Phil 100B
Paper #2
In Spinoza's ethics he provides eight definitions as well as seven axioms at the very beginning of his work. These definitions and axioms are set up in a way in which Spinoza can formulate arguments for the proof of the propositions he later presents. One of the definitions I found surprising was the fourth one, which states “By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.” (pg. 31 Spinoza),which is found in the beginning of Spinoza's ethics. Based off his definition it can be found that it is not completely clear as to what Spinoza's exactly defining because it could be taken in either one of two ways. The first being whether attributes are really the ways substances are or the second interpretation that attributes are simply ways to understand substances in a general sense, but not necessarily the way in which they really are. For Spinoza he believes that there are an infinite number of attributes, but there are two attributes for which he thinks we can have knowledge of; Thought and extension.
The definition provided should be changed to clarify his meaning as this nominal definition is later used in definition six as well as in Proposition ten which is subsequently needed for one of the key proposition's in question(fourteen). I think the most surprising part of the definition is the way in which he uses the word intellect. For the intellect is one of the limited attributes we have access to, yet the intellect perceives substance, which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Spinoza could change the definition to show the correspondence between ideas and reality in a more clear fashion;however, he does not do so specifically for the reason that the definition ought to be put this way in order to prove later propositions. I question why intellect is the special thing that which percieves of substance, when intellect is simply part of one attribute that we comprehend;