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Public Choice
September 2003, Volume 116, Issue 3-4, pp 351-366
Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute
Philipp Harms, Stefan Zink
2 Citations
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Abstract
This paper offers an explanation why most democracies arecharacterized by moderate taxation of wealth although thewealth distribution is persistently skewed to the right. Wemodel an economy in which agents have to acquire highereducation to qualify for skilled work and in which capitalmarket imperfections prevent poor individuals from making sucha profitable human capital investment. If these borrowingconstraints do not bind for members of the middle class, theymay rationally reject redistribution although both the currentand the future median of the wealth distribution are below themean. Close
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About this Article
Title
Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute
Journal
Public Choice
Volume 116, Issue 3-4 , pp 351-366
Cover Date
2003-09-01
DOI
10.1023/A:1024862825446
Print ISSN
0048-5829
Online ISSN
1573-7101
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
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