Socrates View Of The Good Life Analysis

Plato put to writing what Socrates’ view of the good life was throughout several of his dialogues. Much of what Socrates’ view of the necessary requirements for the good life correspond to what are necessary requirements for the good life in the modern, western world. However, the ancient Chinese philosopher, Chuang Tzu, would have various criticisms of Socrates. Yet, these criticisms would not so much be in the essence of the good life, but in the particulars. As demonstrated below, the essentials of a good life for Socrates are primarily piety, morality, and justice. Chuang Tzu would not differ in the broad scope of this assessment, but in the particulars of what constitutes these. An analysis of the contrasting perspectives indicates that
In the Euthyphro dialogue, Socrates poses the question: “And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not?” (11e-12a). Socrates answers this question by claiming piety is a subset of justice: “This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether where there is piety there is also justice, but where there is not always piety, for the pious is part of justice” (12d). This can be understood as that if there is piety, there is justice, but if there is justice, there is not necessarily piety. Justice, then, is a category that contains piety. Moreover, justice is a dichotomous category containing two types of justice: piety, as mentioned, and care of men, or good will towards men. Piety, then, is “care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice” (12e). Caring for other men entails that one must do what is for “the good and the benefit of the object cared for” (13b). This further entails that one should not harm others since harm is not for the good or benefit of fellow men. In fact, for Socrates, doing harm is identical to doing wrong, which is clear when he states that “doing people harm is no different from wrongdoing” (49c). Furthermore, since all doing of harm is wrong, even vengeance is wrong because vengeance is doing wrong in return for wrong received. This consequentialist ethic required Socrates to refuse to attempt an escape from his impending execution despite his friend’s suggestion since to break the Athenian law and sentence which Socrates agreed to would be harming the state and paying vengeance (see