Oil Pollution Act Pros And Cons
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 90 is an act of the Congress enforced in response to the Exxon Valdez incident of Good Friday 1989. The accident involved Exxon Valdez which spilled more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. It emerged from the incident that the country lacked sufficient resources to counter cases of oil spills. The country’s facility entrusted with the role of responding to cases of maritime oil pollution was the United States Coast of Guard. However, the agency was incapacitated to effectively execute its role due to insufficient funding from the Federal, State, and local authorities. Whilst, the lack of adequate funding, the United States Coast Guard also lacked the necessary training to counter such incidents as the Exxon Valdez spill. Upon the realization of the ineffectiveness of US systems to deal with cases of poor response to oil pollution, the Congress initiated the process of drafting an Act which would power the necessary resources to counter oil spill incidents in the United States. In the wake of 1990, the US
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Congress had proposed several bills which would later set up the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The new Act had the objective of allocating more resources for the Coastal Guard to enable a better response than that experienced in the Exxon Valdez (Busenberg,, 2013). This paper explores the Oil Pollution Act of the year 1990 passed the Congress after the Exxon Valdez spill into Prince William Sound. Explored in the paper are the: overview of the OPA 90, detailed background information, theoretical explanation of policy issues, alternatives, and recommendations.
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was enacted in 1990 as a response to the Exxon Valdez spill. This incident spilled more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The Valdez spill was significant in making the US realize that it was short of the resources needed in oil spill response. Consequently, the OPA became of the most notable outcomes of the Valdez spill. Ideally, this Act came as an amendment of the Federal Water Pollution Act, and addressed several challenges linked to the prevention, response, and compensation for oil pollution events taking place in US navigable waters (Sump, 2011). The Oil Pollution Act introduced higher oil-spill liability limits, alongside modifying the financial responsibility requirements (Wood, 2009). The Oil Pollution Act was preceded by two ineffective laws namely the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 1972 and the Clean Water Act (CWA) 1977.
It was worth noting that these two Acts constituted the oil pollution response, liability framework, and containment used during the Exxon Valdez. At this point that it emerged the oil spill liability and response laws in the country were defective. Ideally, such laws ought to be clear on: the parties responsible for reporting and responding to the incident; those will lead the containment and cleanup exercises; detailed damages, costs, and expenses to be incurred by the party deemed responsible for the spill (Sump, 2011). In addition, the Act ought to define the means of compensating the damage caused by the spill and finite conditions under which the responsible party can transfer liability to a third party, limit liability, or evade it all the
same. The Congress and the US Coast Guard were well aware of the inefficiencies of the two Acts utilized to respond to the Exxon Valdez spill. Specifically, the Acts failed on their ability to define oil spill damages and a structure to be used in compensating those affected by the incident. Attempts to pass OPA had not been successful until Good Friday 1989 (Gibbs, 2015). Whilst revealing much about the deficiencies of oil spill mechanisms, Exxon Valdez was not the sole incident that many feared could occur. The failures of CWA would be most evident in the event of a major spill in which the responsible party is underfinanced, unprepared, and unmotivated. However, the Exxon Shipping Company had sufficient funds to finance the estimated clean-up cost of $2.5 billion (Sump, 2011). The major accident saw Exxon Valdez crash on the Alaskan Bligh Reef, March 24, 1989. The navigation of the vessel onto the reef exhibited considerable negligence hence a breach of a single hull of the tanker; ideally, it deposited more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into the scene. Efforts to identify causes of the accident have been marred by different misjudgments and mistakes; inclusive of the fact that vessel was navigated by an unqualified mate. The pilot navigated the vessel through the wrong shipping lane in an attempt to evade ice flows a move which rendered the Coast Guard incapacitated to have contact with Exxon Valdez in the course of transit via Prince William Sound. The first three months after the Exxon Valdez spill saw the Congress engage in a serie4s of debates aimed at introducing bill s that would find a lasting solution to oil pollution challenges, particularly the compensation and response systems. Indeed, both houses came up with several bills which attempted to address all issues surrounding oil pollution. However, the Coast Guard held a position that termed most of the bills unworkable, unnecessary, or ill-conceived. The Coastguard only emphasized on the provisions that were essential to its goals concerning means of improving the Oil pollution system in the country. However, the late June of 1989 saw the Coast Guard lose its capability of losing its influence over the avalanche of ideas. In the review of the origin of the Oil Pollution Act, it is worth on the poor funding of the oil spill response of the Coast Guard prior to the Exxon Valdez spill. Notably, at the time of the accident, the Coast Guard had only $6.7 million to fund the response mission-this kit was commonly referred to as the as 311(k) fund (Sump, 2011). This amount was far below the intended balance of $35 million, yet the Congress was reluctant in allocating more funds for the Coast Guard. Considering the limitation of the 311(k) fund, the Coast Guard ought to have sought an emergency appropriation for different sizes of spills from the Congress. The situation became worse considering that there were no trained teams or responsible parties that would bear responsibility for large spills. There was no doubt about the need to activate Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), and have it used as a constituent of the new federal oil spill scheme. Some of the issue to be discussed included the funding of the OSLTF, the appropriation and availability of the entire OSLTF content, availability of a portion of the fund to the Coast Guard without appropriation, and the level at which OSLTF funding should stop. It subsequently emerged that the only success in addressing the limitations with funding issues lied within the Congress. This realization led to the activation of the OSLTF, with its funding being subject to a tax of five cents imposed on each oil barrel as from 1990 to 1994. The structure if the tax was aimed at maintaining the OSLTF at $1 billion. The OSLTF also received a boost from the outstanding balances in such other oil spill funds as the Offshore oil Pollution Compensation, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and the Deepwater Port funds. In addition, the OSLTF received $1 billion in borrowing authority from OPA 90 expanding the fund to $2 billion.
The OPA 90 provides that the party responsible for a facility which discharges oil, or exhibits a significant threat of discharge, is liable for the costs of removal as per the specifications of the NCP and specific damages associated to the discharged oil. The exceptions to CWA liability provisions are inclusive of oil discharges from a public vessel, oil discharges authorized by a local, State, or Federal law, or oil discharges from onshore facilities that enjoy the cover of the Trans-Alaska Authorization Act’s liability provisions. In §1002(d), the OPA 90 provides that in the event that a responsible party is capable of establishing that the damages and removal costs associated with a spill were solely associated to an omission or act by a third party, then the responsibility will be borne by the third party. §1004 increases the liability for facilities larger than 3000 gross tons to $12000 for each ton. In addition, deepwater ports and onshore facility responsible parties are subjected to a liability of up to $350 million per spill. The Federal government is capable of regulating, hence adjusting the $30 million liability limit set for the onshore facilities. The OPA 90 also requires offshore facilities to keep proof of $150 million, deepwater ports, and vessels, alongside providing financial responsibility proof up to the upper applicable liability amount. There is provision to directly assert claims for damages and removal costs against the guarantor entitled with the provision of financial responsibility evidence. According to §1018(a), CWA cannot preempt State Law. Ideally, States are capable of imposing additional liability, fines and penalties, removal action requirements, and finding mechanisms for responsible parties. Also, the OPA 90 provides that States can enforce requirements for financial responsibility evidence on navigable waters. The various States can also utilize funds held by the Federal government for prevention of discharge, immediate removal, or mitigation; the Trust Fund can do reimbursement for monitoring and removal costs incurred in the course of response and cleanup operations provided they are consistent with the NCP. The development of such public policies as the Oil Pollution Act can be explained using theories developed by various science and environmental scientists. For instance, the group and political system theories have effectively been used to demonstrate the role of groups and public officials in the development and the current state of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The explanation provided by the two theories primarily revolves around the different positions taken by the Congress and the United States Coast Guard towards the creation and enforcement of the Act. The group theory has focused on the principal dynamic aspects in policy development, particularly in such pluralistic societies as the United States; however, the theory seemingly over-emphasizes the power and essence of groups, alongside understating the creative and independent role of public officials in policy formation. It is worth noting that a significant number of groups exist as a result of policies. The theory states that the struggle and interaction among groups are the primary elements of political life. Ideally, a group refers to a collection of individuals using common interests or attitudes to pursue other groups in the society. In addition, the group theory states that group struggle is the primary source of public policy.
Congress had proposed several bills which would later set up the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The new Act had the objective of allocating more resources for the Coastal Guard to enable a better response than that experienced in the Exxon Valdez (Busenberg,, 2013). This paper explores the Oil Pollution Act of the year 1990 passed the Congress after the Exxon Valdez spill into Prince William Sound. Explored in the paper are the: overview of the OPA 90, detailed background information, theoretical explanation of policy issues, alternatives, and recommendations.
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was enacted in 1990 as a response to the Exxon Valdez spill. This incident spilled more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The Valdez spill was significant in making the US realize that it was short of the resources needed in oil spill response. Consequently, the OPA became of the most notable outcomes of the Valdez spill. Ideally, this Act came as an amendment of the Federal Water Pollution Act, and addressed several challenges linked to the prevention, response, and compensation for oil pollution events taking place in US navigable waters (Sump, 2011). The Oil Pollution Act introduced higher oil-spill liability limits, alongside modifying the financial responsibility requirements (Wood, 2009). The Oil Pollution Act was preceded by two ineffective laws namely the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 1972 and the Clean Water Act (CWA) 1977.
It was worth noting that these two Acts constituted the oil pollution response, liability framework, and containment used during the Exxon Valdez. At this point that it emerged the oil spill liability and response laws in the country were defective. Ideally, such laws ought to be clear on: the parties responsible for reporting and responding to the incident; those will lead the containment and cleanup exercises; detailed damages, costs, and expenses to be incurred by the party deemed responsible for the spill (Sump, 2011). In addition, the Act ought to define the means of compensating the damage caused by the spill and finite conditions under which the responsible party can transfer liability to a third party, limit liability, or evade it all the
same. The Congress and the US Coast Guard were well aware of the inefficiencies of the two Acts utilized to respond to the Exxon Valdez spill. Specifically, the Acts failed on their ability to define oil spill damages and a structure to be used in compensating those affected by the incident. Attempts to pass OPA had not been successful until Good Friday 1989 (Gibbs, 2015). Whilst revealing much about the deficiencies of oil spill mechanisms, Exxon Valdez was not the sole incident that many feared could occur. The failures of CWA would be most evident in the event of a major spill in which the responsible party is underfinanced, unprepared, and unmotivated. However, the Exxon Shipping Company had sufficient funds to finance the estimated clean-up cost of $2.5 billion (Sump, 2011). The major accident saw Exxon Valdez crash on the Alaskan Bligh Reef, March 24, 1989. The navigation of the vessel onto the reef exhibited considerable negligence hence a breach of a single hull of the tanker; ideally, it deposited more than 11 million gallons of crude oil into the scene. Efforts to identify causes of the accident have been marred by different misjudgments and mistakes; inclusive of the fact that vessel was navigated by an unqualified mate. The pilot navigated the vessel through the wrong shipping lane in an attempt to evade ice flows a move which rendered the Coast Guard incapacitated to have contact with Exxon Valdez in the course of transit via Prince William Sound. The first three months after the Exxon Valdez spill saw the Congress engage in a serie4s of debates aimed at introducing bill s that would find a lasting solution to oil pollution challenges, particularly the compensation and response systems. Indeed, both houses came up with several bills which attempted to address all issues surrounding oil pollution. However, the Coast Guard held a position that termed most of the bills unworkable, unnecessary, or ill-conceived. The Coastguard only emphasized on the provisions that were essential to its goals concerning means of improving the Oil pollution system in the country. However, the late June of 1989 saw the Coast Guard lose its capability of losing its influence over the avalanche of ideas. In the review of the origin of the Oil Pollution Act, it is worth on the poor funding of the oil spill response of the Coast Guard prior to the Exxon Valdez spill. Notably, at the time of the accident, the Coast Guard had only $6.7 million to fund the response mission-this kit was commonly referred to as the as 311(k) fund (Sump, 2011). This amount was far below the intended balance of $35 million, yet the Congress was reluctant in allocating more funds for the Coast Guard. Considering the limitation of the 311(k) fund, the Coast Guard ought to have sought an emergency appropriation for different sizes of spills from the Congress. The situation became worse considering that there were no trained teams or responsible parties that would bear responsibility for large spills. There was no doubt about the need to activate Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), and have it used as a constituent of the new federal oil spill scheme. Some of the issue to be discussed included the funding of the OSLTF, the appropriation and availability of the entire OSLTF content, availability of a portion of the fund to the Coast Guard without appropriation, and the level at which OSLTF funding should stop. It subsequently emerged that the only success in addressing the limitations with funding issues lied within the Congress. This realization led to the activation of the OSLTF, with its funding being subject to a tax of five cents imposed on each oil barrel as from 1990 to 1994. The structure if the tax was aimed at maintaining the OSLTF at $1 billion. The OSLTF also received a boost from the outstanding balances in such other oil spill funds as the Offshore oil Pollution Compensation, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and the Deepwater Port funds. In addition, the OSLTF received $1 billion in borrowing authority from OPA 90 expanding the fund to $2 billion.
The OPA 90 provides that the party responsible for a facility which discharges oil, or exhibits a significant threat of discharge, is liable for the costs of removal as per the specifications of the NCP and specific damages associated to the discharged oil. The exceptions to CWA liability provisions are inclusive of oil discharges from a public vessel, oil discharges authorized by a local, State, or Federal law, or oil discharges from onshore facilities that enjoy the cover of the Trans-Alaska Authorization Act’s liability provisions. In §1002(d), the OPA 90 provides that in the event that a responsible party is capable of establishing that the damages and removal costs associated with a spill were solely associated to an omission or act by a third party, then the responsibility will be borne by the third party. §1004 increases the liability for facilities larger than 3000 gross tons to $12000 for each ton. In addition, deepwater ports and onshore facility responsible parties are subjected to a liability of up to $350 million per spill. The Federal government is capable of regulating, hence adjusting the $30 million liability limit set for the onshore facilities. The OPA 90 also requires offshore facilities to keep proof of $150 million, deepwater ports, and vessels, alongside providing financial responsibility proof up to the upper applicable liability amount. There is provision to directly assert claims for damages and removal costs against the guarantor entitled with the provision of financial responsibility evidence. According to §1018(a), CWA cannot preempt State Law. Ideally, States are capable of imposing additional liability, fines and penalties, removal action requirements, and finding mechanisms for responsible parties. Also, the OPA 90 provides that States can enforce requirements for financial responsibility evidence on navigable waters. The various States can also utilize funds held by the Federal government for prevention of discharge, immediate removal, or mitigation; the Trust Fund can do reimbursement for monitoring and removal costs incurred in the course of response and cleanup operations provided they are consistent with the NCP. The development of such public policies as the Oil Pollution Act can be explained using theories developed by various science and environmental scientists. For instance, the group and political system theories have effectively been used to demonstrate the role of groups and public officials in the development and the current state of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The explanation provided by the two theories primarily revolves around the different positions taken by the Congress and the United States Coast Guard towards the creation and enforcement of the Act. The group theory has focused on the principal dynamic aspects in policy development, particularly in such pluralistic societies as the United States; however, the theory seemingly over-emphasizes the power and essence of groups, alongside understating the creative and independent role of public officials in policy formation. It is worth noting that a significant number of groups exist as a result of policies. The theory states that the struggle and interaction among groups are the primary elements of political life. Ideally, a group refers to a collection of individuals using common interests or attitudes to pursue other groups in the society. In addition, the group theory states that group struggle is the primary source of public policy.