Murder is, by the world’s definition, the worst criminal offense possible. According to Vito & Maahs (2012), murder is defined as the willful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another. The United States punishes murderers by giving them extremely long sentences in prison, usually life long, or a sentence of death where the offender’s own life is taken. Even though this punishment is universally known throughout the nation, murders are still committed.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (2011) Uniformed Crime Report, 14,748 murders were committed in 2010. Compared to the 24,703 killings of 1991, murder is on the decline. The murder rate dropped from 9.8 per 100,000 in …show more content…
1991 to 4.8 per 100,000 in 2010. Even though murder is on the decline, it is still considered a big problem and must be prevented. The best way to prevent murder is to understand what causes an individual to commit murder.
Over time, many theories have been proposed to explain why individuals commit murder and why some do not. The theory that does best describe this crime is the Rational Choice Theory. According to Vito (2012), Rational Choice Theory proposes that a criminal weighs the consequences against the benefits of committing a crime. In this case an individual will weigh the consequences against the benefits of murdering someone. Whether the consequences or the benefits are greater will entail if the individual will commit murder.
According to Robert Keel (1992), Rational Choice Theory has 8 central points. Those points are: “(1) The human being is a ration actor, (2) Rationality involves an end/means calculation, (3) People (freely) choose all behavior, both conforming and deviant, based on their rational calculations, (4) The central element of calculation involves a cost benefit analysis: Pleasure versus Pain, (5) Choice, with all other conditions equal, will be directed towards the maximization of individual pleasure, (6) Choice can be controlled through the perception and understanding of the potential pain or punishment that will follow an act judged to be in violation of the social good, the social contract, (7) The state is responsible for maintaining order and preserving the common good through a system of laws (this system is the embodiment of the social contract), (8) The Swiftness, Severity, and Certainty of punishment are the key elements in understanding a law 's ability to control human behavior.” (Keel, 1992)
For example, if Subject A and Subject B have an argument and Subject A disrespects Subject B, for Subject B to get his respect back he may have to punch Subject A. But before Subject B decides to punch Subject A, He will weigh the consequences against the benefits of punching Subject A. If for example, the subjects are children at school, Subject B may gain popularity amongst his peers but Subject B may also get suspended from school. So now the decision is based on the individual’s personality. Whether or not being suspended carries enough weight in the subject’s life to prevent him from punching Subject A or if gaining popularity carries enough weight to provoke him to punch Subject B all depends on a personal mental scale.
Rational Choice Theory has also intrigued philosophy of other sciences besides criminology and sociology. The economistic view of rational theory depicts that all human behavior is based upon a rational calculation of costs and benefits in order maximize personal gain (Wilson & Kwileck, 2003). According to economist, Gary Becker, "the economic approach provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human behavior," (Becker, 1976).
From the type of clothes to wear on a winter day or when, why and how to murder an individual, these actions can be understood and evaluated with the rational choice theory. When a murder is committed a rational choice has occurred. This means that the offender took in consideration the consequences of the act and weighed those against the benefits of the act. The offender rationally chose to commit murder because the benefits outweighed the consequences.
Wilson and Kwileck’s (2003) article explains why individuals choose to follow orders from cults that extend to the act of committing murder. This piece entitled, “Are these people crazy, or what? A rational choice interpretation of cults and charisma,” uses the autobiographical testimonies of two cult members to explain how rational choice theory can explain their actions. The testimonies of a member of the Manson Family and the Rajneesh Foundation International are used instead of survey so that more detail would be given about the thought processes used to motivate the member to complete the tasks of the cult.
Wilson and Kwileck (2003) were faced with testimonies of the two cult members that at first seemed to surrender their personal autonomy and deny their ability of cognitive processes. Both this feeling of absence of self-rule and “brainwashing” would be signs that these individuals were unable to think rationally thus is an argument against rational choice theory. In both cults the surrender autonomy is present and it was done so to be closer to or to stay with the leader. Also the constructs of brain washing are present in both cults the Manson Family used a drug called LSD to enhance agreements from followers and implant ideas. The Rajneesh Foundation International used malnutrition, heavy meditation and also hypnosis to enhance agreement and suggestion.
According to this article, rational choice still accounts for the reason for the following and tasks completed by cult members. This is still due to the theory that rationally a person wants to maximize personal utility and minimize cost. The members believed that even murder was not too high of a price to pay in order to belong, follow, and be accepted by the cult and its leader. The article states, “surrender to charismatic authority was freely chosen after weighing costs against anticipated benefits, (Wilson &Kwilek, 2003).
Kerr, Beech, and Murphy (2012), wrote an article entitled “Sexual homicide: Definition, motivation and comparison with other forms of sexual offending.” In this article the authors searched for a universal definition of Sexual homicide. They search for motivations of the crime and also compared Sexual Homicide to that of other sexual offenses.
During their research of definitions of sexual homicide, they found many different definitions of the term. Some reworded the term such as lust murder or even Erotophonophilia which is the clinical term usually connected to sexual homicide. These many definitions have provided basic guidelines for law enforcement to characterize homicide with the sexual element (Kerr, Beech, & Murphy, 2012).
This article reads of the motivations that lead to sexual homicide.
These motivations include anger motivation, sadistic motivation, and sexual motivation. In anger motivation, rage causes the crime to occur. Sadistic motivation requires sexual sadism where the offender is aroused by the suffering or torture of the victim. Finally sexual motivation requires just the sexual arousal given by the victim to the offender in which the offender wants to achieve at any cost. (Kerr, Beech, & Murphy, 2012).These motivations are based from the rational choice of the individual seeking maximum benefit at minimum cost. If the offender commits sexual homicide with anger motivation then that offender has chosen the benefit of satisfying his or her rage outweighs that of the consequences of punishment. Far as sadistic motivation, the offender weighs the pleasure of committing the homicide act over the punishment. The same goes for sexual motivation. The punishment or cost of the act is outweighed by the benefit of committing the sexual act with the victim.
Rational choice theory is combined with motivation and physical acts in order to establish programs that will counteract, punish, and prevent criminal activity. Homicide and violence programs have been constantly brought to the forefront. Some have even failed and since then been revamped and are at the forefront again. This is due to the seriousness of these crimes. Two examples of these programs are Project Safe Neighborhoods and Operation …show more content…
Ceasefire.
Project Safe Neighborhoods began in 2001. Project Safe Neighborhoods is a program to prevent Gun violence. It is a nationwide program with Project Safe Neighborhoods task forces in all 50 states. These tasks forces are headed by United States Attorney’s Offices leadership. All 50 states programs have a distinctive twist to them that the program allows. This flexibility and leadership from the U.S. Attorney’s Office allows and aids each jurisdiction to effectively prevent gun violence uniquely (National Institute of Justice, 2009 (a)). According to The National Institute of Justice (2009 (a)), Project Safe Neighborhoods uses a strategic research-based model originated from the research and foundation of successful approaches used in Boston Ceasefire, the 10-city Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) and Richmond 's Project Exile in order to reduce gun violence through enforcement, deterrence, and prevention.
The main focus of the latter of each Project Safe Neighborhoods program is the increased federal prosecution of illegal gun use and possession. The flexibility of this program allows for strategies such as increased and targeted police patrols, violent offender re-entry programs, neighborhood development programs, and education or school-based programs (National Institute of Justice, 2009 (b)).
The National Institute of Justice funded an evaluation to measure the effectiveness of this major multiyear and multiagency crime prevention program. They found that it reduced violent crime overall in the cities that Project Safe Neighborhoods had focused on. Also, the reductions were greater in cities with a high-level of federal prosecution. Even though overall violence was down in these cities, a decline in gun-related violence in Project Safe Neighborhood cities was found as well. The National Institute of Justice gives credit for this program’s success to the United States Attorney’s Offices’ leadership and the flexibility of the program to adjust to the realities of individual jurisdictions (National Institute of Justice, 2012)
Chicago had its version of Project Safe Neighborhoods. Chicago goal for this program was to reduce the demand among gun offenders, reduce the supply by identifying and intervening in illegal gun markets, and prevent the onset of gun violence (Office of Justice Programs, 2012).
Chicago’s uniqueness of their version of the program came from its community outreach and media campaigns.
Chicago holds Offender Notification Meetings that are targeted toward ex-offenders involved in gang activity or have a history of gun violence or possession. These meetings are held twice a month and consist of three segments. The segments involve law enforcement officials making offenders aware of Project Safe Neighborhoods’ initiative, of gun laws, and of the sentencing of reoffenders. Ex-offenders are told of the heightened probability for federal prosecutions and federal sentencing which involves harsher punishment and lengthier sentences.
According to The Office of Justice and Programs, Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods is a promising program. This is based from the evaluation of Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007). Their study spanned over a 72 month period and was collapsed to 24 quarter –year periods. The measures of crime used were the total homicide rate, gun related homicide, gang related homicide, and the aggravated assault/aggravated battery arrest
rate.
From their evaluation, they observed a 37 percent reduction in total homicide rates. The total homicide rate before implementation at 38.2 per quarter reduced to 24.2 per quarter. The Gun related homicide rate decreased by about 18 percent for every 100 guns recovered due to gun seizure initiatives. These seizures thus reduced the number of gun related homicides. Gang related homicide was viewed as having an insignificant reduction relating to the program and it was found that the program had a statistically modest reduction in aggravated assault/battery (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007).
Operation Ceasefire was formulated in the city of Boston, Massachusetts. In 1995, the Boston police department had a concerning amount of gang-related youth homicides. The Boston Police teamed up with researchers from the National Institute of Justice and the community to formulate a problem solving approach to these homicides (National Institute of Justice, 2008).
According to the Office of Justice programs (2012 (a)), the Boston’s gang task force, Youth Violence Strike Force, needed a way to deter youth from involving themselves in the possession and use of guns and Operation Ceasefire was the program they needed. The programs goals were to be a comprehensive strategy to apprehend and prosecute individual that are illegally carrying and using firearms, to spread notice throughout the community about the severe penalty offenders face if carrying illegal firearms, and to ultimately prevent youth from heading down this criminal path.
One elements of Operation Ceasefire included “lever pulling” which is cracking down on illegally carrying of firearms by exploiting the youths’ vulnerabilities to a variety of penalties. Offenders could be prosecuted for violating parole, sentenced under federal prosecution receiving lengthier terms, or even deported (National Institute of Justice, 2008).
The element of a direct attack on possession and of illegal firearms and its traffickers places in to affect the other element of Operation Ceasefire: Deterrence. Through heightened enforcement of gun crimes, Operation Ceasefire would ultimately deter future offenders because the costs of committing the crime outweighed its benefit. The message about this punitive crackdown would be passed through word of mouth and community outreaches to let offenders and potential offenders aware of the severe risk of carrying and trafficking illicit guns.
There were two evaluations of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. Both gave significant results. The first evaluation was the study by Braga et al. (2001). Braga et al (2001) would evaluate the program through monthly crime rates homicides rates of individuals 24 and younger between January 1, 1991 and May 31, 1998. Shots fired, “calls for service”, and gun assault incident reports were all included in the study and would be evaluated on a monthly basis.
From this study, it was found that Operation Ceasefire made a significant statistical decline in homicide rates. Homicide rates declined from 3.5 per month to 1.3 per month. That gives the homicide rate a monthly decline of 63 percent (Braga et al., 2001). Ceasefire allowed for a monthly decrease of 25 percent in citywide gun assaults. In one particular district of the city, residents witnessed a 44 percent decrease in gun assaults. As for “calls for service” an overall citywide decline of 32 percent was observed (Braga et al., 2001).
The second study by Braga and Pierce (2005) found that Operation Ceasefire made a large impact on traceable new guns involved in crimes. The percentage was based on the time of legal purchase to the time of recovery in a crime. The percentage consistently reduced. Boston experienced a peak of new guns at 40.4 percent between 1991 and 1996 decline to 21.4 percent between 1997 and 2003.
These programs both tell that the story of rational choice theory as a way to prevent crime. They derive from the notion that criminals commit crime on the basis of choice. This choice is then rationalized by the weighing of the cost and benefits of an act. If an act whether criminal or not is more costly than it benefits then this crime would not occur. Programs such as Operation ceasefire and project safe neighborhoods are put in to effect in order to make crime more costly so that individuals are deterred from crime due to its costly outcomes and poor benefits. It is a tug-of-war game that is played between criminality and the common good. It is the individual’s perception of benefits and costs that places them on either side.
References
Becker, G. S. (1976). The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Braga, A. A., Kennedy, D/M., Waring, E.J., & Piehl, A.M. (2001). Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston’s operation ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 38(3):195–225.
Braga, A. A., & Pierce, G.L., 2005. Disrupting illegal firearms markets in Boston: The effects of operation ceasefire on the supply of new handguns to criminals. Criminology & Public Policy 4(4):717–48.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2011). Uniformed crime report. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls
Keel, R. (1992). The evolution of classical theory: Rational choice, deterrence, incapacitation and just dessert. Sociology of Deviant Behavior.
Kerr, K.J., Beech, A.R., & Murphy, D. (2012). Sexual homicide: Definition, motivation and comparison with other forms of sexual offending. Aggression and Violent Behavior. Retrieved from www.sciencedirect.com.library.svsu.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178912000626
Office of Justice Programs. (2012). Program profile: Operation ceasefire (Boston, Mass.). Retrieved from http://crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=207
Office of Justice Programs. (2012). Program profile: Project safe neighborhoods (Chicago). Retrieved from http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=258
National Institute Of Justice. (2008). Gun violence programs: Operation ceasefire. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/crime/gun-violence/prevention/ceasefire.htm
National Institute of Justice. (2009 (a)). How project safe neighborhoods came about. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/crime/gun-violence/prevention/psn-origins.htm)
National Institute of Justice. (2009 (b)). Gun Violence Programs: Project safe neighborhoods. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/prevention/project-safe-neighborhoods.htm
Papachristos, A. V., Meares, T.L., & Fagan, J. (2007). Attention felons: Evaluating project safe neighborhoods in Chicago. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(2):223–72.
Vito, G. F., & Maahs, J. R. (2012). Criminology: Theory, research, and policy. Jones & Barlett Learning, LLC.
Wilson, L. S., & Kwileck, S. (2003). Are these people crazy, or what? A rational choice interpretation of cults and charisma. Humanomics, 19(1), 29-29. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/203023289?accountid=960