Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends
Updated August 31, 2008
Yule Kim Legislative Attorney American Law Division
Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends
Summary
The Supreme Court has expressed an interest “that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.” This report identifies and describes some of the more important rules and conventions of interpretation that the Court applies. Although this report focuses primarily on the Court’s methodology in construing statutory text, the Court’s approach to reliance on legislative history are also briefly described. In analyzing a statute’s text, the Court is guided by the basic principle that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purpose. The various canons of interpretation and presumptions as to substantive results are usually subordinated to interpretations that further a clearly expressed congressional purpose. The Court frequently relies on “canons” of construction to draw inferences about the meaning of statutory language. For example, in considering the meaning of particular words and phrases, the Court distinguishes between terms of art that may have specialized meanings and other words that are ordinarily given a dictionary definition. Other canons direct that all words of a statute be given effect if possible, that a term used more than once in a statute should ordinarily be given the same meaning throughout, and that specific statutory language ordinarily trumps conflicting general language. “Ordinarily” is a necessary caveat, since any of these “canons” gives way if context reveals an evident contrary meaning. Not infrequently the Court stacks the deck, and subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory