Spanish Demography 2050

INTRODUCTION: 1

THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH POPULATION: 1-8

* A preliminary matter: the starting population: 2-3

* Scenarios of future developments in fertility: 3

* Evolution and projecting mortality: 3-5

* Evolution and projected movements of migrants abroad: 5-7

* Results of the projection: 7-8

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS: 9-10

PERSONAL OPINION: 10-11

BIBLIOGRAPHY: 11

INTRODUCTION
Demography is a discipline that articulates social phenomena that present movements of human populations. The importance of this discipline is that the data provided are essential for designing and planning policies for the development of peoples, because they offer a comprehensive characterization of the state of a population, as well as its development and change over its history. The need for information on specific social phenomena, as well as towns and settlements can be manifold according to the demands and concerns. In these cases, demographics data provides, realizing structure. The ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue in which demography is possible that the interpretation is made of demographic phenomena can open new questions and new proposals for improving the quality of life of the population.

THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH POPULATION
Population projections are a prerequisite in many economic and social analysis aimed at detecting and quantifying future changes to current trends advertised. The population is in most cases an essential variable both in volume and number of inhabitants, and its structure, the relative weight of the different age groups.
When making a short or medium term, five to fifteen years, the important thing is focusing on his foresight. The future behavior of the parameters of the population dynamics should be anticipated by analyzing recent trends, both in the direction of change as observed in its pace. In the very short term, one or two years, the forecast is generally reliable, unless there is a reversal of the trend or a sharp jog pace of evolution, which neither can nor intends to predict. The projection quantifies, for this term, the most likely development, based on the latest developments. Applications of this type of population projection are very numerous, especially as a tool for resource planning in areas such as the education system, health system, etc..
At the other end of the spectrum lie the temporal long-term projections, the order of fifty. It aims mainly to support the quantification of the more extreme effects of certain changes that develop the fullness of their long-term effects, such as pension systems intended precisely to implement the collective management of vital time individuals. What matters in this case is to highlight the great inertia of demographic and temporal extent of its rhythms. Consider that half of the Spanish population will live in Spain on a date that may seem as far back as 2050, is born.
In the long-term projections, future scenarios can be made with a greater degree of freedom, but must in any case be consistent with developments more immediate. Thus, recent history intervenes twice, by the footprint permanently in the population pyramid and thus conditions the evolution in the near future, if discarded, as is advisable, the projection of abrupt changes nothing portends.
In Spain, the demographic changes that have occurred in recent years, much like those who know other countries close to us, will shape our future very deeply. It is not, in essence, of changing circumstances, fads product or anomalous behavior in our society. Demographic change is primarily a reflection, and also a determinant of the tremendous economic, social and cultural rights which we live.
The most characteristic feature of this development is the significant decrease in the number of births; the annual number rose from 669,378 to 368,361 in recent years, although it has increased during this period, the proportion of women of childbearing age.
The deaths, however, have increased from 298,192 to 354,305 in recent years, although it has continued to increase life expectancy, due to the increased aging of our population, where there is now a higher proportion of people who, because of age, suffer higher mortality risk.
Finally, net migration has grown in absolute terms and in relative terms, accounting for a substantial share of total population growth.
The eighties and early nineties have been in the field of population and possibly as many others as well, a period of transformations that culminate upstream and announce new times and new problems whose consequences become apparent for many decades.
They have described here because these projections simulation develop three long-term scenarios based on plausible scenarios for future development of the two main parameters, mortality and fertility, consistent with the recent observation, but which is not attributed a probability specific occurrence. This is even more evident in the treatment of immigration, impossible to forecast such a long period.
The Spanish population projections presented here was performed using the method of components, ie separately projecting each component of population change from year to year: deaths (outputs), births (inputs) and migration flows (inflows or outflows, according to their sign).
Here are, briefly, the most important features of the developed scenarios and assumptions about the evolution of the parameters of population dynamics. Also briefly presented and analyzed the results.

- A preliminary matter: the starting population
To make population projections is necessary to have a population taken as a basis, and we will also be able to observe fall away dates of our past to better understand our demographic future 2050. We will disaggregated by sex and age on 1 January. The first operation, in the latter case is to estimate the distribution of the population by age prior to January, simple operation and reliable if available, as is the case in Spain, movement data of the population, births and particularly deaths broken down by months.
For this projection we had detailed results of the statistical exploitation of the Census of 1996, published by the INE and the statistical results derived from continuous management January 1, 1998. The total population figure for Spain and regions is now official after dissemination by INE in compliance with the obligations under the new management mode.
The analysis of the age structure of the population derived from the 1998 Census has revealed major inconsistencies with the results from the 1996 census, which are added to those of the latter with the 1991 Census.
After some hesitation, the decision was taken based on the official population figure for sex to January 1, 1998, derived from the Population Register, and to reconstitute the age distribution based on data from the 1991 Census and statistics births and deaths. Reconstitution by this method of population in 1998 gives a figure lower than the spread by the INE. The difference at each age has been distributed throughout the period, as if it were immigration, except in the case of children born between 1991 and 1997, whose cash has been adjusted prior to birth data for those years of MNP. This has forced rectify structure data released by the INE.
Using these data, which represent a significant growth of the Spanish population by immigration, affect the estimates of the indicators of fertility and mortality and may cause slight discrepancies with previously published indicators.

- Scenarios of future developments in fertility. Spain, 1998-2050
Applying the average population for each year of the projection of that calendar year gets called "middle generation" weighted average effective women of childbearing age by the weight of their contribution to the fecundity of that year. Births each year are obtained as the average number of children per woman screened by half cash generation projected for each year.

-Evolution and projecting mortality
Just as in all of the populations of developed countries, the Spanish population has participated in the dramatic reduction in mortality observed during the twentieth century: in 1900, life expectancy at birth was 34.8 years, and now Spain is among the countries with the lowest mortality rate in the world.
From the beginning of this century warns of increasing mortality Spanish approximation towards the European average. The pace of improvement in life expectancy for both men and women is significantly higher than that of other countries, such as Italy, France and Sweden, for example, despite the effect of the two great changes which lead to influenza epidemic of 1918 and the Civil War. The fight against infant mortality was primarily responsible for the rapid decline in mortality indicators during the first half of the century.
It can be considered that by 1960 the Spanish had wiped mortality and most of the difference that separated it from the neighboring countries. In particular were markedly attenuated the losses in the later ages of childhood, although infant mortality admitted still significant room for improvement. Since then, the infant mortality rate has dropped significantly and causes of death affecting mainly the adult and elderly population have increased, without reaching the levels of other developed countries. Recent data indicate that, in spite of being already in a very high level, life expectancy has continued to grow steadily. During the eighties and early nineties, that of men rose from 72.5 in 1980 to 73.4 years in 1990 to 74.7 years in 1996, and that of women 78.6 to 80 , 5 years and 81.9 years, on the same dates (INE, 2000). The most recent earnings primarily reflect the decline in mortality rates in older ages. Should be noted that, with mortality levels that existed when they were born people now retire, less than half of women and only 40% of men could reach 65, leaving an average of 11 years of life for women and 10 men, while in the mortality conditions reflected in the final table of mortality over 90% of women and almost 80% of men reach that age, with 20 years of life expectancy ahead women and 16 men.
The progression has been even more pronounced in the case of the elderly: the mortality of 1930, 5% of women and 3% of men survive 85 years, but now the proportions are respectively 46% and 25%. The above data explain the significant impact that the decline in mortality has, and will continue to have, on the aging population.
The reduction in mortality from infectious diseases at the same level as the other developed countries and a lower incidence of deaths from cancer and circulatory diseases, constitute an advantageous combination of causes which largely explains the privileged position of mortality in Spanish the current international context. According to the latest statistics from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat, 1999), life expectancy in Spain is above the average of the fifteen countries that now make up the European Union, especially the women, second only to around 0.5 years in Sweden and France. As the life expectancy of men in Spain is surpassed by Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden.
You may think that the current situation is merely circumstantial, and that tends to homogenize the structure of causes of death in all developed countries. This does not necessarily mean that it will enter a period of decline in overall mortality, because Spain can also benefit from those changes that tend to reduce levels of mortality from these causes. It is likely, however, that improvements in the future will require an effort far more widespread economic and greater involvement of individuals in the conservation of their own health through changes in lifestyle.
Moreover, the Spanish population is now, according to the structure of mortality by age and by cause of death in the so-called "late stage (age) of degenerative diseases and deaths caused by man ", that more developed countries have reached before us. This means that deaths tend to focus on ever higher ages. Relying future increases in life expectancy mainly reducing the incidence of mortality at older ages, the expected result will be as lower half-life improvement.
The assumptions adopted for the future evolution of mortality is common to all three scenarios have been developed and is a continuation of the decline in mortality at a moderate pace, reaching a stable level.
This hypothesis implies a marked improvement, but gradually slowed, mortality, consistent with the observed so far. Life expectancy tends, in the limit, at age 85 in women and 78.5 years for men. In the forecast period, the mortality improvement occurs in a slowing-strongest in the early years, softer in recent-and in all ages, although not to the same extent in all of them, in relative terms, more among children and adults, in absolute terms, especially among the elderly. Life expectancy of women first increases at a rate somewhat lower than in the two previous five-year periods, and growing at a rate diminishing to the end of the period. For men, the initial growth rate is somewhat higher than that observed between 1986 and 1990, but consistent with the general trend of the eighties. In 2020, the average lives of men reach, according to this hypothesis, the 77.2 years in 2050 and 78.5 years.
The number of deaths is calculated by applying the average population for each year of the projection mortality rates by sex and age, corresponding to life expectancy at birth of each sex for that year. This is necessary to project the level and structure of mortality for each year between 1999 and 2050.

- Evolution and projected movements of migrants abroad.
Another important feature of recent demographic trends in Spain that has occurred in the eighties is the change in the composition of our net migration to the outside. The balance had become positive as in the previous decade, reflecting mainly the importance of returns of Spanish emigrants, especially from 1975, driven by the oil crisis and attracted by the establishment of democracy in Spain. The Spanish emigration to other countries is nonexistent today, and since the late eighties, the return flow is almost depleted. The novelty is that Spain is now a country of immigration, as are other European neighboring countries. Net immigration to the outside reflects the arrival of foreign immigrants, including workers in Third World countries, especially Moroccans and Latin Americans represent a growing proportion. The flow of immigrants has been rising since the early eighties and, as a reliable estimate, reached in the 1992-94 annual net balance of 50,000. Much has been speculated about illegal immigration, with estimates varied, difficult to prove. The only data come from certain regularization of foreign operations organized by the Ministry of Interior, which have allowed to grant residency to just fewer than 200,000 people so far. Foreign immigration is now an important component of population growth throughout the European Union, due to the drastic decline in natural growth, as a result of the fall in births and the increase in deaths caused by the aging population. According to the same source, in 1997, virtually the entire Spanish population growth was due to the influx of immigrants (about 47,000 people).
The recent increase in the number of immigrants is not, in principle, be extrapolated to the future because there is an explicit immigration policy, based primarily on controlling inflows. However, the economic and political evolution of some Mediterranean neighbors, population growth, and sectors of our labor market, which allows the coexistence of unemployment and jobs not covered, can create increased pressure at the entrance immigrant workers.
The foreign population living in Spain is still a very small percentage, around 2% according to the most reliable estimates compared to France or Germany. The perspective is therefore that Spain will continue to receive immigrants, but there are many unknowns that prevent developing a reasoned forecast. Of all the components of population growth, migration is more subject to rapid change and those most directly dependent on economic developments and policy decisions. The demographic evolution can have an important influence on the extent to promote the entry of immigrants for palliation of certain future imbalances.
That is the point of view that has tried to develop in the treatment of immigration in this work.
Immigration is included in these projections by two very contrasting assumptions. In the first remains indefinitely fixed annual quota. In the second scenario considers immigration as a variable adjustment of imbalances caused by certain demographic.
The annual quota of immigrant inflows is being official policy for several years, although no actual entries are closely related to the objectives set. In all three variants covered include the entry of 30,000 immigrants each year throughout the projection period. This is to mark the new Spanish reality that, in any case, continues welcoming immigrants.
To develop the second course were included in the variant projection for the lowest level of fertility and hence lower growth, additional entries of immigrants who depend on a target demographic considered each year. We have chosen, for example, by posing as immigration policy objective that, when the end of a year is observed to have decreased the potential workforce entry is allowed during the following year, an additional number of immigrants enough to offset the observed decrease.
The above rule is a very simplified version of what could be an immigration policy aimed at correcting imbalances basic labor market, and only intended to provide an approximate quantification of the potential consequences of recent trends and plausible future stages: increased immigration.
Specifically, the model projects, to January 1 of each year, the number of people aged 16-64 years and compared with the previous year at the same date. Negative differences are offset by immigrant inflows, with a minimum of 30,000, corresponding to the annual quota. For this simulation takes into account the age composition of immigrants differs from that of the Spanish population in the initial year. Among immigrants, the proportion of youth is somewhat lower and is significantly lower than for over 65 years. By contrast, the proportion of working age is clearly superior to that of the Spanish population. The model implies that immigrants of working age are accompanied by young and old and therefore the total number of admitted imbalance is greater than it is solving. The formulation of the objective introduces a delay of one year between the onset of the imbalance and the adoption of the remedy, which explains that not prevent the potentially active population decline over time. It can, therefore, considered that the projected numbers of immigrants represent a minimum estimate, which also supports compensation increase participation rates. The course of maintaining the population of working age in the 1998 level inputs immigrants mean higher, peaking at more than 450,000 per year around 2040.
The future evolution of the population is strongly influenced by the current age structure, in turn reflects the checkered history Spain has experienced demographic. This explains the irregularity of the necessary entries. Also one of the least appreciated aspects of demographic imbalances are irregularities between effective next generations causing imbalances induced at different stages that cover individuals (schooling, entering or leaving the labor market, etc..).
However it may seem elementary ideas, the results allow us to appreciate the importance of migration flows needed in the case being considered demographic imbalances solution of a given country. Necessary inputs exceed the minimum quota only sporadically until 2015, but from that time evolution is growing, with significant irregularities as already mentioned, to a maximum of 202,000 in 2042.

- Results of the projection
The assumptions on the components of population dynamics have combined to form three scenarios. The first variant combines low fertility (1.5 children per woman by 2021) and the maintenance of a reduced migratory balance, equivalent to the current quota (30,000 annually). The other two scenarios are formed with the highest fertility variant (1.7 children per woman by 2021), in a case with a reduced migratory balance equivalent to current quota (30,000 per year) and the other with more input streams important, determined by an immigration policy to offset demographic imbalances. Not seen any course of fertility decline below current levels because, firstly, it is considered less likely and the other, the long-term persistence of declining fertility problems pose to our society such that it would unrealistic to project into the future maintenance of existing social protection systems, for example.
The purpose of these projections is to contribute to long-term analysis. For this reason we have chosen to simulate scenarios and to maintain, in the short term, a single hypothesis of evolution of most important variable is fertility.
In the three scenarios the total population increases in the early years but just decreasing, reaching figures in 2050 are very different in each case.
In the worst case of population growth, low fertility and net migration reduced the population increases and decreases after 2020. In 2050 just over 34 million, almost 5 million fewer than in 2000. The population is less than the current from 2030.
On stage with high immigration and fertility somewhat higher than in the previous (Alternative A without adjustment for immigration) the initial population increase lasts until 2014 and ends with a population of 36 million, 2 million above the previous (attributable therefore the difference in fertility) and almost three million below the current level. The population is less than the current from 2036.
On stage with higher fertility and significant immigration flows, the population increases and decreases steadily until 2017 to finish, one million less than in 1998, still below the current from 2045.
According to the hypotheses, scenarios differ mainly in the long run, when the evolution of fertility dominates. This is to draw attention to the changes in the structure of the population, largely conditioned by the structure of the population, in the short term, and the level of fertility, in the longer term.
The aging population is growing in all projection assumptions. In the short and medium term is mainly determined by the current age structure. In the longer term, there are differences, but they all maintained the upward trend in the proportion of older people and deteriorating dependency ratio (ratio of the retirement-age population and the working age population).
According to the hypotheses, the proportion of people 65 and older, estimated at 16% in 1998, in any case exceed 30% in 2050 from 33% in the case of low fertility and low immigration. The spread between the scenarios is very open and immigration, to be achieved over the projection period levels much higher than today, does not have a big impact on the final proportion of older people. In the case of a quota limited immigration to fall in total between 1998 and 2050, 1.6 million immigrants and the proportion of older people would be 33.2%. On stage with a much higher immigration, total inflows of 5.8 billion in the period 1998-2050, the ratio would be 30.8%. The dependency ratio continues to develop in parallel with the above, from 23.6% in 1998 to between 54.8% and 61.5% in 2050.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS
As we know, in the future 2050 the Spanish population will be most of all an old population, a country where the number of young people that will have to take care of the old population will be lower than the number of people that have to be maintained, this phenomenon is known as the inversed pyramid, and this will bring some consequences:
-Spending on social benefits
The protective benefit expenditure are social transfers to households, in cash or in kind, intended to relieve the financial burden for they cover a number of risks or needs and carried through or collectively organized systems, outside these systems, units government and by the Non-profit institutions serving Household.
This is something that will be highly increased if we have a majority of old population.

-Health expenditures
The process of aging that is occurring in developed societies is a major challenge for the health system, not only because the per capita health spending increases with age, but also because it involves a change in the character of the demanded attention and care.
Therefore challenges arise that the health system is brought before the unstoppable process of aging, which is the service coverage. In the case of Spain, which will soon become the country of the European Union with the highest proportion of elderly, the hospital network seems insufficient to meet the health needs of a growing population group.

-Disability
Disability is another question that afflicts many of the oldest people. The disabilities increases with age, causing the third dependent suffer for performing the activities of daily living, such as household chores, travel within and / or outside the home and personal care, among other questions every day.

-Social exclusion of old people
Social exclusion is another problem that affects the elderly group. The process of social exclusion in developed countries is largely determined by access to the labor market or not.
The ability to have a job, to keep and collect benefits, whether economic as salary, such as social prestige or recognition, or psychological and self-esteem or a sense of belonging to a group, enables full integration of the individuals in society. Thus, individuals who remain outside the workplace, such as retirees, early retirees, the disabled and immigrants become excluded or potentially excluded groups.

-Retirement pensions
The other element in dispute in relation to the aging process is the pension. Since some sectors has sounded the alarm at the inability to pay pensions in a society where supposedly the number of workers could be lower than beneficiaries.
Predictably the number of pensions retirement will increase in coming years, while the widow continue a downward trend. In a short-term future, the group of pensioners will draw increasingly on women who have played a paid job outside the home, and the possibility of choice will choose to receive a retirement pension, as the average amount they are higher than those of widowhood (about 625 euros per month, averaged for retirement compared to 398 euros a month for widows).
Another change which will occur in relation to the composition of the population retired and closely linked to the educational level is that of the profession. At present, the majority of retirees have played jobs that require no qualifications, such as agriculture, mining, construction and domestic service, among others. This feature of the retired population in the medium term remains unchanged, as will enter retirement age people with a profession that requires a higher qualification and will guarantee a higher pension.
The increase in the proportion of elderly population and the consequent changes in social policies that this will lead, make from many sectors of society is contended that population aging could lead to a destabilization of the Social Security System and the crisis of the welfare state. This concern of the misconception that the aging of the population leads to a decrease of the potential workforce, and not a decline in young dependent population, as they really think it happens.

PERSONAL OPINION
Pension forecast made at 2050 show a reality somewhat different to that from some political, economic and social being given the aging process. While we can not forget that the increased volume of population over 65 years carries economic implications, the data show that it is not expected to occur as designated crisis of the welfare state. The social, economic and political changes that the aging process required, must be based not so much on the numerical increase of the population, such as the change in the age structure of the Spanish population. The traditionally substantial public funds to cover the needs of young people in the future should be reduced because the number of young people will be less, so that these funds should be passed to meet the needs of another group of people, the elderly. The prospect must start from the aging of the population leads to a change in the age structure of the population. The needs were a priority in the past socially, such as health and education of children and youth in the future could be reduced since the volume young population will fall, so states could address the needs demanded by the elderly population.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• ARCE, E. y BETÉS, F. (2007): El mayor activo. Almuzara.

• CANTALAPIEDRA, M. (2003): «Las proyecciones de la población de España»; en Sistema

• FERNÁNDEZ CORDÓN, J. A. (2003): «El futuro demográfico de España»; en Sistema

• INE (2005): Proyecciones de población a largo plazo. Periodo 2002-2060 (resultados nacionales) y periodo 2002-2017 (resultados por Comunidades Autónomas y provincias).

• INE (2009): Proyecciones de población a corto plazo. Serie 2008-2018.

• PUYOL, R (2006): «Estructura demográfica de la población española. Un ejercicio de prospectiva»; en PUYOL, R. y ABELLÁN, A.: Envejecimiento y dependencia, Madrid

• PUYOL, R. (2008): «El envejecimiento de la población y sus repercusiones sobre el mercado de trabajo»; en Revista del Instituto de Estudios Económicos (2-3).

• ZAMORA, F. (2005): «La España que viene»; en Papeles de Economía española.

Bibliography: • ARCE, E. y BETÉS, F. (2007): El mayor activo. Almuzara. • CANTALAPIEDRA, M. (2003): «Las proyecciones de la población de España»; en Sistema • FERNÁNDEZ CORDÓN, J. A. (2003): «El futuro demográfico de España»; en Sistema • INE (2005): Proyecciones de población a largo plazo. Periodo 2002-2060 (resultados nacionales) y periodo 2002-2017 (resultados por Comunidades Autónomas y provincias). • INE (2009): Proyecciones de población a corto plazo. Serie 2008-2018. • PUYOL, R (2006): «Estructura demográfica de la población española. Un ejercicio de prospectiva»; en PUYOL, R. y ABELLÁN, A.: Envejecimiento y dependencia, Madrid • PUYOL, R. (2008): «El envejecimiento de la población y sus repercusiones sobre el mercado de trabajo»; en Revista del Instituto de Estudios Económicos (2-3). • ZAMORA, F. (2005): «La España que viene»; en Papeles de Economía española.