Plato's Republic Argument

In this essay, I will attempt to evaluate the text of James Butler’s Justice and the Fundamental Question of Plato’s “Republic,” and analyze his position. The article was aimed at proving that Plato’s Republic is grounded within the ideals that justice is welcomed for its own sake, indicating that the act of justice is done as an end in itself rather than to achieve some other purpose and that justice there unfolds the highest degree of happiness in one’s life. It draws attention to proving that the Republic should be studied as being thoroughly eudaimonistic. Since reading the article, I can confirm that I stand convinced by Butler’s claim in the intentions of the “Republic.” As I absorbed his thoroughly explained and persuasive arguments,
I found myself convinced with the arguments Butler made. He accomplished a compelling paper by introducing Socrates and his teachings of justice within the Republic, and further explained why this text has caused many contradictory evaluations by scholars. The article was rather analytical when it came to exploring outside sources and research. To that end, Butler challenges and debunks the interpretations of both J.D. Mabbott and Terence Irwin, in doing this he was able to provide more validation to strengthen his own argument. All things considered, Butler concludes with the simple “three proofs” that account for the reasons why justice must be appreciated as being good for its own sake and its consequences. The paper begins with an introduction to the central question that entirely constructs the subject matter underlying the Republic, which is first raised in Book II with the dialogue of three men who challenge Socrates. What is justice, and why is justice desirable? This question sets the tone for a long and complicated argument defending the just life. In the article, it is explained that Socrates’ categorizes justice as belonging to the “second finest class: those things that must be welcomed both for their own sake and for the consequences by anyone who is going to be blessed” (358a2-3). Butler then continues to stress the importance that one must read the Republic with the understanding that it should be observed with regard to how Plato intended and not merely in the line of modern views present today. With this observation, Butler advances to present the issues he holds with the ideas of both Mabbott and Irwin.
The article transitions to reviewing Mabbott, who is exemplified to demonstrate that his ideas are results from a faulty judgment. Mabbott is regarded as being incorrect in believing that Plato contradicts himself and splits the “Republic” into two different parts. Mabbott’s claim is then brought to closer inspection, where a quote is included from Mabbott himself, explaining that justice has been expressed to be intrinsically good in itself by taking a look in Book lV whilst Book lX pushes justice as being good only for the advantages of the end result. To further this point, Mabbott indicates that the end of Book lV, where he interprets the reading as Socrates is arguing that justice is good in itself regardless of the means. After an in-depth study of Mabbott’s claims, Bulter refutes them and proceeds to project Mabbott as failing to acknowledge the importance of comprehending the reading in terms of understanding phrases such as ‘welcomed for its own sake’ and ‘good in itself regardless of the consequences.’ It is due to this lack of careful interpretation that Mabbott misinterpreted the reading and concluded false ideas. The instance where Glaucon categorizes wholesome pleasures as an example that falls under goods desired for their own sake. Whilst Mabbott perceives this as wholesome pleasures being good in themselves regardless of the consequences.
From here, Butler shifts onto bringing forth that Mabbott’s views cannot be defended since they are unsustainable and weak arguments. Particularly referencing to how Mabbott considers passages rather plainly, especially when discussing points in Books V-lX of Socrates’ argument of justice contributing to happiness. Butler sheds light on the fact that essential accounts between justice and health are unified in the end of the book in order to specifically reveal the objective of Socrates’ examination about happiness. Even so, Mabbott does not conduct any inquiry into this evidence. Instead, he calls attention to other content in the book that lacks valid evidence to support the claims he makes.
On the other hand, Butler takes into account Irwin’s views that he labels as ‘Component Eudaimonism.’ This is due to Irwin’s proposal that justice is an essential part of happiness, meaning that if we desire happiness as a whole ‘for its own sake,’ then we are also simultaneously desiring justice ‘for its own sake.’ Although Butler does agree that the threefold classification of good refers to a means to happiness, he finds fault in Irwin’s dismissal that happiness is a consequence of justice in favor of the view that justice is an essential part of happiness. It is addressed that Irwin rejects the interpretation of the phrase ‘welcomed for its own sake’ refers to the purpose of itself, and the phrase ‘welcomed for its indirect consequences’ implies to the ends of the reputation that come with being just. Irwin believes that this false interpretation conflicts with the threefold classification of goods demonstrated by Glaucon where exercise is deemed to fit under the third class, due to being endured for the later outcome. He uses the example that exercise has beneficial and direct consequences, but it placed in the third class of goods which is thought to welcome solely for the indirect consequence. It is because of this, Irwin argues, that the third class is only exclusive to a good that only has an indirect consequence.
To further this idea, Irwin connects his claim to when Socrates placed justice within the second class of goods, he was not concerned with whether the good was of direct or indirect consequences. Irwin insists that the phrase ‘welcomed for its own sake’ is used in the Republic in an effort to demonstrate that justice is the principal element of happiness. An example Irwin based off of this reasoning is taken from Book lV, where he interprets the analogy Socrates gives between justice and health is a comparison to clarify that justice must be valued above all goods, even physical health because justice is the vital constituent of happiness. Despite Irwin’s reasoning, Butler discredits his view due to the following reasons: Firstly, Irwin was unsuccessful in giving an explanation for why Socrates speaks of happiness and justice having a casual connection.
Moreover, there was no specific text in the Republic where justice is directly referred to being a component to happiness. Secondly, despite arguing that justice is above health, Irwin himself cannot help but submit to embrace health since it is more comfortable than being in an ill condition. A quote where he admits to this is included in the article, which additionally serves to portray his argument as invalid. Lastly, Irwin misinterprets the differences between ‘welcomed for its own sake’ and ‘welcomed for its consequences.’ Butler suggests that the actual differences between the two are that a good is between being a means to happiness in its instantaneous features, or being a means to happiness in its wider aspects. As a result, Butler recognizes that Irwin must be credited for correctly thinking that the Republic is a piece intended to solve the answer to the definition of happiness and why justice should be embraced for the reason that it is a manner of leading the happiest life. Nevertheless, Irwin stands as holding inadequate arguments for proving that justice is a part of happiness, instead of justice being producing
happiness.
After looking into failed interpretations that were insufficient in giving a plausible answer to the principal question of the Republic, Butler proposes that the answer can simply be found within Book lX.
Here lies the direct comparison Socrates makes between the happiness of those who lead just and unjust lives. Three proofs are given according to the just life. Butler interprets these proofs as arguments made by Socrates that the happiest life simply is the most pleasant life to live; the just life is more content than the unjust life. Pleasure is used as the dominant response in measuring the just and unjust life. The unjust life is consumed with dissatisfaction and pain whilst the just life is one filled with virtue, elegance, and beauty. Correspondingly, what makes life happiest is that it most pleasant and pleasurable. Butler concludes that Plato issued the Republic with the intention of proving that justice is better than injustice because justice produces the happiest most pleasure-filled
life.
All things considered, what makes this article worthy of credibility is the extent Butler went to expose the arguments others scholars have made and did it in a manner that offered more validation to his own argument. He explored the wide range of content and analysis others have constructed in the philosophy of Plato and raised the issues that these false conceptions had provided. Although Butler's approach is powerful, the language he demonstrated within the reading was managed to be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner that explained complicated quotes rather simply and productively. Ultimately, Butler was successful in his article for creating plausible reasons for why justice must be appreciated as being good for its own sake and its consequences and why the Republic is a eudaimonist reading.