Ratio Dicidendi

DETERMINING RATIO DECIDENDI – EFFICACY OF WAMBAUGH’S TEST

I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial precedents are an important sources of law. They are the former judgements of the superior courts which the judges in common law countries are bound to follow. This bindingness of previous decisions on the lower courts is partly due to high status which the judges enjoyed in England and also partly because of the importance of the issues which they decided. Judicial decisions were given a high authority as indicative of law of the land. It is often referred to as judge-made law.
However, this absolute and binding quality does not apply to all cases . Thus, a superior court is never bound by the decisions of the lower courts. Also, one court of similar jurisdiction is not bound by the decisions of it’s corresponding coordinate jurisdiction. The binding authority exists in cases of inferior courts which are bound by the decisions of the courts superior to themselves.
In common law countries, the judge made law is as important as that of the law made by the legislature. In England, the hierarchy of courts is maintained in such a way that at the top of hierarchy is the House of Lords. The decisions rendered by the House of Lords are binding on all the courts in England. House of Lords is followed by the High Court and the decisions of the High Court are binding on division courts.
Similarly, the hierarchy of courts in India is that Supreme Court is the Apex Court and the law declared by it is binding on all courts within the territory of India. The Supreme Court is followed by various High Courts of the states and district courts. The decisions rendered by High Courts are binding on all subordinate courts and tribunals within their territory and jurisdiction. A precedent is purely constitutive and in no degree abrogative. This means that a judicial decision can make a law but cannot alter it. Where there is settled rule of law, it is the duty of the judges to follow the same. They cannot substitute their opinions for the established rule of law. Their function is limited to supplying the vacancies of the legal system, filling up with new law the gaps that exists in the old and supplementing the imperfectly developed body of legal doctrine. The role of precedents in the common law system cannot be understood unless one knows what a judge or a lawyer means when he speaks of the ratio decidendi of a case and what he means when he says that a statement in a judicial opinion is an obiter dictum. II. MEANING OF RATIO DECIDENDI
The term ‘ratio decidendi’ is a latin term meaning ‘the reason’ or ‘the rationale for the decision’. The part of a case that is said to possess authority is the ratio decidendi,that is to say, the principle or the rule of law on which the court’s decision is based. Finding the ratio decidendi is an important part of the training of a lawyer. it is not a mechanical process but is an art that one gradually acquires through practice and study. The ratio decidendi is a part of judicial precedents. It means the decision or adjudication of pure question of law involved in a case, though deducible from its application to the facts of the case. It means the pure proposition of law or legal proposition upon which a case is decided. A decision is binding normally inter parties and a judgment in rem binds the whole world. However, the ratio decidendi of a judgment binds other courts either under a statutory provision or under the doctrine of judicial precedents to the extent and in the manner provided.
It is often said that a previous case is binding as to it’s ratio decidendi. and the ratio is distinguished from obiter dicta which do not bind. Propositions not partaking of the character of ratio decidendi may be disregarded by the judge deciding the later case.
There are decisions which do not lay down any proposition of law, example interim orders. There would be no question of ascertainment of any ratio decidendi in such cases.
According to Salmond, “a precedent is a judicial decision which contains in itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its authoritative element is often termed as the ratio decidendi .
Edward M. Morgan defined ratio decidendi in a similar fashion as “those portions of the opinion setting forth the rules of law applied by the court, the application of which was required for the determnaion of the issues presented.”
According to Rupert Cross, ratio decidendi is a rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion.
According to C.K. Allen , ratio decidendi “ in its simplest form may be said to be the principle or principles deduced from authority, or which the courts reached its decision , that it did reach or negatively, the principle or principles without which the court would not have reached its decision , that it did reach.”
According to Dr Goodhart, the ratio decidendi in a case is determined by ascertaining the facts treated as material by the judge. For him what is binding is the conclusion reached by the judge on the basis of material facts. For example there are following facts in a case namely, A, B, C. And suppose court founds that B and C are material facts and A is immaterial facts and then reaches the conclusion X, it may be the judgment for the plaintiff side or the defendant side. Then the doctrine of precedents enable us to say that in any future case in which facts B and C exists or in which A, B and C exist, then the conclusion must be X. if in a future case facts A, B, C & D exists, and fact D is held to be material, the first case will not be a direct authority, though it may be valuable to some extent.
Salmond says that once determination of a dispute has been made by a decision, the ratio decidendi of that decision is an authority on those facts deliberated in that decision and these matters are now res judicata and cannot be the subject matter of further dispute between the original parties, however, third parties who were not involved in the original dispute will not be bound by the ratio decidendi of the parties who were litigants in the first instance. Therefore, as against persons who are not parties to the suit, the only part of a case which is conclusive is the general rule of law for which it is authority. This rule or proposition, the ratio decidendi may be described roughly as the rule of law applied by and acted on by the court, or the rule which the court regarded as governing the case.
The process of determining the ratio decidendi is a correctly thought through analysis of what the court actually decided – essentially, based on the legal points about which the parties in the case actually fought. All other statements about the law in the text of a court opinion – all pronouncements that do not form a part of the court’s rulings on the issues actually decided in that particular case (whether they are correct statements of law or not) -- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for which that particular case stands. III. RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTA
To understand the true meaning of ratio decidendi, it is important that one knows the difference between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though one contains the binding principle of law and one is a mere speculation, the distinction between the two is very thin and lies between the inessential and the essential.
The judgement delivered by a judge may fall into two parts – ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi as has been explained, is that part of the judicial decisions,which contains the rule of law that helped the judge in arriving at the decision.The judge while delivering his judgement, applies the law to the facts of the case and arrives at a decision, for which he gives the reason. The reasoning that he has given is called the ratio decidendi of the case.
Obiter dicta is a Latin phrase meaning "things said by the way". Obita dicta are not binding (unlike the ratio), but they may be regarded as persuasive in a future decision. The weight given to dicta usually depends on the seniority of the court and the eminence of the judge in question. Obiter dicta are pronouncements of law which are not part of the ratio decidendi.In the course of arguments, many incidental considerations often arise which are all part of the logical process, but which necessarily have different degrees of relevance to the to the central issue. Judicial opinion upon such matters whether they be merely casual, or wholly gratuitous or (as is more useful) of what may be called collateral relevance, are known as obiter dicta.
The binding part (if any) of a judicial decision is the ratio decidendi. An obiter dictum is not binding in the later cases because it was not strictly relevant to the matter in issue in the original case. However, an obiter dictum may be of persuasive (as opposed to binding) authority in the later cases.
In Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated its conception of the ratio decidendi of a case in the following language : “The key note of an adjudication is the ruling principle. The details showing the particular facts ruled by some particular principle are helpful ; but, in the end, it is the principle, not the detail circumstances , commonly evidentiary only, which is the important feature as to whether an existing adjudication is a safe guide to follow in a case.” The principle of law enunciated by the court may have been much broader than was required for the decision of the case before it; and it is well established that in such situations, the surplus not necessary to sustain the judgement must be regarded as the obiter dictum.
The division of cases into these two is a theoretical procedure. Unfortunately, judges do not actually separate their judgments into the two clearly defined categories, and it is for the person reading the case to determine what the ratio is. In some cases, this no easy matter, and it may be even more difficult in appellate cases where each of the judges may deliver their own lengthy judgments with no clear single ratio. And sometimes it may be difficult to locate the ratio in some cases where the ratio and obiter are not explicitly separated, and on occasion, the courts have been unable to do so. So the case should be read fully so as to locate the ratio. IV. RATIO DECIDENDI AND THE COMMON LAW COUNTRIES
The doctrine of ratio decidendi is strictly followed by the House of lords as well as by other common law countries. The term is rendered equal to that of the phrases, “reason for deciding” or “reason for decision”. Judges and scholars alike use the phrase on some occasions for any reason which influences the ultimate decision, whether it be a finding of fact, or determination of law, or an opinion about social circumstance or public policy and on some occasion rule of law, whether influencing court or not, for which it thought that the case can be used as an authority.
In Donoghue v. Stevenson, a bottled ginger beer was found to have contained a snail in it; due to which the person who consumed it got sick. When the case came before the court, there was a question as to who ultimately owed duty to the consumer. The observation made by Lord Atkin helps in establishing the ratio decidendi of the case. He held that “the duty which is common to all the cases where liability is established must logically be based upon some elements common to the cases where it is found to exist...There must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to duty of care, of which the particular cases founded in the books are but instances”.The ratio of the case here is that the manufacturer owe a duty of care to whoever is the ultimate consumer of the bottled drink manufactured by him.
In Rylands v. Fletcher ,the plaintiff and the defendant were neighbours owning adjacent lands. the defendant employed an engineer to build a water reservoir which later burst flooding the plaintiff’s land resulting to damage to the plaintiff. The court in imposing the rule of strict liability also held that the defendant keeps the “thing” at his peril and that if it escapes, he is liable for any damage that it leads to.
In Bridges v. Hawkesworth, a customer found some money on the floor of a shop. The court applied the rule of “finders-keepers” and awarded possession of money to him rather than to the shopkeeper. Ratio decidendi of this case is that finder of goods in a public place is the keeper i.e., he has right of possession over it.
However, In South Staffordshire Water Company v. Sharman, where the defendant found two gold rings in a mud of pool owned and occupied by the plaintiffs, the court refused to apply the rule of “finders-keepers” expressed in the previous case on the ground that, in that case, money was found in a public place i.e., on the shop floor, but in the instant case, it was found in a pool which was not open to public. V. RATIO DECIDENDI AND THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
India, as a common law country, also follows the common law practice that precedents have a binding force on the courts and that lower courts are bound by the decisions of the higher courts. Under Article 141 of Constitution of India “the law declared by Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India”. Under this article it was stated that if there is no specific law or where there is no statute on a particular point, then the law which is declared by Supreme Court is the law and has a binding force until the new law comes.
In S.R.Bommai v. Union of India, the nine judges’ bench of the Supreme Court unanimously held that secularism is one of the basic structures of the Constitution of India. Justices Sawant and Kuldeep Singh observed that social pluralism is one of the basic structures while Justice Ramaswamy observed that socialism, social justice and fraternity are included in the basic structure of the Constitution. Justice Ahmadi opined that the rights contained in Articles 15, 16 and 25 of the Constitution formed t part of the basic structure of the constitution . These observations of the learned judges are obiter dicta as they were not directly in issue in the instant case. Ratio of the case is the case is that secularism is a part of basic structure of the Constitution.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar, a man riding a bicycle on the road was electrocuted and died as a result of riding over a live electric wire left on a puddle on the road. The appellant were held liable by the court applying the rule of absolute liability, i.e., the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident , which is also the ratio decidendi of the case. The court here applied the rule of absolute liability which was first formulated in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, which is also stricter than the rule of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher case. VI. DETERMINING THE RATIO DECIDENDI BY WAMBAUGH’S TEST
Various methods of determining the ratio decidendi have been advanced. Professor Eugene Wambaugh put forward a test for determining the ratio decidendi which came to be known as the Wambaugh’s Test.
This test starts with the assumption that the ratio decidendi is a general rule without which a case must have been decided otherwise, Wambaugh propounded his famous test of inversion for determining whether a given proposition is ratio.

He stated the test in the following words:
“First frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good and had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the answer is affirmative, then however excellent the original proposition may be the case is not precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for the other proposition also. In short, when the case turns only on one point the proposition or the doctrine of the case, the reason for the decision, the ratio decidendi, must be a general rule without which the case must have been decided otherwise.”
Framing the supposed preposition of law-:
In Donoghue v. Stevenson, there are two proposition of law in the words of Lord Atkin: 1. A manufacturer of the products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes the duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care. 2. A party must take a reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which he can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure persons who are so closely and directly affected by his act that he ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as been so affected when he is directing his mind to the acts or omissions which are called in questions.
Insertion of the word ‘no’ after the word ‘owes’ at the end of the first proposition, and the insertion of the words ‘need not’ in lieu of word ‘must’ at the beginning of the second proposition lead, on Wambaugh’s test, to the conclusion that both proposition were the ratio decidendi. VII. CRITICISM OF WAMBAUGH’S TEST
Wambaugh’s test assumes that the ratio decidendi is the proposition of law considered by the court to be necessary for its decision. But this test is not of much assistance in the search of ways and means of determining what proposition of law was considered necessary by the court for its decision and this test will not help us in cases where no proposition of law is given.
According to Rupert Cross, this test has a negative value in the sense that it is efficacious only for determining what is not ratio decidendi, and it is not really efficacious in determining what is ratio decidendi.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of judicial precedent as developed in common law legal systems center on the notion of ratio decidendi of a case. It is the ratio which makes the precedent binding.Therefore, if an advocate has proper understanding of what the ratio decidendi of a case is, it can become a very powerful tool in his hands.
However, often, a judgment given by the courts tend to be very long in many cases, and it is often difficult to determine which is the ratio and which is not. Therefore, eventhough Wambaugh’s test may not be an infallible test in determining the ratio decidendi, it has a negative value in the sense that it would still be an efficacious test to determine what is ‘not’ the ratio decidendi.

IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:
1. Dr. S.N. Dhyani, Jurisprudence – A study of Indian Legal Theory (Metropolitan Book Co.Pvt.Ltd) 2. Autar Krishen Koul, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, (Satyam Law International, 1st edn., 2009). 3. V.D.Mahajan, Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, (Eastern Book Company, 5th edn., reprinted 2006). 4. Glanville Williams, Learning the Law ( Sweet & Maxwell,11th edn.,4th Indian reprint ) 5. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence- The philosophy and method of the law (Universal Law Publishing Co., revised edn., 2009 ) 6. John Salmond, “ The Theory of Judicial Precedent”, 16 L.Q Rev. 7. Edmund M. Morgan, Introduction to the Study of Law, (2nd edn., Chicago, 1948 ) 8. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, 86 (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1997). 9. K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai & Jacob Joseph, Cases and Materials on Legal Method. 10. Terence Ingman, The English Legal Process, 192 (Oxford University Press, 11th edn., 2006). 11. Slapper and Kelly, The English Legal System, 90 (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 7th edn., 2004). 12. Dr. J.N.Pandey, Constitutional Law of India(Central Law Agency, 40th edn., 2003). 13. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, (Oxford University Press. 2nd edn., 1997).

ARTICLES: 1. Shard. B. Vakil, “Ratio Decidendi” 20(1) Gujarat Law Herald 1, (2000). 2. John Salmond, “ The Theory of Judicial Precedent”, 16 L.Q Rev. 376

DETERMINING RATIO DECIDENDI
EFFICACY OF WAMBAUGH’S TEST

Submitted by: Debby Lalrinsangi Ralte Roll No. 1 1st Year LLM(2 Years)

TABLE OF CONTENT

Sl. No. | TOPIC | PAGE NO. | 1 | Introduction | 1 - 2 | 2 | Meaning of Ratio Decidendi | 2 - 5 | 3 | Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta | 5 - 7 | 4 | Ratio Decidendi and the Common Law Countries | 7 - 8 | 5 | Ratio Decidendi and the Indian Legal System | 8 - 9 | 6 | Determining Ratio Decidendi by Wambaugh’s Test | 9 - 11 | 7 | Criticism of Wambaugh’s Test | 11 | 8 | Conclusion | 12 | 9 | Bibliography | 12 - 13 |

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[ 1 ]. S.N. Dhyani, Jurisprudence – A study of Indian Legal Theory (Metropolitan Book Co.Pvt.Ltd)
[ 2 ]. Autar Krishen Koul, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, (Satyam Law International, 1st edn., 2009).
[ 3 ]. Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
[ 4 ]. Supra note 2
[ 5 ]. V.D.Mahajan, Jurisprudence and the Legal theory (Eastern Book Company, 5th edn., reprinted 2006).
[ 6 ]. Glanville Williams, Learning the Law ( Sweet & Maxwell,11th edn.,4th Indian reprint )
[ 7 ]. Shard. B. Vakil, “Ratio Decidendi” 20(1) Gujarat Law Herald 1, (2000).
[ 8 ]. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence- The philosophy and method of the law ( Universal Law Publishing Co., revised edn., 2009 )
[ 9 ]. Supra note 4.
[ 10 ]. John Salmond, “ The Theory of Judicial Precedent”, 16 L.Q Rev. 376
[ 11 ]. Edmund M. Morgan, Introduction to the Study of law, (2nd edn., Chicago, 1948 )
[ 12 ]. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, 86 (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1997).
[ 13 ]. Supra note 2 at 1
[ 14 ]. K.N,Chandrasekharan Pillai & Jacob Joseph, Cases and Materials on Legal Method,65.
[ 15 ]. Id at 45.
[ 16 ]. Supra note 2 at 1
[ 17 ]. Supra note 2 at 1
[ 18 ]. Terence Ingman, The English Legal Process, 192 (Oxford University Press, 11th edn., 2006).
[ 19 ]. 140 N.W. 1078, at 1081-1082 (1913)
[ 20 ]. Slapper and Kelly, The English Legal System, 90 (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 7th edn., 2004).
[ 21 ]. Supra note 14
[ 22 ]. (1932) A.C. 562.
[ 23 ]. (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
[ 24 ]. (1851) 21 LJ QB 75.
[ 25 ]. (1896) 2 QB 44.
[ 26 ]. Dr. J.N.Pandey, Constitutional Law of India(Central Law Agency, 40th edn., 2003).
[ 27 ]. (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[ 28 ]. AIR 2002 SC 551
[ 29 ]. AIR 1987 SC 1086
[ 30 ]. Wambaugh,Study of cases (2nd edn.), pp. 17-18 as quoted in Prof. K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai & Jacob Joseph, Cases and Materials on Legal Method.
[ 31 ]. Supra note 22 at 8
[ 32 ]. Supra note 14 at 4
[ 33 ]. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, (Oxford University Press. 2nd edn., 1997).

Bibliography: [ 2 ]. Autar Krishen Koul, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, (Satyam Law International, 1st edn., 2009). [ 3 ]. Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950. [ 8 ]. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence- The philosophy and method of the law ( Universal Law Publishing Co., revised edn., 2009 ) [ 9 ] [ 12 ]. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, 86 (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1997). [ 18 ]. Terence Ingman, The English Legal Process, 192 (Oxford University Press, 11th edn., 2006). [ 19 ]. 140 N.W. 1078, at 1081-1082 (1913) [ 20 ] [ 23 ]. (1868) LR 3 HL 330. [ 24 ]. (1851) 21 LJ QB 75. [ 25 ]. (1896) 2 QB 44. [ 26 ]. Dr. J.N.Pandey, Constitutional Law of India(Central Law Agency, 40th edn., 2003). [ 27 ]. (1994) 3 SCC 1. [ 33 ]. Rupert Cross: Precedent in English Law, (Oxford University Press. 2nd edn., 1997).