Popper's Solution to the Induction Problem
Did Popper solve the problem of induction?
Introduction
Inductive reasoning is the basis upon which we build our lives, thoughts, and knowledge. It is perhaps the cornerstone to all knowledge that we have ever gathered and use. However, is it rationally justified? Can we know that our method of inductive reasoning will lead us to a valid conclusion? The answer to this is surprisingly no. We will look closely at the problem of induction, and 20th century philosopher Karl Popper’s solution to this problem, and reasons for why it is ultimately inadequate in resolving the issues we encounter from using induction.
The problem of induction
Modern science is predominantly based on gathering empirical evidence from experiments and observations, in order to prove a hypothesis or theory about the workings of the natural world. The problem of induction lies within this method, when we consider theories that are ‘universal’, theories that encompass objects that we have not, or possibly cannot observe or experiment on. In order to make conclusions about how these unexamined objects act or are acted upon, we apply premises of objects that we have examined which are similar in nature to them – this is inductive reasoning. For example, in the field of Earth Sciences, we know that if we make a thin section of a hornblende crystal and view it under a petrographic microscope, we will see that the crystal is green-brown pleochroic, has two obvious cleavages at fifty-six degrees, and shows birefringence colours of upper first to lower second order colours. How do we know that we will definitely see this? Because in every hornblende crystal that has ever been examined, we have observed all of these features. So we inductively infer that if we look at any crystal under thin section and we observe all of these features, then it will be hornblende (assuming no other crystals share the exact same features). Although logically speaking, just because all of the hornblende we have seen
Introduction
Inductive reasoning is the basis upon which we build our lives, thoughts, and knowledge. It is perhaps the cornerstone to all knowledge that we have ever gathered and use. However, is it rationally justified? Can we know that our method of inductive reasoning will lead us to a valid conclusion? The answer to this is surprisingly no. We will look closely at the problem of induction, and 20th century philosopher Karl Popper’s solution to this problem, and reasons for why it is ultimately inadequate in resolving the issues we encounter from using induction.
The problem of induction
Modern science is predominantly based on gathering empirical evidence from experiments and observations, in order to prove a hypothesis or theory about the workings of the natural world. The problem of induction lies within this method, when we consider theories that are ‘universal’, theories that encompass objects that we have not, or possibly cannot observe or experiment on. In order to make conclusions about how these unexamined objects act or are acted upon, we apply premises of objects that we have examined which are similar in nature to them – this is inductive reasoning. For example, in the field of Earth Sciences, we know that if we make a thin section of a hornblende crystal and view it under a petrographic microscope, we will see that the crystal is green-brown pleochroic, has two obvious cleavages at fifty-six degrees, and shows birefringence colours of upper first to lower second order colours. How do we know that we will definitely see this? Because in every hornblende crystal that has ever been examined, we have observed all of these features. So we inductively infer that if we look at any crystal under thin section and we observe all of these features, then it will be hornblende (assuming no other crystals share the exact same features). Although logically speaking, just because all of the hornblende we have seen