Sharecropping Case Study

Resolving the Issues under ‘Islamic Sharecropping’ Contract:
From the literature, it has been observed that although a lot of criticism has been seen on the sharecropping and al-muzāraʻa contracts but the later researchers and the Islamic jurists have approved the contract of al-muzāraʻa as well as the contract of sharecropping has been approved by Cheung (1969) and the followers. But the issue of monitoring and input and output sharing has not been answered satisfactorily. In this section, we will try to resolve these issues based on the previous literature of al-muzāraʻa and sharecropping that has already been discussed in this paper. If the given below suggestions are put into the al-muzāraʻa contract then we can get a modified and more
But according to our opinion, this issue can be resolved if the landlord convey to the farmer that he is only concerned with the adequate output that should be produce and in the urge of attaining this objective the fertility of the land should not be damaged extensively. This will save the cost of supervision for the landlord and it will also reduce the change of work avoidance and using of low quality of seeds by the tenant to the great extent. On the other hand each party should know their managerial responsibilities i.e. monitoring activities involved in the sharecropping. Hence the monitoring of primary activities that has already been acknowledged by Aziz & Ismail (2008) includes the sowing and cultivation etc. will fall upon the tenant whereas the monitoring of secondary activities such as harvesting and transportation will be the joint responsibility of both the parties. It should also be known to the landlord that the role of tenant is like a trustee; hence he is not responsible for any damage caused to the crops except in case of the negligence form the tenant side. Regarding the power of landlord, it should be acknowledged that he has the authority to force the farmer in case he is delaying or avoiding doing certain works that has already been mentioned in the
Hence in our model as shown in Figure 1, the source of land for IMFIs would be waqf, where the waqf organization would hold the land from public and family waqf. The capital would be used from government funds, external funds and savings of the client. This would be enough for the IMFI to act as a landlord in the sharecropping contract. So, for the sharecropping contract, the landlord and the farmer should enter into the sharecropping contract where the decisions regarding supervision, input and output sharing are made. Once the contract is settled, then the input would be provided for the sharecropping project based on the terms of the contract. Mostly, each party would provide specific inputs. As it is discussed earlier that the cost of supervision can be decreased if the landlord convey his intentions to the farmer that he is only concern with the adequate output with less damage to the soil fertility. In such case, the cost of supervision would decrease and less effort would be required to monitor the farmer. On the other hand, the farmer would also supervise his labour for the sake of producing efficient level of output with less damage to land fertility. Hence, the supervision would become the joint responsibility of both the parties. On the other hand, in the process of sharecropping