Sanctions: The Effectiveness Of Non-Targeted Sanctions
The international community has been using economic sanctions for decades to change some undesirable behavior of target states in a way favorable to sender states. However, a number of cases in which economic sanctions were imposed comprehensively called into question the effectiveness of sanctions in general.
Iraqi case of comprehensive sanctions imposition revealed the sanctions crisis and put on the agenda three substantial and overlapping issues. First, comprehensive sanctions inflict wide humanitarian damage on mass public. Sanctions imposed on Iraq “… have contributed to more deaths than all WMD throughout history” (Mueller and Mueller 1999, 50). Second, non-targeted sanctions are used as a tool of political blame of senders. In Iraqi case, “Baghdad was quite successful in blaming the UN for the humanitarian crisis…, both within the country …show more content…
and worldwide” (Brzoska 2003, 520). Condemnations from humanitarian groups raised the issue of morality of non-targeted, broad sanctions (Weiss 1999). Third, comprehensive sanctions do not seem to work. Iraqi population suffered a widespread humanitarian damage, while ex ante policy objectives of sanctions imposition were “modestly” achieved. If sanctions so costly failed to achieve desired altering in target’s policy, then the sanctions effectiveness in general is called into doubt.
Labeled as “blunt instrument”, non-targeted sanctions called into the question the sanctions enterprise in general. Recognizing this fact pushed policymakers and scholars to advocate for targeted sanctions, in hope that they will be more “politically effective and attentive to vulnerable population” than non-targeted ones (Weiss 1999, 507).
Targeted sanctions are considered as “precision-guided munitions” (Drezner 2011, 96) of the economic statecraft which are designed with the aim of addressing the problems that were generated by non-targeted sanctions.
First, targeted sanctions minimize the comprehensive suffering of mass public since they are particularly aimed at domestic actors responsible for policies that sender side intend to change. Second, since mass public is out of focus in targeted sanctions imposition, such type of sanctions are ethical from human rights perspective.
In terms of third problem generated by non-targeted sanctions, however, there is lack of even moderate agreement between scholars and policymakers. Namely, there is an ardent debate over the relative effectiveness of targeted sanctions versus non-targeted ones, which insofar have created far more heat than light. Given that the use of targeted sanctions as a foreign policy tool dramatically increased in recent decades, and probably will continue to grow, at the expense of non-targeted sanctions, it is essential to investigate conditions under which targeted sanctions do
succeed.
Since sanctions are imposed with the aim of altering some undesirable behavior within the target states, treating targeted states as unitary actors, which is common in the sanctions literature, would not allow demonstrating the conditions in target states under which sanctions would be effective. To fill this gap, I will disaggregate the target state that will give us more insight regarding which conditions within the target state predetermines the sanctions effectiveness. Namely, this paper will attempt to determine when targeted sanctions are successful in terms of achieving desired policy objectives. Thus, this project aims at investigating how the design of sanctions may influence the success of sanctions, using selectorate theory. This framework allows us to see how domestic political institutions affect leaders decisions. In terms of sanctions, selectorate theory will allow us to see how a specific design of sanctions affects policymaking in target states.
This proposal proceeds in five parts. I will first provide a critical review of the pertinent literature and identify the gaps within it. Next, I will present my theoretical framework and derived hypotheses. This section will be followed by a discussion of the data to be applied and methodology to be used.
Iraqi case of comprehensive sanctions imposition revealed the sanctions crisis and put on the agenda three substantial and overlapping issues. First, comprehensive sanctions inflict wide humanitarian damage on mass public. Sanctions imposed on Iraq “… have contributed to more deaths than all WMD throughout history” (Mueller and Mueller 1999, 50). Second, non-targeted sanctions are used as a tool of political blame of senders. In Iraqi case, “Baghdad was quite successful in blaming the UN for the humanitarian crisis…, both within the country …show more content…
and worldwide” (Brzoska 2003, 520). Condemnations from humanitarian groups raised the issue of morality of non-targeted, broad sanctions (Weiss 1999). Third, comprehensive sanctions do not seem to work. Iraqi population suffered a widespread humanitarian damage, while ex ante policy objectives of sanctions imposition were “modestly” achieved. If sanctions so costly failed to achieve desired altering in target’s policy, then the sanctions effectiveness in general is called into doubt.
Labeled as “blunt instrument”, non-targeted sanctions called into the question the sanctions enterprise in general. Recognizing this fact pushed policymakers and scholars to advocate for targeted sanctions, in hope that they will be more “politically effective and attentive to vulnerable population” than non-targeted ones (Weiss 1999, 507).
Targeted sanctions are considered as “precision-guided munitions” (Drezner 2011, 96) of the economic statecraft which are designed with the aim of addressing the problems that were generated by non-targeted sanctions.
First, targeted sanctions minimize the comprehensive suffering of mass public since they are particularly aimed at domestic actors responsible for policies that sender side intend to change. Second, since mass public is out of focus in targeted sanctions imposition, such type of sanctions are ethical from human rights perspective.
In terms of third problem generated by non-targeted sanctions, however, there is lack of even moderate agreement between scholars and policymakers. Namely, there is an ardent debate over the relative effectiveness of targeted sanctions versus non-targeted ones, which insofar have created far more heat than light. Given that the use of targeted sanctions as a foreign policy tool dramatically increased in recent decades, and probably will continue to grow, at the expense of non-targeted sanctions, it is essential to investigate conditions under which targeted sanctions do
succeed.
Since sanctions are imposed with the aim of altering some undesirable behavior within the target states, treating targeted states as unitary actors, which is common in the sanctions literature, would not allow demonstrating the conditions in target states under which sanctions would be effective. To fill this gap, I will disaggregate the target state that will give us more insight regarding which conditions within the target state predetermines the sanctions effectiveness. Namely, this paper will attempt to determine when targeted sanctions are successful in terms of achieving desired policy objectives. Thus, this project aims at investigating how the design of sanctions may influence the success of sanctions, using selectorate theory. This framework allows us to see how domestic political institutions affect leaders decisions. In terms of sanctions, selectorate theory will allow us to see how a specific design of sanctions affects policymaking in target states.
This proposal proceeds in five parts. I will first provide a critical review of the pertinent literature and identify the gaps within it. Next, I will present my theoretical framework and derived hypotheses. This section will be followed by a discussion of the data to be applied and methodology to be used.