Russell's Simplicity Argument
This essay will consider Russell’s reasons for believing that there exists a real world. The philosopher offers a few arguments and the three most important ones will be outlined, namely, the relativity argument, the argument for instinctive beliefs and the argument for simplicity. The essay will argue that Russell’s simplicity argument is effective because it stands against criticism. In fact, the critical discussion will be mainly focused on the simplicity argument since it provides more room for debate. Therefore, after an outline of all the arguments, this essay will aim to a narrow focus and explain only briefly why the first two arguments are evidently unsound.
For the sake of clarity, to explain Russel’s arguments, it may be useful …show more content…
to specify what he exactly meant for sense-data and sensation. Indeed, “if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data” (Russell, 1912: 7), which means that one can be able to ascertain if a physical world really exists only by means of sense-data, according to Russell. Thus, sense-data are defined as “things that are immediately known in sensation” (Russell, 1912: 7), while a sensation is defined as “the experience of being immediately aware of these things”. To exemplify, in perceiving a colour, one has a sensation of the colour, for example red, while red itself is the sense-datum. Russell utilised this distinction for the relativity argument, according to which, something cannot be recognised as being, say, X because it is sometimes perceived as Y rather than X. In other words, the philosopher appealed to the concept of sense-data and attempted to argue that, since sense-data are different depending on the situation, we cannot say that something is definitely of a kind rather than another.
In addition to the aforementioned argument, Russell outlines another argument based on the appeal to instinctive beliefs. He suggests that everyone has an intrinsic and instinctive belief that is “ready in ourselves as soon as we start to reflect” (Russel, 1912: 13) and that systematises harmoniously all our different experiences. Thus, he argues that everyone has the instinctive belief of the existence of a physical world, while not having reason for disbelieving in such a hypothesis, and that therefore, it is rational to believe that a real world exists. This argument looks apparently similar to the one described in the following paragraph, namely, the simplicity argument. Though, it must be specified straightaway that these two are completely different arguments.
As another reason for believing that a world beyond our experience exists, Russell offers the argument for simplicity.
The philosopher considers the common-sense hypothesis of the world existing, which I will indicate with the letter “A” because of concision, and the sceptical hypothesis denying the existence of the world, which I will indicate with the letter “B” from now on. Thus, Russell claims that although B is logically possible, “there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis”. To explain Russell’s argument, the conclusion that it is rational to believe that the external world exists follows from the premises that simplicity is a reason for believing in A, whereas there is not a reason to believe in B, although this latter may still be a conceivable possibility. This standpoint was also endorsed by a number of other intellectuals, specifically, the similar “Occam’s Razor” (Baker, 2011: ?) hold that if one theory is simpler than another, then it is rational to believe in it. Furthermore, the philosopher Douven pointed out that A and B “are not equally good explanations” (Douven, 2017: ?) because A is simpler than B. In other words, Russell is reasoning by abduction, which means making an inference to the best explanation, according to which, A is a better explanation than B because it uniquely has the feature of simplicity. Moreover, Russell employs the case of the cat’s hunger to exemplify his theory: the simpler explanation for the cat to be hungry is that the cat physically exists rather than being only a set of
sense-data.
Hence, Russell offers at least three arguments to establish the conclusion that “the external world does really exist, and is not wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it” (Russell, 1912: 13). Yet, among the three outlined arguments, the relativity argument is self-evidently weak as it does not entail at all the above-named conclusion. The second argument also fails because, at the present time, one may have a number of instinctive beliefs. For example, one can instinctively believe that the world does or does not exist, or that it only mentally exists, or that it exists only as part of dreams and so on. In fact, that the world exists is not the only conceivable hypothesis that instinctively comes to our minds, and the appeal to instinct is unsound as well. Therefore, since these first two arguments are clearly weak, the following paragraphs will focus on evaluating the simplicity argument, which is much stronger and gives to the essay the chance to develop a more focused critical discussion.
On the one hand, one may offer a reason for discarding the simplicity argument, which can be considered a quite compelling objection at first. In fact, one could say that, before the Copernican Revolution, everybody believed that the earth was the static centre of the universe, and this was the simplest hypothesis that could be found at that time. Then, Nicolaus Copernicus rightly discovered that the sun was in the centre and the earth orbits it, no vice versa. This is relevant to our discussion because one could object Russell’s entitlement to take A as the simple hypothesis on the grounds that judgement should be suspended until we can foresee or know any future hypotheses. This is because, even assuming that at the present time A does seem the simplest hypothesis, one day, science may develop a new and even simpler hypothesis because, just as in the Copernicus example, what one thinks to be the simplest hypothesis today may later turn out to be a false explanation of the facts. Though, this objection is different from the one advanced above for the instinctive beliefs argument because, while we may now have a number of instinctive beliefs, we assume that we now have only one simple hypothesis but that in future this may not be the case anymore.
However, Russell may have replied to the aforementioned objection by acknowledging that one may actually invent a better explanation for the existence of the world in the future but that this is not enough to justify our suspension of judgement. For example, even though it is likely that someone will discover a better cure for cancer one day, this does not imply that doctors should not use today’s cures just because they are not simpler than those that will be invented. In other words, it would be unreasonable to suspend judgement and remain with no explanations whatsoever of why the world exists only because better explanations will be introduced sooner or later. Furthermore, unlike the case of instinctive beliefs, in which we could conceive several instinctive hypotheses at the present time, only one simple hypothesis can be conceived now. This is because no other hypothesis can ever be as simple as the straightforward hypothesis that the world physically exists, and it would be irrational to discard it just for future possibilities.
Of course, even if one accepts that we should not suspend judgement just because of the possibility that simpler hypotheses will be introduced tomorrow, one may object the very first assumption that A is a simpler hypothesis than B. Thus, one may counter-reply to the aforementioned considerations and doubt Russell’s simplicity argument again. Yet, A is as self-evidently a simpler option as a piece within a puzzle is. To explain, we immediately recognise where a piece fits in a puzzle as well as we reason straightforwardly that the physical world exists. Any other hypothesis would have to come from a somehow fictional invention that tries to explain the world in a necessarily less simple way than the one that does not require any imagination. Therefore, Russell’s simplicity argument is ultimately proved valid and sound, since one is allowed to believe in the existence of a physical world only by the fact that this is today’s simplest explanation. Thus, at least with the simplicity argument, the philosopher succeeds in establishing reasons for the existence of a mind-independent world.
To conclude, this essay demonstrated that Russell’s simplicity argument is effective in affirming that there exists a world beyond our experience and why. Also, reasons have been provided to explain why the other considered arguments had not been given the same attention. Indeed, unlike the simplicity argument, the others were not strong enough to allow two-sided criticism and the essay had to focus on the most appealing of Russell’s arguments to argue that he manages to prove the existence of a physical world, at least with the simplicity argument.
For the sake of clarity, to explain Russel’s arguments, it may be useful …show more content…
to specify what he exactly meant for sense-data and sensation. Indeed, “if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data” (Russell, 1912: 7), which means that one can be able to ascertain if a physical world really exists only by means of sense-data, according to Russell. Thus, sense-data are defined as “things that are immediately known in sensation” (Russell, 1912: 7), while a sensation is defined as “the experience of being immediately aware of these things”. To exemplify, in perceiving a colour, one has a sensation of the colour, for example red, while red itself is the sense-datum. Russell utilised this distinction for the relativity argument, according to which, something cannot be recognised as being, say, X because it is sometimes perceived as Y rather than X. In other words, the philosopher appealed to the concept of sense-data and attempted to argue that, since sense-data are different depending on the situation, we cannot say that something is definitely of a kind rather than another.
In addition to the aforementioned argument, Russell outlines another argument based on the appeal to instinctive beliefs. He suggests that everyone has an intrinsic and instinctive belief that is “ready in ourselves as soon as we start to reflect” (Russel, 1912: 13) and that systematises harmoniously all our different experiences. Thus, he argues that everyone has the instinctive belief of the existence of a physical world, while not having reason for disbelieving in such a hypothesis, and that therefore, it is rational to believe that a real world exists. This argument looks apparently similar to the one described in the following paragraph, namely, the simplicity argument. Though, it must be specified straightaway that these two are completely different arguments.
As another reason for believing that a world beyond our experience exists, Russell offers the argument for simplicity.
The philosopher considers the common-sense hypothesis of the world existing, which I will indicate with the letter “A” because of concision, and the sceptical hypothesis denying the existence of the world, which I will indicate with the letter “B” from now on. Thus, Russell claims that although B is logically possible, “there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis”. To explain Russell’s argument, the conclusion that it is rational to believe that the external world exists follows from the premises that simplicity is a reason for believing in A, whereas there is not a reason to believe in B, although this latter may still be a conceivable possibility. This standpoint was also endorsed by a number of other intellectuals, specifically, the similar “Occam’s Razor” (Baker, 2011: ?) hold that if one theory is simpler than another, then it is rational to believe in it. Furthermore, the philosopher Douven pointed out that A and B “are not equally good explanations” (Douven, 2017: ?) because A is simpler than B. In other words, Russell is reasoning by abduction, which means making an inference to the best explanation, according to which, A is a better explanation than B because it uniquely has the feature of simplicity. Moreover, Russell employs the case of the cat’s hunger to exemplify his theory: the simpler explanation for the cat to be hungry is that the cat physically exists rather than being only a set of
sense-data.
Hence, Russell offers at least three arguments to establish the conclusion that “the external world does really exist, and is not wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it” (Russell, 1912: 13). Yet, among the three outlined arguments, the relativity argument is self-evidently weak as it does not entail at all the above-named conclusion. The second argument also fails because, at the present time, one may have a number of instinctive beliefs. For example, one can instinctively believe that the world does or does not exist, or that it only mentally exists, or that it exists only as part of dreams and so on. In fact, that the world exists is not the only conceivable hypothesis that instinctively comes to our minds, and the appeal to instinct is unsound as well. Therefore, since these first two arguments are clearly weak, the following paragraphs will focus on evaluating the simplicity argument, which is much stronger and gives to the essay the chance to develop a more focused critical discussion.
On the one hand, one may offer a reason for discarding the simplicity argument, which can be considered a quite compelling objection at first. In fact, one could say that, before the Copernican Revolution, everybody believed that the earth was the static centre of the universe, and this was the simplest hypothesis that could be found at that time. Then, Nicolaus Copernicus rightly discovered that the sun was in the centre and the earth orbits it, no vice versa. This is relevant to our discussion because one could object Russell’s entitlement to take A as the simple hypothesis on the grounds that judgement should be suspended until we can foresee or know any future hypotheses. This is because, even assuming that at the present time A does seem the simplest hypothesis, one day, science may develop a new and even simpler hypothesis because, just as in the Copernicus example, what one thinks to be the simplest hypothesis today may later turn out to be a false explanation of the facts. Though, this objection is different from the one advanced above for the instinctive beliefs argument because, while we may now have a number of instinctive beliefs, we assume that we now have only one simple hypothesis but that in future this may not be the case anymore.
However, Russell may have replied to the aforementioned objection by acknowledging that one may actually invent a better explanation for the existence of the world in the future but that this is not enough to justify our suspension of judgement. For example, even though it is likely that someone will discover a better cure for cancer one day, this does not imply that doctors should not use today’s cures just because they are not simpler than those that will be invented. In other words, it would be unreasonable to suspend judgement and remain with no explanations whatsoever of why the world exists only because better explanations will be introduced sooner or later. Furthermore, unlike the case of instinctive beliefs, in which we could conceive several instinctive hypotheses at the present time, only one simple hypothesis can be conceived now. This is because no other hypothesis can ever be as simple as the straightforward hypothesis that the world physically exists, and it would be irrational to discard it just for future possibilities.
Of course, even if one accepts that we should not suspend judgement just because of the possibility that simpler hypotheses will be introduced tomorrow, one may object the very first assumption that A is a simpler hypothesis than B. Thus, one may counter-reply to the aforementioned considerations and doubt Russell’s simplicity argument again. Yet, A is as self-evidently a simpler option as a piece within a puzzle is. To explain, we immediately recognise where a piece fits in a puzzle as well as we reason straightforwardly that the physical world exists. Any other hypothesis would have to come from a somehow fictional invention that tries to explain the world in a necessarily less simple way than the one that does not require any imagination. Therefore, Russell’s simplicity argument is ultimately proved valid and sound, since one is allowed to believe in the existence of a physical world only by the fact that this is today’s simplest explanation. Thus, at least with the simplicity argument, the philosopher succeeds in establishing reasons for the existence of a mind-independent world.
To conclude, this essay demonstrated that Russell’s simplicity argument is effective in affirming that there exists a world beyond our experience and why. Also, reasons have been provided to explain why the other considered arguments had not been given the same attention. Indeed, unlike the simplicity argument, the others were not strong enough to allow two-sided criticism and the essay had to focus on the most appealing of Russell’s arguments to argue that he manages to prove the existence of a physical world, at least with the simplicity argument.