Space Shuttle Columbia Failure
The Columbia Accident
National University
On February 1, 2003, the Space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) disintegrated upon reentry in to earth’s atmosphere on its approach to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
What was discovered by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was more than mechanical failure. The CAIB described the catastrophe as a perfect storm of internal and external pressures that undermined NASA’s policies on safety. These pressures weakened NASA’s safety policies and set the space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) on a course destined for failure.
The disaster was brought about by failures of NASA’s administration to acknowledge and resolve safety concerns brought up by the engineering staff due to internal pressures …show more content…
of NASA’s administration due to shortfalls in its budget over the previous years and increased pressure by Congresses to it meet its operational goals. NASA’s leadership was focused and determined on achieving this operational goal to launch STS-107 on or no later than a specific date and cut corners to achieve this.
“The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8.
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to …show more content…
survive.”
The human element was that NASA’s administration was only focused on achieving the objective of the launch date rather than a safe and successful mission. Due to the external pressures of the Administration, Congress, and private contributors, NASA’s management applied pressure to NASA’s engineers and put them in an unusual position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe rather than proving a situation was safe was just the opposite of the normal protocol. I don’t see any evidence of intent that could be described as illegitimate but rather poor management practices brought about by a lack of experience and expertise needed for managing such an operation.
Upon review, the accident could have been avoided. CAIB stated, “The mistakes were rooted in the complex relationship between NASA’s external environment and its internal decision-making behavior”. The post-accident recommendations covered a range of issues from budgetary to nurturing a risk-averse culture through every level of the organization.
In conclusion, this case study was a very sobering realization of the effects of internal pressures in an organization caused by external politics.
The catastrophes with the space shuttle Columbia and the space shuttle Challenger were one in the same and clearly could have been avoided. The CAIB investigation shows that they were caused by the very same issues of internal pressures caused by external politics and the effects on the organization. This was not only a lesson for NASA but myself as well. I remember watching both catastrophes, it was very sad, the astronauts seems to be a million miles away. After reading the CAIB report I realized it was not accident but merely negligence on the part of NASA’s administration. I also came to an understanding that Public Administration is more than just budgets, rules, and organizations, it’s the need for accountability at every level and the responsibility of managers to see that is carried
out.
References
Stillman II, R.J. (2009) Public Administration: Concepts and Cases (9th Ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2003). COLUMBIA Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1, 2003. Retrieved April 12, 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html
National University
On February 1, 2003, the Space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) disintegrated upon reentry in to earth’s atmosphere on its approach to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
What was discovered by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was more than mechanical failure. The CAIB described the catastrophe as a perfect storm of internal and external pressures that undermined NASA’s policies on safety. These pressures weakened NASA’s safety policies and set the space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) on a course destined for failure.
The disaster was brought about by failures of NASA’s administration to acknowledge and resolve safety concerns brought up by the engineering staff due to internal pressures …show more content…
of NASA’s administration due to shortfalls in its budget over the previous years and increased pressure by Congresses to it meet its operational goals. NASA’s leadership was focused and determined on achieving this operational goal to launch STS-107 on or no later than a specific date and cut corners to achieve this.
“The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8.
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to …show more content…
survive.”
The human element was that NASA’s administration was only focused on achieving the objective of the launch date rather than a safe and successful mission. Due to the external pressures of the Administration, Congress, and private contributors, NASA’s management applied pressure to NASA’s engineers and put them in an unusual position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe rather than proving a situation was safe was just the opposite of the normal protocol. I don’t see any evidence of intent that could be described as illegitimate but rather poor management practices brought about by a lack of experience and expertise needed for managing such an operation.
Upon review, the accident could have been avoided. CAIB stated, “The mistakes were rooted in the complex relationship between NASA’s external environment and its internal decision-making behavior”. The post-accident recommendations covered a range of issues from budgetary to nurturing a risk-averse culture through every level of the organization.
In conclusion, this case study was a very sobering realization of the effects of internal pressures in an organization caused by external politics.
The catastrophes with the space shuttle Columbia and the space shuttle Challenger were one in the same and clearly could have been avoided. The CAIB investigation shows that they were caused by the very same issues of internal pressures caused by external politics and the effects on the organization. This was not only a lesson for NASA but myself as well. I remember watching both catastrophes, it was very sad, the astronauts seems to be a million miles away. After reading the CAIB report I realized it was not accident but merely negligence on the part of NASA’s administration. I also came to an understanding that Public Administration is more than just budgets, rules, and organizations, it’s the need for accountability at every level and the responsibility of managers to see that is carried
out.
References
Stillman II, R.J. (2009) Public Administration: Concepts and Cases (9th Ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2003). COLUMBIA Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1, 2003. Retrieved April 12, 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html