Political Conception Of Justice Analysis

Realizing the limits of Neutrality as the sole basis for a Political Conception of justice, Rawls argues for the importance of a conception of primary goods as the basis for the respect of equal persons. Rawls argues that a well laid our political conception of justice will “ensure to the extent that is humanly possible to do so that the political process – that is, not only the right to vote, but also the opportunity to hold public office and influence political decisions – remains equally accessible to all (Rawls 42). In doing so, it will also guard against the prevalence of illiberal policies and the establishment of a tyranny of the majority insofar as the political conception safeguards the rights and liberties of every individual. The
ability of such a conception to achieve this goal is predicated upon the existence of a common concept among all reasonable comprehensive doctrines: namely a strong belief that reasonable conceptions of the good contain a shared idea of rational advantage (Young 174).
A shared idea of rational advantage as Rawl’s puts it, is the belief that:

Citizens affirm the same political conception of themselves as free and equal persons; and… that their (permissible) conceptions of the good, however distinct their content and their related religious and philosophical doctrines, require for their advancement roughly the same primary goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth with all these supported by the same social basis for self-respect (Rawls 180)

The presumed presence of this “Shared Idea” serves as the basis for the notion that a political conception of justice can provide meaningful publicly acceptable way of measuring validity of citizens claims in relation to questions of political justice. This
shared idea is premised upon the idea that all citizens have a desire for the “primary goods” in life (rights liberties, opportunities). However, this means that for everyone to fully benefit from a conception of justice, they must all agree and adopt an identical list of primary goods (Young 180). As mentioned earlier, the five primary goods that Rawls outlines in Justice as Fairness are: the basic rights and liberties, freedom and equality of opportunity, equality of power, wealth and social bases for self-respect (Rawls 58). There are obvious objections in regard to the neutrality of such principles, and it can be argued that they favor a very specific comprehensive doctrine. Nevertheless, Rawls is not troubled by this fact, he argues that the index of primary goods is open to revision through legislation and judicial amendments. This provides a failsafe were there to be primary goods that were no longer essential, or if there needed to be an addition of another basic good. Despite the obvious perversions of political power that can occur as a result of these primary goods (and the comprehensive doctrine which they favor) Rawls and Cohen are unperturbed by the outcomes. However, what they both fail to properly account for is the degree to which those who hold political power (as a function of the amicability of their personal views with the “asserted” comprehensive doctrine) may use their influence to shape the bundle of primary goods and by extension the conception of justice to their advantage, and necessarily exclude others who hold differing comprehensive views.
To complicate the matter even more, Rawls accepts that the value of the primary goods afforded conception of justice will be different for everyone.
The primary goods will not be of equal value to every individual. Though the goods are the same (liberties, rights, opportunity etc.) the usefulness is going to be different depending on the situation of the individual. The value of any primary good is a function of the means that individual has at his disposal of making the most use of that primary good (Young and Rawls). Therefore, those with greater means will be able to make better use of their primary goods that are guaranteed for all by the conception of justice that we arrive at in the original position. Rawls then places the onus on individuals by claiming that it is up to them to align their expectations with their current situations to adequately reflect “the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable situation” (Rawls 189). Therefore, if an individual lacks the “all-purpose means” to secure his preferences, then it is that person’s responsibility to adjust his preferences so that he will be able to achieve realistic goals given his circumstances (Young; Rawls 189-93). This is to illustrate the fact that a conception of justice is not unjust just because citizens hold unrealistic expectations. Although this seems perfectly reasonable, it poses one problem that Rawls was trying to avoid from the outset. The expectation that citizens will
alter their preferences to coincide with the “all-purpose means they can expect” ensures (and logically so) that they will adopt the conception of the good that is best accommodated by the primary goods secured by the “asserted” conception of justice (Young 175). The conception of justice then, via its primary goods, actually engenders a homogenous society, one that is not willfully or freely chosen, but one in which every citizen is nudged to change her values to secure her interests. This poses a big problem if the index of primary goods secured by the conception of justice can be shaped by those in positions of power, and only those whose conception of the good affirms the “shared idea of rational advantage” can hope to gain any meaningful degree of political efficacy, then the primary goods, and by extension, the conception of justice, rather than securing a doctrinal diversity within society, engenders a forced compliance (Young 175). The legitimization of a doctrinal homogeneity goes directly in the face of Rawls original goal, to conceptualize the essence of justice through basic transferrable primary goods. A further problem that this creates is that by rewarding individuals who adopt a conception of justice that favors their use of the “all-purpose means” that they will be granted, logically forces the majority to fall in line. Such a homogenous outlook is not only stifling, because it is vulnerable to perversion by the politically powerful, but it also effectively institutes a tyranny of the majority. Where minority conceptions of justice, and in turn, minority comprehensive doctrines limit citizens ability to gain meaningful agency within their society. Thus, an analysis of universally desirable primary goods illuminates the cracks in the conception of justice. It fails to compensate for the fact that those who control political power may use that power to shape the index of primary goods to serve their own advantage, to the detriment of those who hold differing views.