Pascal’s Wager is not an epistemic argument and Pascal admits that himself claiming that that is not what his argument is intending to show, rather it is solely to create a cost-benefit analysis that demonstrates why being a Christian is worth it for the individual. Although Pascal acknowledges that fact, his argument will still be thoroughly examined and explained from multiple angles. Also, this paper will cover the advantages and disadvantages of Pascal’s Wager, who the wager is targeted to specifically, and most importantly, whether Pascal’s Wager makes a convincing argument to believe in God.
First, one must understand what Pascal’s Wager is and how it differentiates from an epistemic argument. The premise of Pascal’s Wager is the idea of not knowing. Pascal argues no one can truly know whether God exists or not because there is not enough evidence to determine if he exists or not. Thus, reasoning, specifically epistemic reasoning, will not be useful in countering or arguing against Pascal’s Wager. Therefore, Pascal contends that one should ask “should I believe in God” instead of “is god true” because the ladder will never be knowable until after death whereas the former weighs tangible possibilities that one can experience depending upon if God exists or not. “Should I believe in God” creates an assumption that God exists. In this situation, the only thing left to determine is whether or not it is worth it to practice the belief of God’s existence. Therefore, one should compare the outcomes of believing versus not believing in God for one’s personal life. In Pascal’s context, believing in God gives the follower a position in heaven and God’s eternal love, whereas not believing in God gives the non-believer nothing in return. Pascal’s Wager offers no other alternative solutions either. One cannot argue that one is not partaking in this scenario because choosing to do abstain from participating has the same results as choosing not to believe in God.
Now that Pascal’s Wager and how it differentiates from an epistemic argument is understood, the flaws that are apparent with Pascal’s Wager must be addressed. We will start from least to most challenging counter arguments levied against Pascal’s Wager. The first objection to Pascal’s Wager to be discussed is that one cannot believe something to be true simply by willing oneself to believe something is true. Meaning, one cannot force oneself to have a belief just because maintaining that belief is beneficial to oneself. However, this objection has flaws of its own. Specifically, in its foundation. Indeed, it is possible for someone to truly believe in something because of the benefits from the outcome are so great. For instance, before finding out the results of an exam taken at school, one can either believe one performed well or poorly. If one believes one performed poorly on the test, one may attempt to convince oneself that one performed well on the test in order to feel relaxed and comfortable, because believing one’s outcome is success is more beneficial to ponder than to believe one’s outcome is failure. Before knowing one’s results on this test, one has time to think and reach a conclusion about how one performed, so too, before knowing if God truly exists, one has time to either believe or disbelieve in him. All the more so, does this form of belief extend to an powerful being like God. This is a being that controls every aspect of our lives and we have a lot more time to decide what we believe about him than a test result. Also, until one days, one can always change their belief in God whereas once a test is handed in, nothing can be changed. With this in mind, one can force oneself to commit to believing in God because of the rewards presented by doing so the same way one can force oneself to be optimistic about their test results. Pascal has his own response to the initial objection as well.
Pascal counters that if one repeatedly acts in a religious manner, like going to temple, or reading holy texts, one will come to genuinely believe in the religion one is practicing. Pascal’s response is a plausible response that can be demonstrated in reality. For instance, repetition of customs help cultivate many religious individuals convictions and religious beliefs. These customs and routines gradually precipitate one’s thoughts to change as well. If one has to go through routines like praying multiple times a day, and making blessings before eating, one will start cultivating a connection with God and become constantly conscious of God’s presence. Although Pascal’s response is sound by itself, there is also a psychological understanding that one can force oneself to believe in something that supports Pascal’s Wager.
In psychology, Cognitive Dissonance and Irrevocability support the idea that people have the power to force themselves to truly believe in something. Before explaining how Cognitive Dissonance and Irrevocability help substantiate Pascal’s Wager, one must understand what both of these psychological terms mean. Cognitive Dissonance is a theory that people will experience tension if they hold on to two beliefs that are incongruent with one another. This discomfort can also be caused by an inconsistency between one’s personal beliefs and one’s behaviors. Not believing in God, but Acting in a religious manner is an example of a Cognitive Dissonance inconsistency between one’s personal beliefs and one’s behaviors. Therefore, this individual is forced to align his beliefs and actions, otherwise he will continue feeling this discomfort. He can either believe inside and demonstrate it outwardly as such, or he could not believe inside and demonstrate it outwardly as such. Since he has weighed the benefits of believing and not believing he would choose to believe. Therefore, Cognitive Dissonance is applicable to Pascal’s Wager because it demonstrate that one can force oneself to believe in something.
Irrevocability also helps further this idea. Irrevocability contends that once one is committed to a decision one becomes compelled to believe in it or compelled to justify belief in it. For instance, one would like their shoes after purchasing more than before purchasing them because, now one has become committed to the shoes. Even more so, if one is continuously engaging in religious activities, one becomes more and more committed to the beliefs attached to the activities, thus one becomes compelled to justify their beliefs and starts formulate ways to do just that.
What was not raised as an objection by this counterargument is the different types of thinking that people experience. Specifically, the different depths of thinking between conscious and subconscious thinking. One is aware of their Conscious thinking because it is an awareness at the present moment, whereas one is not aware of their subconscious thinking because it is a deeper thinking than a current awareness that influences one’s feelings and actions. One may consciously believe in God’s validity, in an effort to attain the expected rewards, but subconsciously, on a deeper level, one truly knows whether one believes in God’s existence or not.
Another objection to Pascal’s Wager contends that Pascal’s Wager presupposes a low view of God and of people with Religious Faith. This objection contends Pascal’s Wager causes a low view of God and religion because Pascal’s Wager is entirely about self-interest. Like Pascal’s Wager, seeking a resolution strictly because it benefits one-self, essentially is the textbook definition of self- interest. However, this objection argues that self-interest is not what faith and believing in God is about, but rather, sacrificing one's own interests and being generous is what God represents, especially in Christianity.
One can respond to this objection by arguing that it is possible that God views people with self-interest in a positive light. Under the framework in Christianity, this may not be the case, but God can be different than the parameters defined in Christianity and can condone self-interest if he so chooses. To create only two possibilities is very limiting and minimizes the actual amount of different possibilities that are expendable to God. The idea of a multitude of possibilities existing is expressed by individuals like Simon Blackburn later on as well, who argue that God can be completely different than the parameters that Pascal created for him under Christianity.
Another counterargument to the above objection specifically, is that self-interest is merely a stepping stone on the road to being a generous person performing good deeds. Although initially performing religious acts for selfish reasons, by jumping into practicing the faith, one gradually develops true believe and acts altruistically based off of those beliefs. This idea of acting in a questionable manner in order to achieve the “greater good” was previously discussed in my paper concerning how to understand the problem of evil within a monotheistic framework. Specifically, some argued that evil is necessary because it is a counterpart to good that creates the opportunity for more good to rise. So too, even if it may be based off of self-interest, following Pascal’s Wager can result in one engaging in more selfless acts than ever previously imagined because of his new found beliefs. Linda Zagzebski has her own counterarguments to the low-view of God objection.
Responding to this objection, Linda Zagzebski explains that Pascal’s Wager is specifically intended for certain individuals that are on the fence between belief and disbelief and that it is just a precursor to true faith geared towards in Christianity.
Although Linda’s argument, especially the latter half, may seem similar to my argument, Linda’s argument is not sound, but rather a weak counterargument to the objection made, because Linda makes Pascal’s Wager more of a religious recruiting tool than an actual legitimate argument by itself. The distinction between our arguments is that I argued Pascal’s Wager causes an individual to follow the religion for its benefits, temporarily becoming a selfish person before becoming a selfless individual, whereas Linda argues that the Wager itself does not create a low view of God and of religious people because the Wager is not faith in and of itself but rather the Wager is just the beginning of the path to sincere faith. Meaning, similar to the “greater good” argument about evil discussed above, I argue that Pascal’s Wager is a “greater good” argument for a necessity to temporarily be selfish until one becomes selfless, whereas Linda views the Wager more as a path for atheists or christians who are having second thoughts about believing in
God.
But, Pascal’s Wager does appear to be a “greater good” argument. The other objections point out flaws in the Wager that are resolved by explaining that this Wager is only for certain people, or as Linda explained, people that are on the fence between atheism and christianity. It is clear that this argument cannot even attempt to convincingly prove God, but rather, at best, convince believers or disbelievers that they might as well follow it or not. With this in mind, the next objection highlights the limited scope of Pascal’s Wager.