over others, decreases. The existence of antipower is predicated on pre-existing dominion. This dominion, Pettit asserts, involves “a difference in resources, or a difference in the preparedness to use resources” (589). Consequently, it becomes evident that antipower is not innate to humans, but rather, the result of an unequal “resource” distribution (Pettit 589). Antipower is an extrinsic freedom. The extrinsic quality of antipower, presents a stark contrast to the notions of negative and positive freedom. Very rudimentarily, Isaiah Berlin defines negative freedom as the degree to which no entity may interfere with another’s activity and positive freedom as an individual’s desire for self-mastery (Berlin 15, 22). Though incredibly distinct to Berlin, both negative and positive freedom are inherent to humans. They are qualities innate and utilized against outside threats. Unlike antipower, outside institutions and structures do not enhance negative and positive freedom (Pettit 590). On the contrary, Berlin postulates that outside influence can severely limit freedom. Ultimately, positive and negative freedom are far from dependent on external structures. A freedom contingent on injustice, subordination, and dominion is unsettling. Beyond its apparent cynicism, antifreedom can go unrealized. Its extrinsic nature, born out of external situations, implies that power has the capacity to go unchecked. As subjugation and dominion remain, freedom cannot grow. Unlike innate negative and positive freedoms, antipower is not guaranteed to exist, let alone flourish.
over others, decreases. The existence of antipower is predicated on pre-existing dominion. This dominion, Pettit asserts, involves “a difference in resources, or a difference in the preparedness to use resources” (589). Consequently, it becomes evident that antipower is not innate to humans, but rather, the result of an unequal “resource” distribution (Pettit 589). Antipower is an extrinsic freedom. The extrinsic quality of antipower, presents a stark contrast to the notions of negative and positive freedom. Very rudimentarily, Isaiah Berlin defines negative freedom as the degree to which no entity may interfere with another’s activity and positive freedom as an individual’s desire for self-mastery (Berlin 15, 22). Though incredibly distinct to Berlin, both negative and positive freedom are inherent to humans. They are qualities innate and utilized against outside threats. Unlike antipower, outside institutions and structures do not enhance negative and positive freedom (Pettit 590). On the contrary, Berlin postulates that outside influence can severely limit freedom. Ultimately, positive and negative freedom are far from dependent on external structures. A freedom contingent on injustice, subordination, and dominion is unsettling. Beyond its apparent cynicism, antifreedom can go unrealized. Its extrinsic nature, born out of external situations, implies that power has the capacity to go unchecked. As subjugation and dominion remain, freedom cannot grow. Unlike innate negative and positive freedoms, antipower is not guaranteed to exist, let alone flourish.