A fundamental assumption underlying a ‘free-market’ perspective to accounting regulation is that accounting information should be treated like other goods, and demand and supply forces should be allowed to freely operate so as to generate an optimal supply of information about an entity. Watts and Zimmerman(1978) states there are private economics-based incentives for the organization to provide credible information about its operations and performance to certain parties outside the organization, otherwise the costs of the organization’s operations will arise. More specifically, the owners of the firm will assume that the managers might be operating the business for their own personal benefit rather than maximizing the value of the organization if absence of information about the organization’s operations. In the other hand, potential lenders are assumed to expect managers to undertake opportunistic actions with the funds the lenders might advance, and therefore in the absence of safeguards the lenders will charge the organization a higher price for their funds. Hence, the cost of attracting capital will increase and this will have negative implications for the value of the organization.
A fundamental assumption underlying a ‘free-market’ perspective to accounting regulation is that accounting information should be treated like other goods, and demand and supply forces should be allowed to freely operate so as to generate an optimal supply of information about an entity. Watts and Zimmerman(1978) states there are private economics-based incentives for the organization to provide credible information about its operations and performance to certain parties outside the organization, otherwise the costs of the organization’s operations will arise. More specifically, the owners of the firm will assume that the managers might be operating the business for their own personal benefit rather than maximizing the value of the organization if absence of information about the organization’s operations. In the other hand, potential lenders are assumed to expect managers to undertake opportunistic actions with the funds the lenders might advance, and therefore in the absence of safeguards the lenders will charge the organization a higher price for their funds. Hence, the cost of attracting capital will increase and this will have negative implications for the value of the organization.