Rawls - Justice as Fairness
Analyse & Kritik 28/2006 ( c Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart) p. 83–88
Fabienne Peter
Justice: Political Not Natural
Abstract: Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice—a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice.
A political conception of justice, as famously put forward by John Rawls, rests on fundamental democratic values. The premise is that an irreducible pluralism of views about what justice requires and about what constitutes the relationship between individuals and the society they live in renders it impossible to base justice on any single comprehensive philosophical doctrine. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Ken Binmore should be seen as belonging to one family of such doctrines. Naturalist theories are not written by nature, but are scholarly attempts to reflect on a select set of data about social life. They are part of a particular (and venerable) philosophical tradition of thinking about justice. The theories put forward are contested by fellow naturalists as well as by adherents of other philosophical traditions. I agree with Binmore that we should theorize about how the social world is structured and, based on this, about what constitutes justice. But he interprets this endeavor too narrowly. I shall argue naturalist theories go wrong when they are conceived of as overriding a political conception of justice. I find Binmore’s book very intelligent and I would recommend it to everyone as an extremely
Fabienne Peter
Justice: Political Not Natural
Abstract: Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice—a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice.
A political conception of justice, as famously put forward by John Rawls, rests on fundamental democratic values. The premise is that an irreducible pluralism of views about what justice requires and about what constitutes the relationship between individuals and the society they live in renders it impossible to base justice on any single comprehensive philosophical doctrine. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Ken Binmore should be seen as belonging to one family of such doctrines. Naturalist theories are not written by nature, but are scholarly attempts to reflect on a select set of data about social life. They are part of a particular (and venerable) philosophical tradition of thinking about justice. The theories put forward are contested by fellow naturalists as well as by adherents of other philosophical traditions. I agree with Binmore that we should theorize about how the social world is structured and, based on this, about what constitutes justice. But he interprets this endeavor too narrowly. I shall argue naturalist theories go wrong when they are conceived of as overriding a political conception of justice. I find Binmore’s book very intelligent and I would recommend it to everyone as an extremely
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