organisational behaviour

believe that the United States explicitly or implicitly addresses most of the elements of safety culture in the NRC’s regulatory process, despite the fact that we do not directly regulate safety culture. We believe that it is unnecessary to assess a licensee’s safety culture as a distinct component because the concept of safety culture is similar, if not integral, to the licensee’s more specific responsibilities. If a licensee has a poor safety culture, problems and events will continue to occur at that facility either causing various performance indicators to exceed their thresholds, or surfacing during the NRC’s baseline inspection activities. Yet, some aspects of safety are extremely to assess using probabilistic and risk-informed methods. In particular, the adequacy of security and emergency preparedness programs are extremely difficult to gauge.
In Munn v. Illinois the Supreme Court established the legal basis for state regulation by recognizing that certain economic activities were so critical to the functioning of a modern society that government has the right to oversee the prices charged to assure that such services are provided to the public in a reasonable manner. Yet the Court‘s decision in Munn did not adopt a particular process for establishing the prices that could be charged by those entities deemed to be critical to the modern society (often we call these entities ―utilities‖). Indeed, it was not until the early 20th century that the commission-based regulation of public utilities that is so prevalent today was implemented. Regulation of private entities by expert commissions was something new and there were no ―text books‖ to turn to for guidance. The process of regulation involved much trial and error and experimentation. For instance, the development of the uniform system of accounts, procedural due process, and economic and administrative theory all evolved concurrently to establish what has become the modern regulatory system (Covaleksi