Outline Of Rowe's Argument

Outline of Rowe's Chapter on the Argument from Contingency in His Philosophy of Religion, Part II
Notes on Rowe on the Cosmological Argument, Part Two: Four Criticisms of the Argument

0. Review
0.1 Dependent beings: a being whose existence is accounted for by the causal activity of other beings
0.2 Self-existent beings: beings whose existence is self-explanatory, or accounted for by their own inner nature
0.3 The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): There must be an explanation for (a) the existence of every object, and (b) of every positive fact whatsoever, either in terms of something else or in terms of its own inner nature.
0.4 The basic argument:

1. Either everything is a dependent being, or there is a self-existent being.
2. Not everything is a dependent being.
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3.
Therefore, there is a self-existent being.

1. First Criticism: Dependence and the fallacy of composition
1.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of beings within the universe is dependent, that therefore the whole collection of such beings is itself dependent. But this doesn’t follow.
1.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR(b) that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection exists.
2. Second Criticism: Causation and the fallacy of composition
2.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of dependent beings has a cause, that therefore the whole collection of dependent beings has a cause. But this doesn’t follow.
2.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR(b) that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection
exists.
3. Third Criticism: Nothing’s left to explain
3.1 The defender of the cosmological argument fails to see that once the existence of each member of the collection of dependent beings is explained, the existence of the whole collection is thereby explained.
3.2 Reply: This isn’t necessarily true
4. Fourth Criticism: What’s wrong with brute facts?
4.1 The argument assumes that it’s impossible for there to be brute facts – facts involving contingent beings or events that have no further explanation.
4.2 But what’s wrong with this, exactly? It turns out that it all turns on whether you accept PSR.
4.3 Thus, to see if this criticism of the cosmological argument is any good, we must first see what reason there is to accept PSR. Let’s do so now.
5. Two arguments for PSR
5.1 It’s self-evident
5.1.1 Self-evident propositions are those that, once you understand what they mean, you automatically see that they’re necessarily true. Here are some examples: all triangles have three sides; all red things are colored things; nothing could be red all over and green all over at the same time.
5.1.2 The defender of the cosmological argument claims that the same is true of PSR: once you understand it, you automatically see that it’s necessarily true.
5.1.3 The problem: lots of people who have thought about it for a long time – and thus, presumably, understand what it means – nevertheless fail to see that it’s necessarily true. If so, then this seems to be evidence that it’s not self-evident.
5.2 It’s not known to be true, but it’s a presupposition of reason:
5.2.1 it’s a basic assumption that all people make – or perhaps must make – in order to be rational.
5.2.2 Compare: believing that there are material objects; believing that the there is a past (as opposed to our being created 10 minutes ago, with our minds implanted with false memories, etc.)
5.2.3 Similarly, belief in PSR is a basic assumption like these that all rational people do – and perhaps must – accept in order to be rational.
5.2.4 Some problems:
5.4.1 from the fact that we must presuppose PSR in order to be rational, it doesn’t follow that it’s true.
5.4.2 granted, if PSR really is a presupposition of reason, we should accept it in order to be rationally consistent. But unfortunately, it’s not clear that it is a presupposition of reaso

William RoweThe Cosmological ArgumentRowe substantially clarifies the Cosmological Argument by making explicit the way in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason ('PSR') operates in the argument.
Rowe explains that the PSR has two parts. First, the PSR requires that there be an explanation for the existence of any being; thus, for any being that exists, the PSR demands that one be able to point to the cause of that being. Second, the PSR requires that there be an explanation for "any positive fact whatever."� To illustrate how the PSR operates with the Cosmological Argument, Rowe begins by describing the only three ways in which the existence of a being might be explained: it might be explained by another being (in which case it would be a dependent being on Clarke's account); it might be explained by itself (in which case it would be an independent being on Clarke's account); and it might be explained by nothing (which is unaccounted for on Clarke's account). Now, the PSR (specifically the first part of the PSR) is what justifies Clarke's assertion that all beings fit into the first two of these categories; that is, because the PSR demands that there be an explanation for any being, it is not possible for there to be no explanation for the existence of a being. Thus follows Clarke's premise that every extant being must be either dependent or independent. But this does not suffice to show that the Cosmological Argument is sound, for it could be that every extant being is
dependent upon another dependent being in an infinite succession of dependent beings. In such a case, the existence of every being is accounted for, and the first part of the PSR satisfied. However, Rowe points out that Clarke invokes the second criterion of the PSR, that any positive fact must have an explanation, to argue that there must be an independent being. One can explain each member of an infinite succession of dependent beings by pointing to a different dependent being, but no independent being can account for the fact of the existence of the series. Thus, in order to account for the second part of the PSR, one must posit an independent being. Rowe points out several criticisms and counter-criticisms of this move; more importantly, he notes that Clarke's formulation of the Cosmological Argument is only as good as the PSR. However, Rowe argues that it is unclear why we should embrace the PSR at all. That is, why should we believe that the PSR is true? One common answer is that it is just obviously true; but many people fail to accept it, so it seems that it is not at all obvious. Second, some argue that the PSR is just a presupposition that people make; however our presuppositions seem to be bad tests for the truth of principles. In sum, then, the status of the PSR is questionable, and so, according to Rowe, is the Cosmological Argument. |
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