Oratory's Cauterizing Effect On Knowledge Rhetorical Analysis

Gorgias: Oratory’s Cauterizing Effect on Knowledge In Gorgias, Plato exposes oration as a horribly shameful skill that corrupts the retention of knowledge, and encourages the false belief in unexamined appearances. The deceptive rhetoric that oratory employs is merely a tactic used to convince inexperienced people through an appeal to their soul’s desires, eliciting a favorable response through sheer flattery. In this paper, I will argue that Gorgias exposes oration as a dishonest skill—rather than a learned expertise—and advances Plato’s belief that oration leads to the loss of knowledge. Furthermore, I will explore the implications of such supposed cognitive dissonance, including the objection that oration itself cannot facilitate corruption,
It is much easier to convince people that some claim is true and just when those people being convinced don’t have the knowledge to understand the subject of interest. To Plato, this is one of the many great issues with rhetoric; it is a kind of fluttering flattery, not a learned craft. And, further, it is a dishonest skill, at best. Let us look at the previously addressed example of the doctor-orator dilemma: there is a patient faced with a treatment plan, but rather than following his doctor’s instructions in regard to his ailment, he listens to the orator. Before we supposed that the orator convinced the patient to get the treatment, for whatever reason he chose; say his wife hired the orator to do so. Let us now suppose that the orator convinces the patient not to get the treatment; say his heir hired the orator to do so. Now the patient dies. Are the orator’s actions still just? Are his intentions still honest? Apparently, they are not. But how is causing this bad outcome any more wrong than causing a good outcome, considering that in both instances the orator “guess[ed] at what’s pleasant with no consideration for what’s best” (465a)? In both instances, no knowledge was applied, and even if in only one instance there was a bad result, both situations gave no knowledgeable consideration where it was due. In the latter situation where the patient dies, the speaker still
Is he not vulnerable to such tragedies like false conviction from other rhetoricians, or worse, has he already been affected unbeknownst to him? And, if we consider that he has, there is absolutely no way for him to be aware of his falsehoods unless he examined his beliefs. In order to do this, though, he needs knowledge, something oration must not possess. If it did, it would not be oration. So then why would he practice something he himself did not participate in? He must be aware of his dishonesties and injustices, or else he would not practice oratory, but he would practice a craft, which requires knowledge for its respective mastery. Furthermore, if this man, aware of his evils, continues this practice, is he not committing a great injustice—in fact, is he not doing what is “the greatest of evils” (469b)? Apparently, he is. So not only is he encouraging the blatant ignorance of truth, but he is also accepting the greatest evil of all to affect