• (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
• (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm;
• (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and
• (4) that party's …show more content…
Sclafani’s case depends upon whether a special relationship existed between Ms. Sclafani and representatives of the municipality.
In Applewhite v. Accuhealth, when the plaintiff suffered anaphylactic shock, her mother called 911. Two EMTs arrived and the mother requested that her daughter be brought to a nearby hospital immediately (the hospital was only 4 minutes away). However, the EMTs advised the mother that she should wait for an Advanced Life Support ambulance; the plaintiff’s mother did wait, but the ALS ambulance did not arrive until 20 minutes later; the plaintiff survived, but suffered significant brain damage.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant should have transported the infant plaintiff to the hospital immediately rather than waiting an additional 20 minutes for the ALS ambulance to effectuate transport. The court held that defendant's actions were ministerial and the special relationship doctrine did apply, citing “[the] quintessential purpose of the municipal ambulance system is transporting the patient to the hospital as quickly as possible. Thus, defendant's poor advice and failure to transport is much closer to the performance of a government function than to the proprietary act of a medical provider caring for a patient.” Ultimately, the court’s analysis focused on the fourth element of the special relationship test, in which it found that the mother justifiably relied on the EMS technicians who had taken control of the emergency …show more content…
City of New York, the court held that that city was not liable for an ambulance personnel’s purported negligence because no special relationship existed between it and the decedent. There, the plaintiff’s decedent was barely breathing when he suffered an asthma attack in his apartment, which prompted a 911 call. The decedent regained consciousness and became combative after paramedics placed him on a cardiac monitor, started IV fluids, intubated him and prepared him for transport. The decedent was administered a sedative for the purpose of calming him down and transporting him to the ambulance, however, he suffered cardiac arrest on the way to the hospital and subsequently died a few days