Revisions To The Schlieffen Plan's Failure

A. Plan of the Investigation In the dawn of the twentieth century, self-defence was the right of a sovereign nation, meaning that even during peacetime, nations prepared for war. In 1905, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff, finalized the details of his plan, whereby Germany would be able to fight a two-front war against both France and Russia. This investigation will evaluate the extent to which the terms of the Schlieffen Plan itself contributed to its failure in 1914. To assess the plan's failure, this investigation will focus on; von Moltke’s revisions to the Schlieffen Plan, and its implications in the French invasion, the unexpected Belgian resistance, which brought Great Britain into the war and slowed down
It was designed to express how Moltke was not the cause of Germany's failure, not only with the Schlieffen Plan but throughout the entire war, which is a popular belief expressed by many historians. Rather, she emphasizes, without praising Moltke, how he did the best he could with his resources. The 1907 Schlieffen Plan was unrealistic and adjustments were made; Mombauer writes “it was Moltke's right, even his duty, to adapt the war plan to changing circumstances” (91). Annika Mombauer born in Germany is a lecturer, and this book, and many of her journals, act as a rebuttal to a growing number of historians claiming that the Schlieffen Plan was non-existent; Moltke seemed to believe there was a plan. The book's value lies in its objectivity, examining Moltke military career politically, and stating clearly the reasoning behind the General Staff's decisions leading up to the outbreak of war. However, Mombauer omits many larger aspects of the German war plan because her book is so detailed. Also, the book follows the life of Moltke as an individual, and this puts an abundant amount of emphasis and Moltke own agency, rather than circumstance, which can be detrimental in some historical