Role of the Second Triumvirate

How Significant was the Second Triumvirate to the fall of the Republic? By Martin Kimber

The Second Triumvirate had a limited amount of significance towards the fall of the Roman Republic. This is a direct result of the Second Triumvirate’s lack of involvement in the direct issues affecting Rome and the Republic long before the inception of this political coalition between Octavian, Antony and Lepidus. The Triumvirate’s influence in the collapse of the Republic can be seen in their march on Rome, their legal recognition as Triumvirs, the instigation of a new program of proscriptions and the expelling of the last real threat of Republican influence at the battle of Philippi but they cannot be seen to be the sole reasons for the fall of the Republic. Issues such as provincial warfare to which the Senate was not able to handle alone and the increased factionalism within the Senate all highlight the fact that to place the sole blame for the fall of the Republic upon the Second Triumvirate would be myopic. The overshadowing of the Triumvirate’s significance by problems that had plagued the Republic long before the birth of the Triumvirate show that the Republic had already faced several mortal blows, it was just the Second Triumvirate that carried the Roman Republic to it’s death bed.

The meeting of Octavian, Antony and Lepidus on a small island near Bononia had seen the three men take advantage of an obvious power vacuum left by the dictator Caesar. The result of the meeting was the decision to appoint themselves Triumviri Republicae Constituendae for a period of 5 years with the authority to make laws and to nominate magistrates and governors. The men upon their decision backed by their legions marched on Rome. This highlighted the aggravation of the issue of powerful generals and the attainment of political advancement through military means. The senate’s inability to defend itself from powerful generals backed by their armies was a weakness used by the triumvirs in their following of the example set by Sulla which Keaveney describes as “a model which the unscrupulous… were bound to want to imitate”1. The ability of the triumvirs just like other powerful men to attain political advancement through military means had seen a senate bullied with the threat force, a threat the senate would never be able to fight back on since the creation of professional armies in Rome. This reiteration and others before it would see “each individual incident inexorably bringing about the next“2and so therefore it was only natural that Octavian, Antony and Lepidus follow the precedent set by previous Roman generals before them. Although the march on Rome by the Second Triumvirate had disempowered the Senate, this march was only an exacerbation of the problem that had already existed and as such is only a reiteration of a problem by which had plagued the Republic previously limiting the significance of such an actions by the triumvirs.

The proposal of Lex Titia by P. Titius and it’s passing in the tribal assembly on the 27 November 43 had effectively seen the power of the Senate nullified as the Second Triumvirate had gained dictatorial powers similar to that of Caesar. The passing of Lex Titia had turned the Second Triumvirate into “a formal magistracy legally appointed which could dominate the Senate and state”3. Thus highlighting a major difference between the First and Second Triumvirate. The achievement of such power would prove to be detrimental to the Senate and the Republican system, as the result would see the triumvirs complete with superfluous powers. In place of the dictator Caesar, there were now three dictators. 4Thus the single dictator Caesar would now be replaced in effect (but not in title) by three5. The dictatorial powers attained by the triumvirs would effectively quash any power that the Senate really had left as the triumvirs ability ranged from making laws to being able to nominate magistrates and governors. The triumvirs had essentially stamped their power down upon Rome and “to advertise their rule and the effective death of the Republic, they all three had coins issued bearing their portrait”.6 The power of the Senate which had now belonged to the dictator like triumvirs would see a similar replication of Caesar’s and Sulla’s terms as dictators and hence is again only an aggravation of previous problems that the dying Republic was facing and thus highlights a minimal sense of significance of the Second Triumvirate in the fall of the Republic.

The division of the Roman provinces between the three triumvirs after the legalization of their positions was evidence of complete ignorance towards the republican system by the Second Triumvirate, which would only further harm the Republic until it’s timely end at the hands of Octavian. Antony would retain Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul, Octavian would receive Africa, Sicily and Sardinia and Lepidus would acquire the rest of Gaul and all of Spain.
David Shotter comments “it’s nature clearly marked out Antonius as the senior partner,” 7reflecting on Antony’s attainment of the provinces deemed to be more beneficial and Octavian being given the most difficult and dangerous post war task, for he had to handle Sextus Pompeius and mastermind a huge program of land confiscation. 8The transfer of control of these provinces from governors for each province to the rule of three men is an elucidation of the triumvirate’s complete disregard for the Republican system and highlights their anti-republican stance. The running of Rome and the provinces in the form of an oligarchy could only be damaging to what was left of the Republic and Syme emphasizes this in “Yet the old framework and categories subsist: a monarchy rules through an oligarchy” 9The division of the Roman provinces highlights the beginnings of a movement away from a Republican system of government towards the ruling by an oligarchy of which would continue to rule until Octavian’s victory at Actium where he would achieve sole rule of Rome only marking the beginning of an empire, therefore seeing this division as not a major cause for an inevitable collapse of the Roman Republic.

The proscriptions against those deemed to be of political opposition had resulted in the last of those in support of the Republic being killed. The mass murdering of those deemed to be possible opponents had seen the elimination of those able to defend the Republic. The Triumvirs forgot the example of Caesar and remembered Marius and Sulla10. Cassius Dio reflects on this replication of Sulla in “those murders by which Sulla had once indulged in were once more resorted to”. 11These men had effectively eliminated the last Republicans, their only opposition out of Rome, with few managing to escape; those lucky enough had joined Sextus Pompey. Their dominant motive will have been the need to confiscate estates with which to pay their troops 12in attempt to alleviate the problem of the payment of their troops and the settling of veterans. It was the victims that emphasized their motive with the clear majority came from the equestrian order indicating that money was the chief priority. 13The carrying out of these executions was detrimental to a Roman Republic already nearing its final days. At the expense of the Roman Republic, the triumvirs achieved political security and money. Many prominent senators and Romans such as Cicero, Brutus and Cassius had fallen victims to the campaign of proscriptions carried out by the triumvirs. In light of the speeches made by Cicero against Antony called the Phillipics, it was not surprising that it would be his name also included in the list of those to be executed. It was the attempts of Cicero to restore the republic that cost his life and thus perished one of Rome’s greatest son’s14. Upon Antony’s orders Cicero’s head and hands were removed and taken to Rome and displayed within the forum, a sight to make the Romans shudder 15. Although the proscriptions had seen the direct eradication of those in support for the Republic from Rome, this was only a minor fragment in an inescapable process, which would pave the way for the creation of the principate and the demise of Rome.

With the carrying out of proscriptions against the Republicans in Italy, campaigns were carried out to deal with Brutus and Cassius in the East who had built up powerful armies. The battle of Philippi that came as a result of the need to enforce these executions by force of arms had seen the outcome of the battle mean effectively the end of the Republic. Octavian’s underlying motive to avenge Caesar is highlighted by Suetonius in “the underlying motive of every campaign was that Augustus felt it his duty, above all, to avenge Caesar”. 16With much of the Republican support eliminated as the result of the proscriptions Brutus had become as Scullard describes “increasingly independent and the chief Republican rallying point”. 17Brutus and Cassius were essentially the last true threat of Republican support and their defeat would highlight that the Republican cause was irretrievably lost18. The defeat at Philippi and the suicides of both Brutus and Cassius marked the end for the Republic. The result of the battle of Philippi had resulted in the Triumvirs successful elimination of Republican support but only confirmed the fall of the Republic and was not a direct cause for it’s inevitable collapse.

Administrative and military issues in the provinces and the inability of the Senate to deal with them had seen the Senate continually trying to address these issues by providing Roman generals with extraordinary powers to deal with such matters. A problem plaguing the Senate and the Republic long before the inception of the Second Triumvirate, the presence of professional armies under independent Roman generals would be a major factor in the eventual collapse of the Republic. Pompey’s dealing with Brutus and Lepidus in the period after Sulla highlights this inability of the senate and the further empowering of Roman generals as a result of their assistance as Pompey was given a proconsular command, which made him a colleague not a legate. 19The inability of the senate to defend it’s provinces and the heavy reliance upon the generals that could was an act against Sulla’s intentions of protection the Republic and would prove to be suicidal to the Senate and the Republic20. The powerlessness of the senate to deal with issues relating to administrative matters and military matters in the Provinces and Rome itself had seen the increased use of powerful generals and professional armies. The use of military commanders had maligned belief and support for the Senate. Thus the Roman ‘ warlords’ were provided with the ability to extort the senate for increased military and political powers aggravating a problem the Republic had suffered before the appointment of the Second Triumvirate and hence the significance of the Second Triumvirate severely restricted to a marginal amount.

The increasing factionalism within the Senate would be a major cause for the fall of the Republic and thus represents the Second Triumvirate as having minimal significance in the Republic’s eventual fall. Roman politics had centered around the two main political factions the optimates, the more traditional majority focused on the limiting of the popular assemblies power, the tribunes and the extension of their own power. The populares were the other faction in Roman politics that relied on these popular assemblies and tribunes for the acquiring of their power and hence were against the stance of the optimates. The conflict between the optimates and the populares would see the result in the climax of civil war with Caesar being a prime example of civil war as a result of optimate political moves. Caesar being a populare would face political struggles at the hands of the optimates, which would eventually see the outburst of civil war. The hard-core optimate clique and Cato were responsible for the blocking of Caesar’s negotiations, the ignoring of the tribunate vetoes of Antony and Cassius and the overriding of the senators against the outbreak of civil war.
Scullard reflects on this “It was the small Optimate clique, the twenty two senators who voted against disarmament, that forced the issue.”21 The prime example of Caesar highlights the effects of the antagonizing politics and the indifference of the political factions if the result would see out a civil war. This indifference highlighted by these political factions in the senate is comment on by Cary “Therefore the twenty two extremist senators who insisted on Caesar’s immediate recall were in fact insisting on civil war”22. The attempts to further achieve their own political aspirations and the resulting lack of care for the health of the Republic had been a major factor in the fall of the Republic. Thus the increased factionalism in the Senate would prove to be detrimental to the Roman Republic, aiding its eventual downfall even before the beginnings of the Second Triumvirate.

The Second Triumvirate was only partly significant in the fall of the Roman Republic. The role of the Second Triumvirate in their march on Rome, the division and centralization of control of the provinces to three men, the use of proscriptions and decimation of the Republican support as seen in their victory at Philippi all played a role in the Republic’s eventual downfall. Although these events epitomize what seems to be quite a wide range of responsibility on the Second Triumvirate it was far more likely that they only exacerbated problems that were already made evident during the life of the Republic. It was the inevitable downfall of the Republic that had been the result of issues that were not created by the Second Triumvirate and that the triumvirs had not taken any part in the inability of the senate to deal with provincial problems and the rising factionalism within the senate that reflect a wide range of issues that were associated with the Republic that did not involve the Second Triumvirate and hence sole blame cannot be placed upon the political coalition of Octavian, Antony and Lepidus. Thus it is unmistakable that the Second Triumvirate had a limited amount of significance in regards to the fall of the Roman Republic.

References
Cary, M. and Scullard, H. (1935). A History of Rome Down to the reign of Constatine. 3rd ed. London: Bredford/St Martin 's.
Dio, C. (1917). Roman History: Book 47. 1st ed. London: St Edmundsbery Ltd.
Keaveney, A. (1982). Sulla; The Last Republican. 2nd ed. USA: Routledge, pp.222-225.
Plutarch, (1958). The Fall of the Roman Republic Revised Edition. 1st ed. London: Penguin Books.
Scullard, H. (1976). The Gracchi to Nero. 4th ed. Oxon: Routledge, pp.154-163.
Shotter, D. (1994). The Fall of the Roman Republic. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, pp.88-95.
Suetonius, (2007). The Twelve Caesar 's. 1st ed. London: Penguin Books, pp.47-57.
Syme, R. (1939). The Roman Revolution. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.8.

References: Cary, M. and Scullard, H. (1935). A History of Rome Down to the reign of Constatine. 3rd ed. London: Bredford/St Martin 's. Dio, C. (1917). Roman History: Book 47. 1st ed. London: St Edmundsbery Ltd. Keaveney, A. (1982). Sulla; The Last Republican. 2nd ed. USA: Routledge, pp.222-225. Plutarch, (1958). The Fall of the Roman Republic Revised Edition. 1st ed. London: Penguin Books. Scullard, H. (1976). The Gracchi to Nero. 4th ed. Oxon: Routledge, pp.154-163. Shotter, D. (1994). The Fall of the Roman Republic. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, pp.88-95. Suetonius, (2007). The Twelve Caesar 's. 1st ed. London: Penguin Books, pp.47-57. Syme, R. (1939). The Roman Revolution. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.8.