Robert E Lee Mission Command Analysis

Although Robert E. Lee, Commanding General of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, was on the losing side of the Civil War, people still recognize him as a war hero due to his successful battlefield tactics and maneuvering. Midway through the war, Gen. Lee had so much success out-maneuvering Union forces that it seemed as though the Confederates would win. However, in July of 1863, Union forces defeated the Army of Northern Virginia at the Battle of Gettysburg causing a pivotal moment in the course of the war. Analyzing Gen. Lee’s failure at the Battle of Gettysburg through the principles of Mission Command will help determine why he was unsuccessful. Today, the principles of Mission Command are the standard by which military leaders
Lee failed to execute mission command by ignoring risk on day three of the Battle of Gettysburg when he ordered Longstreet to conduct a full frontal assault on the center of the Union defensive line. According to ADRP 6-0, effective mission command utilizes the acceptance of prudent risk when making decisions because there is a degree of uncertainty in all military operations. However, Longstreet believed Lee gambled rather than carefully calculating the risk and using measures to mitigate it. Also in ADRP 6-0, gambling “is staking the success of an entire action on a single event without considering the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned.” Longstreet advised Gen. Lee on the inherent danger of attacking the enemy dug into defensive positions, but Gen. Lee insisted they attack anyway (Achenbach 2013). Years after the war Longstreet revealed, “Lee knew that I did not believe that success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the grounds…” (Achenbach, 2013). The frontal assault became known as “Picket’s Charge” (Golden, 2012). It was named after one of Longstreet’s Division Commanders: Brigadier General Pickett, who was ordered to attack to fulfill Gen. Lee’s order. The charge resulted in half of the BG Picket’s 13,000 men killed, wounded or captured (Achenbach, 2013). After realizing his disastrous mistake he said, “I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations in the field which I feel to be necessary… I am so dull in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled” (Achenbach, 2013). Had Gen. Lee calculated the risk Longstreet was so adamant about, he might have decided to attack elsewhere or possibly even retrograde his