Simmons V. Juveniles Summary

FACTS: Christopher Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death for capital crimes he committed when he was 17 years old. At the time of his conviction the Court’s ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky held that the 8th Amendment did not proscribe juvenile between the ages of 16 and 18 from being sentenced to death. In 2002 the Supreme Court ruling in the Atkins v. Virginia barred the use of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders due to “evolving standards of decency” which put them in a class that is “categorically less culpable than the average criminal. In response to the above ruling, Simmons petitioned for postconviction relief on the basis that the reasoning in the Atkins decision applies to minors. His petition was heard by the
Missouri Supreme Court which found that “a national consensus has developed…that the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade”. They reached this conclusion from surveying states that had abolished the death penalty, as well as those who had barred use of the death penalty on juvenile offenders both pre and post Stanford v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether applying the death penalty to juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment?
HOLDING:
Yes. The 8th Amendment prohibits the death penalty for those who were under 18 at the time the crime was committed.
RATIONALE:
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion. To reach a determination on which punishments are cruel and unusual, the Court attempted to discern “ the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S 1160 (2004)). The 8th Amendment also prohibits the use of “excessive sanctions” (Atkins). The majority attempts to show that both factors are present by addressing society’s shifting attitudes through the “consensus” of legislatures on the issue, and whether the death penalty is a “disproportionate punishment for juveniles”. Seeking precedent to justify overturning their decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S 361 (1989), the Court drew attention to the progression of their jurisprudence in death penalty cases involving mentally retarded defendants. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) the Court upheld the death sentence of a mentally retarded man. However, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court found that in the interim between Penry and Atkins, a majority of states passed laws prohibiting the sentencing of mentally handicapped to death. As such, the Court held that evolving standards of decency evidenced by legisltion “place a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender” (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Having established reasonable grounds to review their ruling in the Stanford case, the Court went on to find that the death penalty is a disproportional and excessive punishment for juvenile offenders.
The majority advances their argument by listing some of the mental differences between adults and juveniles such as: “susceptibility to immature behavior”, lack of control over their environment and the peers that come with it, the ability to undergo a character change. These factors were enough for the Court to find the age group a suspect class and hold that they have diminished culpability, at least to an extent that the death penalty becomes an excessive
sanction.
DISSENT:
Justice Scalia authored the dissenting opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. The dissent argues that the majority was wrong to interpret the 8th Amendment as having evolving standards which the Court can identify and act upon. Furthermore, the dissent finds the logic the Court used to determine a national consensus “flimsy”, and their consideration of other nation’s laws abhorrent.
Attacking what he sees as the Justices distorting facts and cherry-picking survey data, Justice Scalia states that “words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus.” In addition Justice Scalia argues that the Court should not regard states that have abolished the death penalty entirely as being supportive of the view that juveniles are less culpable for murder. Support for his point is based on examples of states trying juveniles as adults for numerous criminal offenses, including capital murder.
Another contention aired by the dissent was against the majority’s claim that the Constitution allows justices to “bring their own judgements to bear” when considering the constitutionality of the death penalty.
According to the dissent, the above claim has only been theorized in dicta, and is unsupported by actual precedent setting holdings. Justice Scalia claims that the Court is once again attempting to create precedent in order to legislate from the bench. Citing numerous cases including Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) “in a democratic society legislatures, not courts,…respond to…the moral values of the people” the dissent provides evidence for their stance, and highlight the majority’s lack
thereof.
MY OPINION: The wording of the 8th Amendment grants the Supreme Court the authority to interpret what constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment in contemporary society. Especially in regards to the ultimate and most permanent of punishments, the death penalty. While the Court still maintains that the death penalty is constitutional, it has previously limited the scope of its use in cases of diminished culpability. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), drew a line that prohibited the use of the death penalty for those who committed a capital offense while under the age of 16. In Roper v. Simmons the court overturned the Stanford ruling in order to bring the age limit for the death penalty in line with societies expectation of acceptable treatment of minors.. The dissent presents a strong argument that in rare cases the factors surrounding juveniles actions suggest a high degree of culpability for their actions. However the Court never came to the conclusion that juveniles cannot be accountable for their actions, only that their level of responsibility cannot land them on death row. From the evidence provided by philosophical musings over the millennia, to the modern survey takers, cast doubt upon the death penalty’s credibility in deterring crime. As it continues to be phased out of the United States legal systems, and use in the states that do still allow it decline, the case against the death penalty’s constitutionality will continue to grow.