Organ Market Debate

As the gap between supply and demand for transplantable organs widens, the suggestion for legislation allowing an organ market becomes more popular. However, this proposal has been condemned by many as an unethical practice that allows the body to be devalued and seen solely as a commodity that is composed of marketable parts. In his article, “No such thing as ethical organ market”, Alastair V. Campbell explores the principles that drive the ban on organ trading and challenges the prospect of a live organ market due to its effect on human integrity, equality, and value.
Campbell makes a very structured argument about the moral and ethical implications of a legal organ market. Throughout his discussion, he highlights the issues of human integrity, ethics, and the division of social classes. By breaking down his argument in this manner, he consistently displays his view that payment for organ donation is an unethical practice that must be addressed. Campbell emphasizes the idea that in an
organ market, the human body would be viewed as a “piece of property”, detracting from its inherent integrity. He claims that this would provoke the sale of other “expendable” parts and negatively affect the social relationships and the current altruistic rationale of individuals. Subsequently, he directly challenges the ethics of organ trade by stating that the idea of an “ethical and regulated market” is deceptive. By citing that many poor participants express “donor regret” and the organ market’s possible destruction of need-based allocation of organ donation, Campbell dismisses the thought that an ethical market could exist.
It is hard to imagine that there will be numerous persons in wealthy western nations eager to sell their kidneys unless compensation is significant.
This fact raises questions as to whether a large class divide will emerge where the poor populations are the vendors and the rich populations are the buyers. Campbell touches upon the idea that an open market would widen the social gap between the less fortunate and the wealthy, making inequality a more prevalent issue in our already greatly divided world. In addition to this, he mentions the possibilities that the trade will likely attract people that have “marginal organs”, that vendors might not be able to afford care after the procedure, and that in the long run these poor individuals could need an organ transplant themselves. While it may be true that many disadvantaged citizens would sell to a rich patient, Campbell ignores the opposing view that this may merely be a reflection of the existing inequalities in our
society.
In his effort to make a clear explanation of the repercussions of an organ market, Campbell avoids addressing various alternative positions. For instance, he completely overlooks the idea that the “health and employment” of vendors can be protected. He also ignores the fact that organ prices can be regulated and that a need-based process of allocation can be implemented. He also fails to address the fact that many patients on the waiting list for organs die each day, which is a crucial factor in this ongoing debate. Without concentrating on the counterarguments, his own argument falls short. In the debate over the organ market, it is clear that no definitive solution exists. However, something should be done to try and find a “middle ground” between a ban and legislation of an organ market in order to save lives, integrity, and human value.