Simple Detection Model

The alternative to the simple detection model is the expert model of moral perception. Roughly, the expert model of moral perception states that some of us non-inferentially perceive moral facts the same way experts in other areas non-inferentially perceive non-moral facts. Take wine-tasting. A well-trained sommelier can, through just tasting the wine, detect subtle nuances in flavor, such as the presence of certain tannins. On the other hand, a non-expert, someone who is less discerning and who has a hard time distinguishing cheap boxed wine from gorgeous French wine, certainly cannot taste and non-inferentially know about the tannins. To be clear, wine experts, such as our sommelier, have perceptual experiences which can represent properties
Recall that accounts of moral perception claim that perception gets us non-inferential justification for our moral beliefs. The concern is that expert perception, both in the non-moral case and the moral case, is actually inferential. Return to the wine example, which is meant to be analogous to cases in the moral domain. Those who accept the expert model of taste perception claim that the sommelier non-inferentially tastes the tannins in the wine. However, an alternative, compelling story is that the sommelier tastes the wine and makes an immediate inference, with all of his impressive knowledge of wine, that the taste is tannic. This inference may occur so quickly that the sommelier, so used to drinking wine and determining the presence of tannins, doesn’t consciously register the inference. A similar point holds for cases in which moral experts perceive the moral
First, it is quite striking that the simple detection model turns out to rely on the truth of questionable empirical conjectures, but the expert model does not. Second, the expert model of moral perception seems quite analogous to the expert model of ordinary sense perception. The strong analogy between moral experts and wine experts makes this point clear. The simple detection model of moral perception is disanalogous to the expert model of ordinary perception. We have dedicated sense organs in the ordinary case, but no such organ in the moral case. The analogy may hold when the simple detection model is developed by theory-laden perception, but, as we’ve seen, theory-laden perception is equally, if not more, implausible than the existence of a dedicated moral organ. We should expect, unless given a reason otherwise, that moral perception to be similar to non-moral, ordinary perception. The theoretical unity between the non-moral domain and the moral domain which the expert model possesses, but the simple detection model lacks, is another point in favor of the expert model. All else being equal, those seeking to give perceptual accounts of moral knowledge should explain moral perception through the expert model over the simple detection