental causation is the view that mental events or states, e.g. desires and beliefs, contribute causally to the bodily movements involved in action. Descartes held that mental states are non-material and suggested that the point of interaction was the pineal gland. * Major problem: how can something that is immaterial (mind) causally interact with something that is material (body)? Nowadays the notion of a non-physical interference is incoherent or at the very least the discussion seems not fruitful in terms of our understanding. * Many have argued that in order for mental states to have any effect on the physical they themselves must be physical and in someway causally receptive. This we can understand?
4
The hard problem? Explaining the qualitative feel associated with consciousness. ‘The explanatory gap’ * Not hard to appreciate that systems like brains can process information in complex ways, and behaviourally respond to stimuli or even exhibit complex capacities such as memory, learning, language and imagination. * Understanding the physics underpinning the dynamics of information processing in complex systems leaves out (the explanatory gap) what it is like to be a conscious being. * Conscious experience seems to be a feature that evades explanation. It is not so difficult to appreciate that systems like brains can process information in complex ways, and behaviourally respond to stimuli or even exhibit complex capacities such as memory, learning, language and imagination. Having an understanding of the physics underpinning the dynamics of information processing in complex systems seems to leave out (the explanatory gap) an important aspect which a fully fledged theory should provide, that is, what it is like to be a conscious being. * Chalmers (1996 p.5) suggests that a theory of consciousness ought to provide the following summarised details: conditions under which physical processes give rise to consciousness; specify what sort of experience is associated with the processes that do give rise to consciousness; explain how it arises; we should be able to see consciousness as an integral part of the natural world.
5
Some classifications/worldviews in particular, relative to developing a theory of Consciousness
Worldviews: Monism = Idealism and Materialism
Worldviews: Dualism = substance/property
Behaviourism – logical/psychological
Identity theories – type, token, type-type (materialist)
Functionalism
Connectionism
Computationalism
Double aspect theories
Triple aspect theories
Quantum mechanical approaches
Property dualism is a compromise position between substance dualism and materialism. Like materialism, it holds that there is only one type of substance: physical. Property dualism denies the existence of immaterial minds that somehow interact with the physical world, animating unconscious bodies.
Property dualism parts with materialism since it does not attempt to reduce mental states to physical states. Mental states, according to the property dualist, are irreducible; there is no purely physical analysis of mind.
Property dualism thus holds that although there is only one type of substance--physical--there are two types of property--physical and non-physical. Our bodies have physical properties such as weight and height, and mental properties such as beliefs and desires.
This position is intended to combine the plausible aspects of both dualism and materialism, while avoiding the problems of each.
6
The Phenomenal and the Psychological Concepts of Mind
The phenomenal concept of mind is characterised by the way it feels. Phenomenal concepts deal with first-person aspects of mind (we can distinguish various types of phenomenal consciousness)
The psychological concept of the mind is characterised by what it does and psychological concepts deal with third-person aspects of mind. What matters mostly from this perspective is the role a mental state plays in a cognitive economy and not so much the specific conscious quality it bears.
There are at least two major distinct concepts of mind. Firstly the phenomenal (qualitative – consciously experienced mental state) concept of mind and secondly the psychological concept of mind (in relation to the causal or explanatory basis of behaviour). What matters mostly from this perspective is the role a mental state plays in a cognitive economy and not so much the specific conscious quality it bears.
The phenomenal concept of mind is characterised by the way it feels and the psychological concept of the mind characterised by what it does (Chalmers D.J. 1996 p. 11-12).
7
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) Rationalism
Foundationalist (epistemology)
Egocentric approach Method of doubtCorner stone: Cogito ergo sum ‘I think, therefore I am’ Substance Dualist: res extensa and res cogitans
On November 10, 1619 Descartes spent the night by a large stove in Ulm; there he had a vision, and later three dreams, about how to lay the foundations of a unified science which include all human learning. Descartes’ aim was to establish a science on absolute certainty, free from sceptical doubts, developing a method of inquiry, if properly followed, would lead science to certain truths.
Descartes unique contribution is the egocentricity of his approach: the foundation of truth and knowledge begins by working from what is most evident to the mind of the individual. He attempts to show in the Meditations both the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. Descartes sets out to show that when the mind is emptied of all sense-dependent beliefs, it is not empty of ideas or concepts, and those that remain are sufficient to establish the basis for science.
The material world is reduced to one fundamental kind: matter as extension.
Reference: John Shand, (1994) Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy , London, Penguin Books pp. 76-78
8
Rene Descartes - The Epistemological Quest: What can we know?
Challenging the Skeptic...Two hypotheses: 1) The dream hypothesis 2) The evil demon hypothesis
He suggests two hypotheses: the ‘dream hypothesis’ and the ‘evil demon hypothesis’: The first one points to those times when I thought I was awake but in fact I was dreaming. When dreaming what we feel often cannot be distinguished from our waking states. This is enough to undermine the trust we have in our senses as representing something real.
This doubt extends to the existence of my own body, which brings us to the second class of beliefs: the existence of ‘simple natures’. When we dream we dream about something, and the something, Descartes contends, must conform to the most simple and universal categories such as extension, shape, duration, number, and movement. Even if what we dream of does not exist exactly as we dream about it, it is still possible, and less doubtful, that simple and universal natures exist e.g. objects with extension.
The evil demon however finally makes it conceivable that no external world exists corresponding to our idea of a world of extended substance.
Reference: John Shand, (1994) Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy , London, Penguin Books pp. 79-81
Please note the brain does not distinguish between real or imagined things.
9
Rene Descartes
In a world where the senses can be deceived, where an evil demon is capable of making us believe that logical truths like 2 + 2 = 4 are false, and 2 + 2 = 5 true; the only thing that remains that cannot be doubted is the cogito -
Cogito ergo sum:
I think, therefore I exist Homunculus (mini me)
The evil demon does not have the power to alter logical truths and make 2 + 2 = 4 false and 2 + 2 = 5 true; however the demon can make us believe that 2 + 2 = 5. Descartes thinks however it is within God’s power to alter logical truths.
We have at best a pure mathematics and geometry which has been shown not to apply to anything existing for the simple natures are what it would deal with. What remains that cannot be doubted is cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I exist. I am essentially a thing that thinks, for, although I can doubt that I have a body and still exist, I cannot cease to think and still exist. Descartes thinks that he is a thinking thing: he is necessarily immaterial (incorporeal) if he exists at all, and only contingently embodied.
Reference: John Shand, (1994) Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy , London, Penguin Books pp. 79-81
Rene Descartes
The cogito is the necessary condition for all reasoning – even all deception.
In other words, if I am doubting, I must exist.
If I am thinking, I must exist.
If I doubt, I must have a mind.
If I think, I must have a mind.
Therefore I cannot doubt that I have a mind.
11
Descartes Dualism
Descartes is an internalist: justifying factors are accessible to the ‘knower’s conscious awareness’. For Descartes, all justifying factors take the form of ideas. He’s a Rationalist!
Question: If mind and body are separate substances, how do they interact? If mental stuff is immaterial - and therefore without quantity, weight, size, etc. - how do we know it exists?
An important principle for Dualistic approaches is:‘
Indiscernibility of Identicals’ – the principle that if X is identical with Y then everything true of X is true of Y (Numerically speaking)
“One way to divide theories of justification is in terms of the internalism-externalism distinction. Broadly speaking: a theory of justification is internalist insofar as it requires that the justifying factors are accessible to the knower's conscious awareness; it is externalist insofar as it does not impose this requirement.” (Newman, 2005)
“Descartes' internalism requires that all justifying factors take the form of ideas.
For he holds that ideas are, strictly speaking, the only objects of perception, or conscious awareness. Independent of this theory of ideas, Descartes' methodical doubts underwrite an assumption with similar force: for almost the entirety of the Meditations, his meditator-spokesperson (the ‘meditator’), adopts the assumption that his every thought is occurring in a dream. Essentially the assumption is a requirement that justification come in the form of ideas”. Reference: Lex Newman (2005) ‘Descartes Epistemology’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available online @ …show more content…
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
Descartes is a substance dualist. The main philosophical obstacle (problem) is explaining how two different substances (mind and body) can interact. How are they causally related? Descartes’ tried to argue that it is the pineal gland in the brain that is the seat of interaction. We now know this to be incorrect.
Please note there are several kinds of dualistic theories and equally several versions of the same kinds that you should explore.
12
Dissolving Dualism.
Identity Theory?
Identity theory was developed in the 1950s and is associated with such philosophers as J.J.C. Smart, U.T. Place and Herbert Feigl.
The theory goes back to the 17th century, but was especially influenced by modern research into brain function that suggested localisation, i.e. different parts of the brain seemed to be associated with different actions. This had long been suggested by earlier research conducted in the 19th century by such figures as Dr. Paul Broca (1824-1880) and Dr. Carl Wernicke (1848-1904).
The theory claims that when we experience something, for example, some pain, that is exactly reflected by a corresponding neurological state in the brain (such as the interaction of certain neurons, axons, etc.). From this point of view, your mind is your brain - they are identical.
Wilder Penfield, Professor of Neurology and Neurosurgery at McGill, revolutionised our understanding of the human brain. Penfield refined and extended a daring surgical technique learned from his German mentor, Otfried Foerster.
13
Identity
Theory?
The Montreal Procedure - Wilder Penfield * Karl Lashley had earlier conducted experiments on rats and he demonstrated that memory is distributed not localised. * The "Montreal Procedure" allowed patients to remain awake and verbally describe their reactions while the surgeon stimulated different areas of the brain. (No pain receptors in the brain) * Penfield applied this procedure to the surgical treatment of epilepsy and used the information gained during many hundreds of brain operations to create functional maps of the cortex (surface) of the brain. He mapped accurately for the first time the cortical areas relating to speech. * Penfield also discovered that stimulation of the temporal lobes provoked startlingly vivid recollections - proof of the physical basis of memory. Point of discussion: Karl Lashley – experiments on rats, removed different areas of brain; demonstrated capacity to retain memories; conclusion - memory is distributed throughout the brain and not necessarily localised to specific regions of the brain. Brain Mapping
14
Identity Theory: Major problems * Correspondence between brain state and experience * Could such an account of my brain states be identical to my thoughts? * Multiple Realisability: a mind may depend upon vastly different physical mechanisms that underpin a specific experience or mental state. So how can we assume that such an experience is identical with only a certain brain state.
Okay firstly, it builds on the presupposition that it is theoretically possible to observe what is going on in your brain which is meant to translate to mean the same thing as what you are actually experiencing.
Multiple Realisability: another problem for identity theory is the possibility that other species feel pain. Not hard to imagine. Whether these species are actual – such as fish and spiders – or hypothetical – such as aliens from Mars – the problem is the same.
If we accept these species have very different ways of realising such a sensation as pain (i.e. they have different physical processes for registering it), then how can we assume that such an experience is identical with only a certain brain state? So we have two options available: we either assume that such creatures do not have similar experiences to us, or we admit that such conscious experiences as pain are “multiply realisable”. That means that in theory, a mind may depend upon vastly different physical mechanisms that underpin a specific experience or mental state. This latter view seems the more plausible line of reasoning.
15
Relatively New Theory: Functionalism
Functionalism is a materialist theory though in recent years other versions have emerged that are not strictly materialist or physicalist due to a broader understanding of what constitutes matter or the stuff of the universe.
Brain states are not mental states.
Functionalism is currently an important and highly regarded theory of mind due to the influence of computers - both in scientific terms and in the popular imagination through films, books, etc. Question: What does it take to be a Mouse Trap? Answer: Anything that catches mice!
What is the functionalist perspective? SCREEN
For instance, if I feel a pain and say, "I’m in pain" it doesn’t seem consistent to say, "The C-fibres in my brain are firing". But, if I assume that mental states and brain states are identical, then these two statements should mean the same thing? “If not, and certain types of neurological processes cannot be matched up with certain types of mental state, then something over and above simple physical processes must be taking place”. Reference: Philosophy Online , Philosophy of Mind – Functionalism, Available @ http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_functionalism_introduction.htm
16 * The main thrust of the argument is to say that neurological states or brain activity help to realise mental states, which subsequently lead to behaviour. * Functionalism proposes that brain states are "low level" activities that help realise "high level" mental states. * Functionalists in general believe that brain states are responsible for mental states, however do not believe that they are identical with them as is common with Identity theorist for example. * “The most common example used by Functionalists is the computer. Consider adding the numbers 3 and 7 on a computer. On one level – the ‘low level’ – the process happening in the computer is dependent on the hardware; yet on another level - the ‘high level’ - the computer's software is calculating the answer”. * Computers have evolved with different hardware that work in different ways, in summary, the process of calculation is not the activity of hardware. Rather the Functionalist contends that the process of calculation is realised by the hardware. Therefore, the software is a function of the hardware. Translation: The mind is the software. The brain the hardware.
17
* Compare the brain with other organs, say the eye. * The individual parts that form the eye, collectively, serve the function of seeing. * Similarly, for the Functionalist all the parts of the brain serve the function of thinking * Trades on multiple realisability argument
18
Argument against Functionalism: The Chinese Room Argument:
A thought experiment provided by the American philosopher John Searle.
Searle imagines that someone who does not understand Chinese is placed in a room with an "In" slot and an "Out" slot, (cavities fixed into the walls).
Through one slot come Chinese symbols, which the person responds to by arranging other Chinese symbols according to rules laid down in a hand book and then sending them out through the other slot. Now imagine that the "In" slot provides questions in Chinese which the person "answers" by following rules set out in the hand book, we have what Searle considers a certain view of artificial intelligence.
Here’s the catch, would the person in the room really be said to understand Chinese? Searle thinks no and therefore argues that no view of artificial intelligence could ever result in a truly conscious being (in the human sense) because all that is ever happening is rule-based activity (which is not how humans work) i.e. simply just symbol manipulation.