Program Evaluation Fast

Running head: FAST: A PROGRAM EVALUATION

FAST: A program evaluation
Gazmon Tahiri
University of Windsor
Quantitative Methods in Political Science
45-575 01
Dr. L. Miljan
April-16-15

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FAST: A PROGRAM EVALUATION

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3
A Program Description of FAST ................................................................................................. 6
Background and Literature Review .............................................................................................
7
Stakeholders and Intended Purpose ........................................................................................... 14
Evaluation Context .................................................................................................................... 15
Methods and Data ...................................................................................................................... 17
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 18
Conclusion and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 23
Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 25
References ..................................................................................................................................... 27

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FAST: A program evaluation
Executive Summary
FAST was introduced in 2001 under the Smart Border Accord, and it went into effect in later in 2002. The FAST program was meant to ensure the free and secure movement of goods between Canada and the United States (US). The main purpose of FAST is to facilitate and expedite the flow of commercial cargo and reduce border delays by eliminating or minimizing border wait times.
This study is a program evaluation of FAST as it was implemented and adopted by the Canadian government. The evaluation has provided an assessment of how FAST has achieved its goals; it has identified the program’s shortcomings and it has provided recommendations for future improvements.
This evaluation uses a mixed methods approach utilizing triangulation as a method of collecting data and analyzing information. The first step of this approach involves an extensive literature review, which has provided background information on the FAST program; furthermore an examination of two comprehensive previous evaluations of fast have been examined. The literature review and the previous evaluations of FAST have indicated that the efficiency and effectiveness of the FAST program is constrained by a number of challenges that are related to the costs of enrollment and compliance with the program. Furthermore, the findings have indicated that there also a number of issues and challenges that relate to the application process, dual regulatory system of Canada and the US as well as issues arising from the lack of proper infrastructure where FAST is being implemented. Based on these findings
this evaluation has recommended that these issues and challenges must be addressed properly in order for the fast program to be effective and efficient.

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The second step of the triangulation approach involves a regression analysis on a number of variables, which were constructed using the available data from a number of credible and reliable sources. The variables constructed are as followed: truck volumes crossing the CanadaUS border, and in this case, truck volumes is the dependent variable. The independent variables include year, cargo trains, GDP, and exchange rate. This analysis found that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable—truck volumes and the independent variables year, cargo trains, GDP, and exchange rate. The third step of the triangulation approach involves adopting a survey developed by The Whatcom Council of
Governments in 2008. This survey would be administered on a national level and across all the border crossings along the Canada-US border. The results from this survey will provide relevant and accurate data for future evaluations of the FAST program. A copy of the survey as it was designed by The Whatcom Council of Governments is attached under the Appendix heading.
The evaluation concludes that further research and more data is needed to fully determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the FAST program.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 drastically changed the way individuals travel and the transportation of goods across the world. In the immediate aftermath, the United States (US) transformed its country into a fortress, as border crossings and airports were shut down. What followed were a series of programs and securitization measures, which were implement at all international check-points with access to the US. Furthermore, the US sought to extend their fortress by having many of their trading partners adopt and comply with those measures. For Canada, these programs and the security measures meant trade impediments, and scholars, in particular economists, indicated that these

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measures would result in significant economic declines in the Canada-US trade partnership
(Globerman & Storer, 2009). To avoid these negative consequences, both countries agreed to introduce the Smart Border Action Plan (2001), under which both nations agreed to implement the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program. FAST went into effect in 2002, and the main goals of the program were to expedite border cargo clearance, reduce delays for FAST participating trucks, insure fast and secure cross-border movement for members even during high alerts times, and significantly reduce overall border wait times. This study is a program evaluation of FAST as it was implemented and adopted by the Canadian government. It will also provide an assessment of how FAST has achieved its goals, identify its shortcomings as well as provide recommendations for future improvements.
This evaluation of the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program is being undertaken as a final project for a graduate level course on policy and program evaluation. The project was approved by Dr. Lydia Miljan, who is the professor for the course. An evaluation of the FAST program is deemed to be important to a number of stakeholders; however, the main stakeholders in this case could be identified as the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) and the private firms involved in cross-border transportation and cross-border trade. The FAST program was introduced in late 2001 under Smart Border Accord, which is a binational agreement signed between the executive branches of the government of Canada and the United States (US). Both countries decided to develop and implement the FAST program as a strategy that would address the security issues and the free flow of goods between the two nations (Bradbury, 2013).
Therefore, the main goal of the program was to overcome some of the trade barriers created by the various securitization measures that were introduced after the 9/11 events; such goal was to be achieved by creating an environment, both legal and infrastructure wise, that

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would “ensure both secure and efficient trade across the Canada–US border” (Bradbury, 2010, p.
376). This assessment is an evaluation of the ability of the FAST program to fulfill the stakeholder expectations. The private firms and transportation companies that are enrolled in the fast program are able “benefit from access to dedicated lanes at designated land borders and expedited border crossing between Canada and the United States” (Canada Border Services
Agency [CBSA], 2008). Therefore, by designating specific lanes for FAST qualified cargo border crossings are expected to become less congested, overall wait times and delays would decline, and border authorities would be able to dedicate more time and attention to goods and people that represent higher risks (U.S Customs and Border Protection [U.S CBP], n.d).
The program is implemented by both Canada and the US, but the countries have designed a separate approval process, which requires firms, carriers, drivers, and importers to go through the approval process in both Canada and the US (Canada-United States-Ontario-Michigan
Border Transportation Partnership [URS], 2008). In order to obtain approval by the Canadian
CBSA firms, carriers, drivers, and importers need to be enrolled in “the Customs SelfAssessment (CSA) and Partners in Protection (PIP) programs, which were initiated under the
Customs Action Plan (CAP) 2000–2004” (CBSA, 2008). For approval from the US side FAST participants must have approval by the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism.
The general importance of this evaluation has to do with providing empirical data that measures the performance of FAST as it is implement by both Canada and the US. Furthermore, it will develop a strategy to collect measurement data from firms, carriers, drivers, and importers involved in cross-border trade. This evaluation will provide a number of recommendations that will address any issues regarding the regulatory as well as the physical infrastructure environment in which FAST is implemented; furthermore, this evaluation will make

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recommendations regarding the application process and the approval procedures as well as the costs associated with enrollment into the FAST program. Recommendations will also address issues regarding enrollment of medium and small firms, which, as it is indicated in the literature have a low enrollment record (Bradbury, 2010; Richards, 2012).
A Program Description of FAST
A detailed description of FAST program as well as a description of the events and conditions, which lead to the implementation of such program, will provide for a better picture and a better understanding of FAST and its importance for all the stakeholders involved. The events of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which the US thought of its northern border with Canada (Goodchild, Leung, & Albercht, 2010). Once the one of world’s undefended border, the border between the two nations became a security threat, and the US was quick to introduce a number of security policies as an attempt of preventing and detecting any future terrorist attacks on American soil (MacPherson, McConnell, Vance, & Vanchan, 2006).
Furthermore, the US demanded that many of its trading partners, including Canada, that they also comply and implement the majority of these policies and securitization measures. The long border between these two nations is home to some of the world’s busiest customs check points because Canada and the US have developed an interconnected and interdependent economy
(Anderson & Brown, 2012), which represents the second largest economy in the world
(Globerman & Storer, 2009).
Both countries have developed an interconnected and very interdependent economy, and the majority of the Canadian exports are destined to the US markets (Brown, 2012). After the
9/11 events and after some of the first security policies that were introduced, there was an immediate reaction from scholars and economists suggesting that these policies and security

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programs would led to trade impediments, which would contribute to a significant economic decline for both countries. Therefore, both government, at the executive level, were able to come together and agree on a number of programs and accords that could be implemented in order to avoid some of the negative effects of these securitization measures that were implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 (Richards, 2012). In November 2001, Canada and the US signed the Smart
Border Acord under which the FAST program was develop and that went into effect in early
2002. The FAST program was designed to allow qualified firms, cargo, and drivers to be preapproved and have expedited clearance through Canada and US customs (Richards, 2012).
Background and Literature Review
An extensive literature review of the existing literature, government documentations, and any previous evaluations of FAST will provide this evaluation with enough information to develop a theoretical framework, which will drive the evaluation and provide grounds for formulating the research hypothesis. The Whatcom Council of Governments completed an evaluation report on a marketing campaign that was undertaken to promote the FAST program during 2003 and 2004. The report was made public in November, 2008, and it reviews the effectiveness of the 2003 and 2004 campaign, which included a wide variety of promotion strategies such as advertising campaigns, interviews with different stakeholders, surveys, workshops and training seminars, “trade show booths, and the development of materials for distribution to eligible carrier companies” (The Whatcom Council of Governments [WCOG],
2008, p. 1).
The most important part of this report from WCOG has to do with the fact that in 2008 they were able to design and implement a survey and also conduct interviews with a large number of carrier companies, which represented 23 percent of all truck trips observed during the

FAST: A PROGRAM EVALUATION marketing campaign in the Cascade Gateway (WCOG, 2008). The report has identified the objectives of the interviews as an attempt to collect information regarding the size of a firm’s fleet and its traveling patterns; establish membership numbers regarding the FAST program and the firm’s familiarity with the program in general and the enrollment process in particular; provide already enrolled firms with information regarding the new FAST lanes that were added at different entry points and offer non-member firms more information on how to join FAST; and “gather general feedback about the FAST program” (WCOG, 2008, p. 3).
There were 33 participating trucking firms that responded to the survey questionnaire, and the majority of this firms were based in Canada, mainly in the British Colombia (BC) area.
The questionnaire asked 26 questions, and it was constructed in a manner that gathered information on six specific sections. These six sections, which focused on general information regarding the basic details of the firms such company name, fleet size, involvement in crossborder transportation, the variety of commodities transported, where the companies operated from, what was the direction that the goods were going, the customer base that hired those companies, and enrollment in the FAST program. Furthermore, a number of questions were asked to assess the FAST application process as well as the benefits and issues that program members have encountered; moreover, the survey asked questions, which gave companies that were not part of the program an opportunity to express their concerns and identify any issues or barriers that prevented them from joining the FAST program (WCOG, 2008).
The findings from the WCOG survey indicated that approximately 90 percent of the firms that responded to the survey were based in Canada, and approximately 40 percent of them were located in Surrey, BC. Their size varied from large trucking firms operating as many as
2500 trucks to small firms operating as many as10 trucks. The goods that they transported

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varied, but nearly 50 percent of the carriers identified that the majority of their shipments represented less than a truck load, which means that trucks were not loaded at full capacity
(WCOG, 2008). Furthermore, these findings have indicated that 80 percent of the trucking firms carried goods in both directions, and the majority of them used “standard tractor-trailer trucks”
(WCOG, 2008, p. 6). One fourth of the trucking companies that participated in the survey indicated that on average they were providing transportation services for as many as one hundred clients, and that only ten percent of these clients were a qualified, which means that even though their trucks and drivers were enrolled into the program, by carrying non-FAST cargo disqualified them from taking advantage of FAST lanes (WCOG, 2008).
Based on open ended questions and feedback from the survey, the WCOG evaluation has identified a number of common themes regarding some of the major issues that most companies face as far as enrollment, compliance, and physical infrastructure shortcomings of the FAST program. One of the most common comments from carriers and trucking firms was that not enough shippers were enrolled into the program; therefore, when their trucks were loaded with cargo from these shippers even though the trucks and drivers were FAST qualified, they were not able to take advantage of FAST lanes. The main argument from shippers was that there is no real incentive for them to enroll and qualify their facilities and cargo for this program. An option that most carriers have considered is to charge higher fees for non-qualified cargo, but “if carriers were to charge a higher rate to non-FAST shippers, they would simply lose that business”
(WCOG, 2008, p. 6).
Another common complaint was that the enrollment process was complicated took a considerable effort from everyone involved in the process (The International Mobility and Trade
Corridor Project [IMTC], 2010). Furthermore, many companies argued that that even after

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enrollment it was too difficult to comply with the program requirements. Companies identified a number of unreasonable costs associated with “upgrading accounting programs, adhering to specific security requirements, and the cost in staff time to retrain and update protocols, [which] proved to be too burdensome to make FAST a viable option” (WCOG, 2008, p. 6). However, what must be noted is the fact that this complaints came mostly from small to medium side trucking companies, which also noted that in order for them to gain FAST-lane access in both directions, they must apply twice; once for the Canadian program in Canada and also for the US program in the US, which has different requirements (WCOG, 2008, p. 6). A frequent comment had to do with the physical infrastructure of border crossings and the way FAST lanes are set up.
The main issues regarding this comment had to do with the fact that at times FAST lanes get backed up because there aren’t enough of them, and also that, because of the way in which they are set up, traffic from regular lanes blocks “access to the FAST lanes” (WCOG, 2008, p. 6).
Another comprehensive assessment of FAST was done by Bradbury (2010), and she has indicated that FAST was designed by both the Canadian and the US governments “to promote trade and ensure security” (p. 369). According to Bradbury (2010), “as of today the FAST program is operational at 18 border crossings along the Canada–US border” (p. 369). Her assessment of the FAST program is driven by the economic significance of such program for both Canada and the US. She has indicated that “with over 70 percent of the approximately $577 billion Canada–US trade transported by trucks, the ability to move goods across the border has significant implications for both countries’ economies” (Bradbury, 2010, p. 369).
Bradbury (2010), has utilized a case study approach, and she has made the argument that such approach would provide for the best empirical inquiry considering the security and secrecy environment under which the FAST program has been implemented. For this assessment the

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author has been able to examine the FAST program as it is implemented in five of the busiest commercial border crossings along the Canada-US border. The five cases include the
Ambassador Bridge, the Blue Water Bridge, the Peace Bridge, the Queenston-Lewiston Bridge and the Pacific Highway corridor; furthermore, according to the statistical information available,
“these five crossings account for approximately 62 percent of total Canada–US cross-border truck traffic” (Bradbury, 2010, p. 369), which represents a large enough volume that would allow
“for a sufficient number of replications so that similarities and differences could be discerned among the cases with regard to how the FAST program was implemented and the overall outcomes associated with the program” (Bradbury, 2010, p. 369).
The data for the assessment was collected through a two-step process, which involved collecting data and information from a number of reliable government “sources such as Statistics
Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency and the US Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics “(Bradbury, 2010, p. 369), and the second step involved field work and on-site observations, which complemented the data analysis completed during the first step and provided information regarding the views and perspectives of “border personnel, port authority representatives, trucking companies, and business organizations in order to obtain their view on what was occurring along the border and the impact of the various security programs on trade and commercial truck traffic” (Bradbury, 2010, p. 370). The data was organized into a dataset and different statistical analysis were conducted to construct a clear profile of the trade and tuck volumes going through these five major crossings. Furthermore, the results from the first step were utilized to tailor the questions and focus of the interviews and observations, which were part of the second step of the evaluation process.

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Along the observations, the second step involved semi structured interviews where participants from the border authorities were asked “to comment on general commercial truck trends or changes in patterns of truck traffic through that particular port since 2001; what improvements had been made to the port since 2001 in terms of facilities, technology, approaches, staffing or programs and how did these improvements facilitate truck traffic; specifics about the implementation of the FAST program at that particular port when implemented, participation rate, overall impact, and any problems; types of goods that flow through the port; and comment on trends concerning average wait time for commercial vehicles at that port since 2001” (Bradbury, 2013, p.
370).
Furthermore, unstructured interviews were conducted on a considerable number of randomly selected truck drivers from each border crossing. These interviews focused on five specific questions, which asked participants if they were personally FAST qualified; if their truck and their trucking company were enrolled into the FAST program; if they had used a FAST lane on the day of the interview; if yes, why, and if no, why not; and the last question asked
the participants if they had any other comments that they wanted to share regarding the FAST program or the general operations and process of crossing the border (Bradbury, 2013).
Moreover, a number of semi-structured, open- ended interviews were conducted with
“representatives from several organizations such as Whatcom Council of Governments and seven local Chambers of Commerce” (Bradbury, 2013, p. 370). The focus of these interviews was the participants’ views on “border operations/truck traffic at the various ports; border improvements and their impact on facilitating trade and traffic flows; and FAST program— positives and negatives” (Bradbury, 2013, p. 370).

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Bradbury (2013) has indicated that, based on the results from the statistical analysis on the available data regarding average wait times, “of the five major border crossings examined, four of them, the Ambassador Bridge, Blue Water Bridge, Queenston–Lewiston Bridge, and
Pacific Highway, experienced a statistically significant drop in average border wait time after the implementation of the FAST program” (Bradbury, 2013, p. 378). According to Bradbury (2013), the “findings do show that the FAST program has had a positive impact on reducing border wait time at four of the five busiest ports” (p. 378). Furthermore, Bradbury’s findings from the second step of the evaluation, which included observations and interviews have indicated that “the benefits with the FAST program vary by the port utilized, [and] the results also identify the very real limitations present at the major border ports” (Bradbury, 2013, p. 378). These findings are consistent with the results from the WCOG study conducted in 2008, and they indicated that one of the major issues has to do with constrains imposed by the physical infrastructure of these major entry points. Bradbury (2013) has argued “that overcoming these infrastructure constraints is critical to the successful implementation of the FAST program” (p. 378). The author has indicated that because of the infrastructure in place or the lack of it, at certain crossing, FAST lanes were either too backed up or underutilized, means that the program can become inconsistent with its goals and what it tries to achieve.
Moreover, consistent with the WCOG findings is the variability in enrollment and participation rates, which have indicated that “particularly small and medium-size trucking companies and exporters, have chosen not to participate in” the FAST program because participation is not cost-effective (Bradbury, 2013, p. 378). Furthermore, Bradbury (2013) has argued that “although many carriers have enrolled in FAST and C-TPAT/CSA many of their clients have not and thus the carriers are unable to capitalize on any benefits associated with the

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programs” (ibid). The findings also indicated that what affected the decision of most shippers regarding enrollment and participation in the FAST program had to do with the types of goods they shipped and the fact that a large number of goods such as agricultural goods, meats, dairy products, and live animals are most likely to be sent through secondary inspections thus deterring shippers from FAST enrollment. Also consistent with the WCOG findings was the fact that many shipping firms, and trucking companies find the enrollment program difficult to join as well as expensive because of the dual standards, which also make compliance and maintaining the membership difficult for most firms and carries involved in cross-border trade.
Stakeholders and Intended Purpose
The stakeholders are all the actors involved in the FAST program, they are those who are invested and deal with the implications of such program on a daily basis. One of the main stakeholders is the Canadian Federal Government. This particular stakeholder has an interest in the FAST program not only because the program is implemented at the Federal level but also because it affects the overall trade relationship between Canada and the US. The Canada Border
Services Agency is also one of the main stakeholders; they are responsible for implementing such program, and this evaluation will directly benefit them. The provincial governments are also a main stake holder first because of the effect of this program on the trade between the provinces and the US, and also because the provincial governments are responsible for some of connecting infrastructures to the border crossings where the FAST program is being implemented. These connecting infrastructures, which the provinces may be responsible for include roads, highways, and bridges.
Moreover, important stakeholders include Chambers of Commerce and business associations that have an interest and are involved in cross-border trade. Other stakeholders

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include private companies involved in managing and operating borer points of entry. And finally, the most important stakeholders are the FAST members, who are enrolled into the program.
These members include exporting and importing firms, shipping companies and carries, trucking companies, and individual truck drivers. These are the stakeholders that deal with the program on a daily basis, and they are the ones most affect by the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the
FAST program. Furthermore, the purpose of this evaluation is to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the FAST program and identify the main issues and concerns that affect all stakeholders, and the intended use of this evaluation could be specified within the nature of informational report, which could benefit all stakeholder and especially the Federal Government.
Based on the findings and recommendations of this evaluation the Federal Government will be able to make improvements to the program and address any of current shortcomings. A copy of this evaluation report with findings and final results will become available to stakeholders through an online publication from the open source website Academia.edu.
Evaluation Context
The purpose of this study is an overall evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program. This program is a binational agreement between the
Executive levels of the Canadian and the US government. The program was undertaken and developed in the Smart Border Accord in 2001; however, it did not go into effect until late 2002
(U.S CBP, n.d). This evaluation will focus on the FAST program as it is implemented by the
Canadian Border Services Agency and the Canadian government. The main questions driving this evaluation are as followed: Has the FAST program been effective; has the implementation of the FAST program been consistent with its goals across all entry points; are there effective measures regarding the performance of the FAST program at a national level; do border officials

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possess adequate knowledge and training to be consistent and effective in implementing the program; has the FAST program been effective in meeting its objectives and the needs of all the stakeholders involved; how have program members benefited from this program; has the enrollment process been effective in generating membership; if not, how can that process become more appealing; what are the shortcomings that need to be addressed; what is the future of the FAST program; and are there any more effective and efficient alternatives to implement such program?
The evaluation is constructed based on the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Since the implementation of the FAST program in 2002, the overall border wait times have experienced a significant decrease.
Hypothesis 2: Since the implementation of the FAST program in 2002, the volume of trucks crossing the Canada-US border has continued to significantly increase yearly.
Hypothesis 3: Truck volumes crossing the Canada-US Border are effected by the fluctuating exchange rate, which means that as the Canadian dollar gains strength exports to the
US will decrease and imports from the US into Canada will increase.
Hypothesis 4: If truck volumes crossing the Canada-US Border increase Canada’s GDP will increase.
Hypothesis 5: If truck volumes crossing the Canada-US Border decrease Canada’s GDP will decrease.
Hypothesis 6: Because of the implementation of the FAST program in 2002, the volume of trucks crossing the Canada-US border has increased; therefore, the volume of train cargo has decreased yearly.

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Null: The implementation of the FAST program in 2002 has had no effect on border wait times, truck and trade volumes crossing the Canada-US border, and there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the variables identified in the hypotheses above.

Methods and Data
This evaluation uses a mixed methods approach to achieve the best empirical results; it utilizes triangulation as method to gather the data and analyze the information. The first step in this approach was an extensive literature review of the available scholarship on FAST as well as a review of two prior comprehensive evaluations. One of these evaluations was conducted in
2008 by WCOG, and the other evaluation or assessment of FAST was conducted by Lisa
Bradbury, an expert in the field, in 2010. There are several limitations to associate with this step, but the most significant limitation has to do with the fact that both prior evaluations were not conducted at a national level and they only focused on certain regional or specific border crossings. The second step in the triangulation approach involves the collection of available data from reputable and credible sources such as Statistics Canada, the United States Department of
Transportation, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis. The data was coded into variables that include commercial truck volumes crossing the Canada-US border, within a time period from
1995 to 2014. Therefore, truck volumes will be the dependent variable. The independent variables include year, exchange rate, GDP, average trade volumes and train cargo moving between Canada and the US. The ideal dependent variable for this evaluation would have been the overall yearly average of border wait times. I was unable to find the data regarding that information; furthermore, the data that is available for border wait times is limited to the last two

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years, and it is available as it is reported on an hourly basis. Therefore, to construct a variable that would represent a yearly average will be time consuming and will exceed the time limitations for this evaluation. However, it should be noted that a recommendation will be made on how such information can be gathered and properly documented for future evaluations.
Gathering information on wait times, would require going through a lengthy process of dealing with government agencies such CBSA, or CBP. The process will require some to compile that information and construct an average yearly wait time. This is assuming that those agencies have such information and they are willing to make it available. The data that is available for the purpose of this evaluation is indirect data; which means that this data will be used under certain assumptions. The third step involves the adoption and implementation at the national level of the survey conducted by the WCOG in 2008. Implementing this survey at the national level would provide sufficient information for a complete evaluation of the FAST program as well as providing accurate data for future analysis to make generalizations and significant predictions.
Results
Figure 1

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A time series analysis of volume of total trucks crossing the Canada-US border from
1995 to 2014. The graph indicates that the volume of trucks crossing the border between Canada and the US was on the increase from 1995 until 2000, and after the year 2000 there was a significant decrease, with volumes bouncing up and down until 2004-2005. After 2005 there is a steep decline in the volume of trucks crossing the border, the lowest point being 2009 and after that we notice an increase but truck volumes continue to remain below 1997 levels.
Figure 2

The same patterns could be noticed in the volumes of cargo trains crossing the CanadaUS border. However, here we see that the decline started in 1998, gained some increases during
2002-2003 and continued the steep decline reaching the lowest point in 2009. It seems that cargo train volumes have increased since 2009, but they continue to remain below 1995 volumes. The literature available associates these sharp declines in truck and cargo train volumes with the
2008-2009 recession period.

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Figure 3

Figure 3 represents the total value of Canadian exports to the US measured in Canadian dollars. We notice the sharp increase from 1995 to 1999, after that we see the decline with a few up and down periods and a sharp decline in 2008-2009. However, it seems that the total value of
Canadian Exports going to the US seems to be in a steady increase well above the 1990-2000 levels. Economists and scholars have attributed this increase to the oil being exported from
Canada to the US; however, data for the 2014-2015 that reflect the fall in oil prices has not yet been available.
Figure 4

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Figure 4 represents the Canadian GDP from1995 to 2013. The graph shows the GDP has experienced a steady increase, with the declining value in 2008-2009, but it seems to have bounced back after that.
Figure 5
Figure 5 represent the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar against the US dollar.
A regression analysis with the volume of Trucks as the dependent variable and GDP,
Cargo Trains, Exchange Rate, and Year as independent variables returned the following results.

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Table 1
Model Summary
Model
R
R
Adjusted Std. Error of
Change Statistics
DurbinSquare
R the Estimate
R
F Change df1 df2
Sig. F Watson
Square
Square
Change
Change a 1
.969
.938
.938 165049.08841
.938 144380.280 4 38071
.000
.001
a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP, Cargo Trains, Exchange Rate, Year
b. Dependent Variable: Trucks
Table 1, this table contains the R Square and the Adjusted R Square, because this model is running a multiple regression, what needs to be reported here is the Adjusted R Square. The
Adjusted R Square measures the proportion of the total variability in the volume of trucks
(dependent variable) that is explained by the independent variables included in the model. An
Adjusted R Square of .938 means that about 93% of total variability in the volume of trucks is explained by the statistical model involving the independent variables. Or, 93% of total variability in the volume of trucks is explained by the independent variables.
The Anova presents two tests, the F value and the p value. The key thing here is to know the Null hypothesis and the alternative hypotheses. In this case, for the F test F= 144380.280, would be that the model of the independent variables has no explanatory power, which would mean that all the coefficients in the independent variables will be equal to 0. However, F=
144380.280, and for this test p=.000, which is < 0.05 indicating that the test is significant; therefore, it strongly suggest that the Null is rejected and that the model has significant explanatory power.

Table 2
Coefficientsa

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Model
(Constant)
Year
1 Cargo Trains
Exchange Rate
GDP

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Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t B
Std. Error
Beta
674951678.946 3012772.589
224.030
-344456.172
81.999
1817014.878
11.703

1522.862
.606
8947.306
.039

-2.843
.366
.542
3.364

Sig.

-226.190
135.233
203.080
301.929

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

Table 3, the coefficients table indicates the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Examining the t statistic for each corresponding independent variable and the fact that the corresponding p values are < 0.05. This indicates that the test is significant. The null is rejected; and therefore each independent variable has predictable ability for the dependent variable. Therefore, if we look at the standardized coefficients, the Beta value for year is equal to -2.843, which means that for each increase in one unit of the year variable we can predict a decrease of 2.843 units in truck volumes. For Cargo trains the Beta value is equal to 0.366, which means that for each unit increase in cargo train volumes we can predict a 0.366 unit increase in truck volumes. And for exchange rates a Beta equals to 0.542 means that for each unit increase in the exchange rate we can predict a 0.542 unit increase in truck volumes. GDP has the highest Beta value equal to 3.364 which means that for each unit increase in GDP, we can predict a 3,364 unit increase in truck volumes.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, the information examined in the literature review part of this evaluation suggests the FAST program faces a number of challenges that can have a negative effect on the programs efficiency and effectiveness. These challenges include: the fact that not enough exporters are enrolled into the program; the fact that secondary inspections depend on the type of the products regardless of the membership status; and the fact that the costs associated with

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enrollment and compliance in the program are high especially for medium and small companies
(WCOG, 2008). Furthermore, the literature review has indicated that in order for fast too be fully efficient and effective the proper infrastructure must be in place. The literature suggest that the process of enrollment must be simplified and the dual requirements by both the US and the
Canadian Governments must be eliminated or regulations must be streamlined (WCOG, 2008).
Furthermore, even though Bradbury (2010) has indicated that border wait times have significantly declined in four of the five major case studies that she considered in her assessment, it is difficult to make that generalization at a national level and across all border crossings. This evaluation was unable to make any predicaments regarding border wait times, and it suggested that a survey at the national level be administered to gather the proper data and examine it for future evaluations. The statistical analysis done in this evaluation has indicated that overall truck volumes have been on the decline and continue to remain stagnant or below 1999 level. The findings also suggest that a number of other factors influence truck volumes going across the
Canada-US border. Moreover, Bradbury (2010) found the same issues and the same challenges that were indicated in the WCOG evaluation which was conducted in 2008. These issues are associated with the costs, difficulties in the enrollment process and lack of proper infrastructure, and her recommendations are in-line with those made in the WCOG evaluation. Overall, this evaluation concludes that further research is needed to fully determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the FAST program.

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Appendix
“Survey Questionnaire
1. Company name, interviewee name, interviewee title, date
2. Fleet size
3. Percentage of fleet used in cross-border trade
4. Primary commodities carried cross-border
5. Base of operations (city)
6. Do you primarily carry goods northbound, southbound, or both?
7. Vehicle types used
8. Approximate number of cross-border shipper clients
9. Is your company enrolled in any of the FAST programs? If so, which ones?
Enrolled in C-TPAT only
10. What percentage of your cross-border shipper clients are C-TPAT/PIP enrolled?
11. What percentage of your drivers are FAST enrolled?
12. When your company’s trucks use the FAST lane to enter the U.S., are they usually loaded or empty? 13. Have you considered enrolling in CSA to make empty returns easier? Why or why not?
FAST or CSA only
14. What percentage of your cross-border shipper clients are C-TPAT/PIP enrolled?
15. What percentage of your drivers are FAST enrolled?
16. When your company’s trucks use the FAST lane to enter the U.S., are they usually loaded or empty? 17. Have you considered enrolling in C-TPAT to make empty returns easier? Why or why not?
Both
18. What percentage of your cross-border shipper clients are C-TPAT/PIP?
19. What percentage of your drivers are FAST enrolled?
20. When your company’s trucks use the FAST lane to enter the U.S., are they usually loaded or empty? 21. When your company’s trucks use the FAST lane to enter Canada, are they usually loaded or empty? 22. Which program was easier for you to understand/apply to?
Application in Process
23. Where is your application for each program at present?
24. If you are only considering applying for one direction, why have you made that decision/ why are you not interested in joining the other program?
None
25. Has your company considered C-TPAT or CSA? Which? Why or why not?
26. Do you have any other feedback on ways to make either the northbound or southbound programs more attractive?” (WCOG, 2008, p. 5)

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